Does the rule barring a municipal judge from political activity also bar his law partners and associates, and is the judge's dual role as school board attorney an ethics question for the committee?

Plain-English summary

The inquirer was a partner in a four-lawyer firm and served as attorney for the board of education of a regional high school district; one partner was the county surrogate, and the inquirer was being considered for appointment as a municipal court judge in one of the district's municipalities. He first asked whether serving as municipal court judge would conflict with his role as board attorney, and whether disqualifying himself as judge when the board needed to appear in his court would resolve it.

The Committee held that this first question was not an ethical inquiry within its jurisdiction under R. 1:19-2, but a substantive question of dual office-holding within the competence of the judiciary itself, citing R. 1:17-1(a), Schear v. City of Elizabeth, and Reilly v. Assured. It did no more than suggest the inquirer seek the approval contemplated by R. 1:17-1, under which a judge may not, without prior written appraisal of the Supreme Court requested through the Administrative Director of the Courts, hold any other public office, position, or employment.

The inquirer's second question was whether the R. 1:17-1 prohibition against engaging in politics would apply to his partners and associates if he were appointed. The Committee noted that R. 1:17-1(a) bars a judge from holding elective public office, being a candidate, or engaging in political activity, but that no part of R. 1:17 extends the prohibition to partners or associates, and unlike R. 1:15-4 there was no rule overcoming that omission. It held that the political-activity prohibition would not automatically apply to the inquirer's partners or associate, but cautioned that a partner or associate could not properly assume a governmental post incompatible with the judge's duties, and that any partner or associate active in politics had to conduct himself so that no suspicion could arise that the judge's judicial activities might be influenced by the political preferences of that partner or associate, citing In re Hayden.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 1976, before New Jersey's adoption of the 2004 revisions to the Rules of Professional Conduct, and predates the 1984 replacement of the Disciplinary Rules by the RPCs. It turns on versions of Rules 1:17 and 1:19 governing judges and the Committee's jurisdiction that have since been amended, and judicial conduct is now governed by the Code of Judicial Conduct. Treat this page as historical context, not current guidance. Verify against current rules before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or requirement mentioned here.

Common questions

Q: Does a municipal judge's ban on politics reach his law partners?

A: Under this opinion, not automatically. The Committee held R. 1:17-1's political-activity ban does not extend to partners or associates, since no rule says it does.

Q: Did the Committee decide whether the judge could also be the board attorney?

A: No. It held that dual-office question was for the judiciary, not the Committee, and suggested seeking R. 1:17-1 approval.

Q: What limit applies to a politically active partner?

A: The partner must avoid conduct creating any suspicion that the judge's judicial activities could be influenced by the partner's political preferences, and may not take a post incompatible with the judge's duties.

Background and rules framework

The opinion construed R. 1:17-1 (restrictions on judges, including political activity) and R. 1:19-2 (the Committee's jurisdiction), declining the dual-office question and confining the political-activity bar to the judge himself. In current New Jersey terms, conflict questions are analyzed under RPC 1.7 and judicial conduct under the Code of Judicial Conduct.

Citations and references

Rules of Professional Conduct:

• R. 1:17-1(a) (judge may not hold other public office or engage in political activity without Supreme Court appraisal) and R. 1:19-2 (Committee jurisdiction), as in effect 1976
• Conflict principles now under MR 1.7 / NJ RPC 1.7; judicial conduct now under the Code of Judicial Conduct

Cases:

• Schear v. City of Elizabeth, 41 N.J. 321, 325-329 (1964)
• Reilly v. Assured, 33 N.J. 529 (1960)
• In re Hayden, 41 N.J. 443, 445 (1964)

See also

• NJ ACPE Op. 375: Judge Sitting Where Counsel Is the Brother of His Partner
• NJ ACPE Op. 376: Office Relationship of a Municipal Magistrate and a School Board Solicitor
• NJ ACPE Op. 359 (Supplement): A Judge Sharing an Office With a Prosecutor

Source

• Full text (Justia mirror): https://law.justia.com/cases/new-jersey/advisory-committee-on-professional-ethics/2004/acp345-1.html
• Issuing authority: New Jersey Supreme Court Advisory Committee on Professional Ethics, via the NJ Courts Supreme Court Committees page

Original opinion text

Reproduced from a full-text mirror of the official opinion for research purposes. The linked official source controls.

99 N.J.L.J. 714, August 12, 1976

OPINION 345

Municipal Judge Serving as School Board Attorney; Associates Participating in Politics

The inquirer is a partner in a law firm consisting of three partners and one associate. He serves as the attorney for the board of education of a regional high school district, which is an elected autonomous body. One of his partners serves as surrogate of the county which includes the municipalities comprising the regional district. The inquirer is being considered for appointment by the borough council of one of the municipalities included within the regional district as judge of the municipal court.

1. Under these circumstances the inquirer asks whether his serving as municipal court judge would conflict with his position as board attorney for the regional school district. If so, may the matter be resolved by his disqualifying himself as judge when the board finds it necessary to file charges or appear in the municipal court?

This question is not an ethical inquiry within the jurisdiction of this Committee, R. 1:19-2, but a substantive question of dual office-holding within the competence of the judiciary itself. See R. 1:17-1(a); Schear v. City of Elizabeth, 41 N.J. 321, 325-329 (1964); Reilly v. Assured, 33 N.J. 529, 536, 541-543, 548-550 (1960). Therefore, we do no more than to suggest that the inquirer request the approval contemplated by R. 1:17-1 which provides that a judge may not "without prior written appraisal of the Supreme Court, requested through the Administrative Director of the Courts, hold any other public office, position or employment."

2. The inquirer also asks whether the prohibition contained in R. 1:17-1 against engaging in politics would apply to his partners and associates if he were so appointed.

R. 1:17-1(a) provides that a judge "shall not hold any elective public office nor be a candidate therefor, nor engage in political activity...." No part of R. 1:17 purports to extend this prohibition to partners or associates. We think that if the Supreme Court had intended any such extension, it would have said so. Cf. R: 1:15-4. There is no other court rule or other authority which overcomes the effect of this significant omission. Accordingly, we hold that if the inquirer is appointed municipal judge, the prohibition against engaging in politics contained in R. 1:17-1(a) would not automatically apply to his partners or his associate. However, this is not to say that a partner or associate, as a result of his political activity or otherwise, could ever properly assume a governmental post, the duties of which would be incompatible with the duties of the inquirer as municipal judge. See cases cited in discussion of first question, supra. And any partner or associate participating in politics would have so to conduct himself that no suspicion could arise that the inquirer's judicial activities might be influenced by the political preferences of such partner or associate. See In re Hayden, 41 N.J. 443, 445 (1964).