NJACPE August 8, 1985

Can a municipal prosecutor's law firm privately represent the same municipality's judge, or take fee-sharing referrals of the judge's negligence cases?

Short answer: No. Both the municipal prosecutor's firm representing that municipality's judge in private matters and accepting fee-sharing referrals of the judge's negligence cases are improper, because the financial nexus creates an unacceptable appearance of impropriety.

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Currency note: this opinion is from 1985
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Plain-English summary

The Committee was asked two questions: (a) whether a municipal prosecutor's law firm may represent the private interests of the same municipality's judge, even if limited to real estate matters in a different jurisdiction; and (b) whether the same firm may accept referrals and handle the judge's pending negligence cases, sharing fees with the judge based on services actually performed. The Committee observed that an obvious financial nexus permeates both situations.

Drawing on its long-standing instruction that attorneys must avoid not only impropriety but the appearance of impropriety (Opinion 8, 86 N.J.L.J. 718 (1963); ABA Opinion 49 (1931); Opinion 189, 93 N.J.L.J. 189 (1970), which called avoiding even the appearance of wrongdoing "perhaps the most demanding precept of professional discipline"), the Committee reasoned that lawyers do not practice in a vacuum and that the profession operates amid diminished public confidence in its integrity. It concluded that the proposed monetary relationship between the judge and the municipal prosecutor's firm raises an unnecessary and unacceptable appearance of impropriety, and that the potential undermining of public confidence outweighs the judge's preference to obtain representation and referral fees from the prosecutor's firm. The Committee held that both active representation of the judge in personal matters and the handling of negligence referrals by that firm would be improper.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 1985, before New Jersey's adoption of the 2004 revisions to the Rules of Professional Conduct (which abolished the freestanding "appearance of impropriety" standard the Committee applied here). Subsequent rule amendments or later opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current guidance. Verify against current rules before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or requirement mentioned here.

Common questions

Q: Can a municipal prosecutor's firm privately represent the municipal judge it appears before?

A: No. The opinion held that active representation of the judge in personal matters by the prosecutor's firm would be improper because of the appearance of impropriety the financial nexus creates.

Q: Does it matter that the private work is real estate in another jurisdiction?

A: No. The opinion treated the limited, out-of-jurisdiction nature of the representation as not curing the problem; the monetary relationship itself was the concern.

Q: Can the firm take fee-sharing referrals of the judge's negligence cases?

A: No. The opinion held the handling of the judge's negligence referrals by the prosecutor's firm, with fees shared with the judge, would also be improper.

Background and rules framework

The opinion applies New Jersey's appearance-of-impropriety doctrine to the financial relationship between a municipal prosecutor's firm and the municipal judge before whom it appears. It builds on earlier opinions addressing the interrelationships among municipal judges, municipal prosecutors, and county assistant prosecutors, including Opinion 359 and its supplement.

Citations and references

Other opinions cited:

  • ACPE Opinion 8, 86 N.J.L.J. 718 (1963) (avoid the appearance of impropriety)
  • ACPE Opinion 189, 93 N.J.L.J. 189 (1970) (appearance of wrongdoing as a demanding precept)
  • ACPE Opinion 359, 99 N.J.L.J. 1153 (1976), and Opinion 359 (Supplement), 100 N.J.L.J. 417 (1977) (municipal judge / prosecutor interrelationships)
  • ABA Committee on Professional Ethics, Opinion 49 (1931)

See also

Source

Original opinion text

Reproduced from a full-text mirror of the official opinion for research purposes. The linked official source controls.

116 N.J.L.J. 203, August 8, 1985

OPINION 563

Conflict of Interest - Municipal Prosecutor's Law Firm Representing Municipal Judge: and Accepting Referrals from Judge in Unrelated Actions

Questions relative to the inter-relationships among municipal judges, municipal prosecutors, and county assistant prosecutors were previously considered by this Committee in Opinion 359, 99 N.J.L.J. 1153 (1976) and by a later supplement, Opinion 359 (Supplement), 100 N.J.L.J. 417 (1977).

We are now asked:

(a) May a municipal prosecutor's law firm represent the private interests of the same municipality's judge, even if representation is limited to real estate matters in a different jurisdiction?

(b) May the same firm accept referrals and assume the handling of that judge's pending negligence cases wherein fees will be shared with the judge on the basis of services actually performed?

An obvious financial nexus permeates both situations.

We have often emphasized that attorneys should not only avoid all impropriety, but should likewise avoid the appearance of impropriety. Opinion 8, 86 N.J.L.J. 718 (1963). Cf. American Bar Association Committee on Professional Ethics, Opinion 49 (1931) and our Opinion 189, 93 N.J.L.J. 189 (1970). In the latter, we characterized avoidance of not only "actual wrong doing, but even the appearance of wrong doing" as "perhaps the most demanding precept of professional discipline."

Lawyers do not practice in a vacuum. There are obvious and totally appropriate personal and social relationships which exist among us, but we practice in a climate of unfortunately diminished public confidence in the integrity of our profession.

The monetary relationship which is proposed here between the judge and the municipal prosecutor's firm raises an unnecessary and unacceptable appearance of impropriety.

The potential undermining of confidence in our profession outweighs the personal predilection of the judge to secure representation and referral fees from the municipal prosecutor's law firm. We hold that not only active representation by the prosecutor's firm on behalf of the judge in personal matters but also the handling of negligence referrals by that firm would be improper.

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