Can a lawyer advertise under a trade name without the lawyer's own name, and charge a contingent fee to collect overdue child support or alimony?

Plain-English summary

A lawyer wanted to advertise post-judgment domestic-relations enforcement services (collecting overdue child support, alimony, and property-settlement amounts, and enforcing paternity orders) under a trade name that would not include the lawyer's own name, offering contingent fees to clients who could not afford hourly rates. The Committee was asked whether the lawyer could advertise under a trade name without the lawyer's name, whether the trade name "Support Collection Group" was unethical, and whether a contingent fee was allowed in these post-judgment matters.

The opinion concluded that, under MRPC 7.5(a) and 7.2(a), a lawyer may advertise under a trade name that omits the lawyer's own name, so long as it does not violate MRPC 7.1 (no false, misleading, or deceptive content) and does not imply a connection with a government agency or a public or charitable legal services organization (citing RI-16). On the specific name, the opinion observed that "Group" implies more than one lawyer, so if only one lawyer is available the name is misleading and violates MRPC 7.1; whether the name was otherwise misleading depended on facts the Committee could not find.

On fees, the opinion explained that MRPC 1.5(d) bars contingent fees in domestic relations matters because such fees could discourage counseling toward reconciliation. But the Committee had repeatedly held that rationale does not apply post-judgment, once a divorce judgment is entered and reconciliation is generally no longer a constraint (citing RI-28, RI-127, RI-198, RI-204). The opinion concluded that a contingent fee for post-judgment enforcement is not unethical where it is the only practical means for the client to pursue the claim, the fee is reasonable, any court-awarded fees are credited against it, and the agreement is in writing under MRPC 1.5(c) and MCR 8.121(F).

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 1994, before later amendments to the Michigan Rules of Professional Conduct. The State Bar notes the opinion has been superseded in part by the addition of MRPC 7.2(d). MRPC 7.1, 7.2, 7.5, and 1.5 have also been amended since, and subsequent rule changes or later opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current guidance. Verify against current rules before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or requirement mentioned here.

Common questions

Q: Can a lawyer advertise under a trade name without listing the lawyer's own name?

A: Yes. The opinion concluded a lawyer may, under MRPC 7.5(a) and 7.2(a), as long as the name is not misleading and does not imply a government or charitable connection.

Q: Why might "Support Collection Group" be a problem?

A: The opinion concluded the word "Group" implies more than one lawyer, so if only one lawyer is available the name is misleading under MRPC 7.1.

Q: Can a lawyer charge a contingent fee to collect overdue child support or alimony?

A: Yes, post-judgment. The opinion concluded the MRPC 1.5(d) bar (rooted in not discouraging reconciliation) does not apply once a divorce judgment is entered, so a reasonable written contingent fee is allowed where it is the only practical means to pursue the claim.

Q: What conditions attach to such a contingent fee?

A: The opinion required that it be the only practical means for the client to pursue the claim, be reasonable, credit any court-awarded fees against it, and be in writing under MRPC 1.5(c) and MCR 8.121(F).

Background and rules framework

The opinion applied Michigan's advertising and fee rules. MRPC 7.1 (Model Rule 7.1) bars misleading communications; MRPC 7.2(a) (Model Rule 7.2) permits advertising; MRPC 7.5(a) (Model Rule 7.5) governs firm and trade names. MRPC 1.5(c) and (d) (Model Rule 1.5) govern written contingent fees and the domestic-relations contingent-fee bar. The opinion relied on RI-16 (trade names) and RI-28, RI-127, RI-198, and RI-204 (post-judgment domestic-relations contingent fees), and on MCR 8.121.

Citations and references

Rules of Professional Conduct:

• MR 1.5 / MRPC 1.5(c), (d) (written contingent fees; domestic-relations bar)
• MR 7.1 / MRPC 7.1 (truthful communications)
• MR 7.2 / MRPC 7.2(a) (advertising permitted)
• MR 7.5 / MRPC 7.5 (firm and trade names)

Court rules:

• MCR 8.121 (contingent fees in certain domestic-relations matters)

Other opinions cited:

• Michigan RI-16: trade-name advertising
• Michigan RI-28, RI-127, RI-198, RI-204: post-judgment domestic-relations contingent fees

See also

• Mich Ethics Op. RI-169: targeted direct-mail letter to newcomers
• Mich Ethics Op. RI-167: referrals and advertising through an inventor-protection group
• Mich Ethics Op. R-11: contingent-fee obligation to appeal and additional fee

Source

• Landing page: https://www.michbar.org/opinions/ethics/numbered_opinions?OpinionID=1091&Type=6

Original opinion text

Reproduced from the official source for research purposes. The linked source is authoritative.

NOTE: This opinion has been superseded in part by the addition of MRPC 7.2(d)

RI-221

October 13, 1994

SYLLABUS

A lawyer may place an advertisement offering legal services under a trade name and that does not include the lawyer's own name.

A lawyer may represent a client in post-judgment enforcement of child support, alimony, and property settlement provisions of divorce judgments and paternity orders on a contingent fee basis, where a contingent fee is the only practical means by which the client can pursue the claim, the contingent fee is reasonable, and any court awarded fees are credited against the contingent fee.

References: MRPC 1.5(c) and (d), 7.1, 7.2(a), 7.5; RI-16, RI-28, RI-127, RI-198, RI-204.

TEXT

A lawyer is considering placing an advertisement offering legal services regarding the post-judgment enforcement of child support, alimony, and property settlement provisions of divorce judgments, and paternity orders. The law firm name is a trade name, and the lawyer's name would not appear in the advertisement. Prospective clients unable to afford representation on an hourly basis would be informed of the ability to enter into a contingent fee arrangement. The Committee is asked:

• Whether the lawyer may advertise legal services under a trade name without including the lawyer's own name in the advertisement?

• Whether the trade name "Support Collection Group," when used in an advertisement offering post-judgment domestic relations enforcement services, is unethical?

• Whether the lawyer may charge a contingent fee in post-judgment domestic relations matters?

MRPC 7.5(a) states:

"(a) A lawyer shall not use a firm name, letterhead or other professional designation that violates Rule 7.1. A trade name may be used by a lawyer in private practice if it does not imply a connection with a government agency or with a public or charitable legal services organization and it is not otherwise in violation of Rule 7.1."

MRPC 7.1 states:

"A lawyer may, on the lawyer's own behalf, on behalf of a partner or associate, or on behalf of any other lawyer affiliated with the lawyer or the lawyer's law firm, use or participate in the use of any form of public communication that is not false, fraudulent, misleading, or deceptive. A communication shall not:

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"(a) contain a material misrepresentation of fact or law, or omit a fact necessary to make the statement considered as a whole not materially misleading;

"(b) be likely to create an unjustified expectation about results the lawyer can achieve, or state or imply that the lawyer can achieve results by means that violate the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law; or

"(c) compare the lawyers' services with other lawyers' services, unless the comparison can be factually substantiated."

MRPC 7.2(a) states:

"(a) Subject to the provisions of these rules, a lawyer may advertise."

Therefore, absent any violation of MRPC 7.1 or 7.5, a lawyer may place an advertisement offering legal services under a trade name that, in and of itself, does not include the lawyer's own name. See RI-16.

Regarding the firm name, we note that the term "Group" in the firm name infers more than one lawyer is available. If that is not the case, the name is misleading and violates MRPC 7.1. Whether or not the proposed trade name "Support Collection Group" is otherwise false, fraudulent, misleading, or deceptive, is based upon facts not provided in this inquiry. The Committee is not a fact-finder.

Clearly, the proposed advertised trade name must not only comply with the provisions of MRPC 7.1, but also the provisions of MRPC 7.5, inasmuch as it must not imply a connection with a government agency or with a public or charitable legal services organization. MRPC 1.5(c) and (d) state:

"(c) A fee may be contingent on the outcome of the matter for which the service is rendered, except in a matter in which a contingent-fee is prohibited by paragraph (d) or by other law. A contingent- fee agreement shall be in writing and shall state the method by which the fee is to be determined. Upon conclusion of a contingent- fee matter, the lawyer shall provide the client with a written statement of the outcome of the matter and, if there is a recovery, show the remittance to the client and method of its determination. See MCR 8.121.

"(d) A lawyer shall not enter into an arrangement for, charge, or collect a contingent fee in a domestic relations matter or in a criminal matter."

The rationale behind MRPC 1.5(d) contingent fee prohibition in domestic relations matters stems from the premise that if a lawyer were permitted to charge a contingent fee on the amount recovered for a client in a divorce case, the lawyer would be less inclined to counsel the client regarding reconciliation. However, that prohibition is not absolute. The Committee on several occasions has opined that the rationale behind MRPC 1.5(d) was not applicable to post-judgment domestic relations matters. Once a judgment of divorce has been entered, reconciliation is generally no longer an ethical constraint. See RI-28, RI-127, RI-198, RI-204

It is not unethical for a lawyer to undertake representation of a client regarding the post-judgment enforcement of child support, alimony, and property settlement provisions of divorce judgments, and paternity orders, on a contingent fee basis, where a contingent fee is the only practical means by which the client can pursue the claim, the contingent fee is reasonable, and any court awarded fees are credited against the contingent fee. Furthermore, the arrangement must be in writing pursuant to MRPC 1.5(c) and MCR 8.121(F).