Can a Kentucky lawyer borrow money to cover a client's litigation costs, pass the loan interest on to the client, and pledge the contingent fee as collateral?

Plain-English summary

A lawyer handling contingent fee cases asked three questions: whether the lawyer may borrow from a lending institution to cover litigation expenses, whether the lawyer may pass the loan interest and related fees on to the client by deducting them from the recovery, and whether the lawyer may give the lender a security interest in the contingent fee. The Committee answered yes, yes (subject to cautions), and no.

On borrowing, the Committee read Rule 1.8(e), which permits a lawyer to advance court costs and litigation expenses, as not prohibiting borrowing those funds from a lender, so long as the lawyer guards against the lender improperly influencing the case and against disclosure of client confidences under Rule 1.6; tying the loan to a line of credit rather than a specific case reduces those risks. On charging interest, the Committee, following KBA E-216, treated interest as a further litigation expense that may be charged to the client, but stressed that once an advance becomes an interest-bearing loan it takes on the character of a business transaction under Rule 1.8(a). That requires terms fair and reasonable to the client, full written disclosure the client can understand, a reasonable opportunity to consult independent counsel, and the client's written consent. Because this was a contingent fee case, Rule 1.5(c) also required a written agreement explaining how interest is calculated, that interest and loan expenses are deducted as litigation expenses, whether the contingent percentage is computed before or after those deductions, and whether the duty to repay depends on the outcome; Rules 1.4 and 1.5 also required keeping the client informed and providing a written closing statement.

On the security interest, the Committee answered no. Pledging the prospective contingent fee in a specific case as collateral creates a conflict that threatens the lawyer's independent judgment under Rules 1.7 through 1.12: a lender could pressure the lawyer to conclude the case to turn an unearned fee expectancy into an earned fee, and a creditor that deemed itself insecure could accelerate the loan and force a quick conclusion or a transfer of the case. The Committee concluded it would be unethical for a lawyer to borrow funds to pay litigation expenses in a particular case and grant the lender a security interest in the lawyer's contingent fee.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 2002 and predates the Kentucky Supreme Court's substantial 2009 revisions to the Rules of Professional Conduct (SCR 3.130), under which several cited rules were amended or renumbered, including the amendment requiring contingent fee contracts to be in writing and signed by the client. The Kentucky Bar Association notes that lawyers should consult the current version of the rules before relying on this opinion. Treat this page as historical context, not current guidance. Verify against the current rules before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or requirement mentioned here.

Common questions

Q: Can a Kentucky lawyer borrow money from a bank to cover a client's litigation costs?

A: Per the opinion, yes. The Committee read Rule 1.8(e) as not prohibiting borrowing to fund litigation expenses, provided the lawyer guards against lender influence over the case and protects client confidences under Rule 1.6.

Q: Can the lawyer charge the client the interest on that loan?

A: The opinion concluded yes, treating interest as a further litigation expense, but only with the Rule 1.8(a) business-transaction safeguards (fair terms, written disclosure, a chance to consult independent counsel, written consent) and a Rule 1.5(c) contingent fee agreement spelling out how interest is charged and deducted.

Q: Can the lawyer pledge the contingent fee to the lender as collateral?

A: Per the opinion, no. The Committee concluded that giving a lender a security interest in the contingent fee in a particular case creates pressure that threatens the lawyer's independent judgment, making it unethical.

Q: Does it matter whether the loan is tied to a specific case?

A: The opinion noted the risks of lender influence and breach of confidentiality are substantially reduced when the loan is a general line of credit rather than tied to one case.

Background and rules framework

The opinion interprets Rule 1.8(e) (advancing litigation expenses) and Rule 1.8(a) (business transactions with clients), Rule 1.5(c) (contingent fee agreements), Rule 1.4 (client communication), Rule 1.6 (confidentiality), and the conflict-of-interest rules 1.7 through 1.12, the Model Rule counterparts of each (SCR 3.130). It relies on KBA E-216 and out-of-state authority including Ohio Op. 2001-3 and Chittenden v. State Farm (La. 2001).

Citations and references

Rules of Professional Conduct:

• MR 1.8 / SCR 3.130(1.8)(a), (e) (business transactions; advancing litigation expenses)
• MR 1.5 / SCR 3.130(1.5)(c) (contingent fee agreements)
• MR 1.4 / SCR 3.130(1.4) (client communication)
• MR 1.6 / SCR 3.130(1.6) (confidentiality)
• MR 1.7 / SCR 3.130(1.7) (conflicts of interest; independent judgment)

Cases:

• Chittenden v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 788 So.2d 1140 (La. 2001), litigation-financing arrangements

Other opinions cited:

• KBA E-216 (1979): charging interest on advancements
• Ohio Bd. of Commissioners Op. 2001-3 (2001); Utah Op. 02-01; ABCNY Op. 1997-1: litigation financing
• ABA Formal Op. 93-379 (1993): billing and written statements

See also

• KBA Ethics Op. E-408: Lawyer as Real Estate Sales Agent
• KBA Ethics Op. E-417: Sharing Office Space With Nonlawyers

Source

• Landing page: https://kybar.org/For-Members/Rules-Ethics-Information/Ethics-Opinions
• Original PDF: https://kybar.org/Portals/0/Admin/Ethics%20Opinions/KBA_E-420.pdf

Original opinion text

Reproduced from the official source for research purposes. The linked source is authoritative.

KENTUCKY BAR ASSOCIATION
Ethics Opinion KBA E-420
Issued: November 15, 2002

Since the adoption of the Rules of Professional Conduct in 1990, the Kentucky
Supreme Court has adopted various amendments, and made substantial revisions in
2009. For example, this opinion refers to Rule 1.5, which was amended to require
that contingent fee contracts be in writing, signed by the client. Lawyers should
consult the current version of the rules and comments, SCR 3.130 (available at
http://www.kybar.org), before relying on this opinion.

Subject:

Lawyer Borrowing Litigation Costs and Granting Lender a Security
Interest in Lawyer’s Contingent Fee

Question 1:

May a lawyer who represents a client under a contingent fee contract
borrow funds from a lending institution to cover litigation expenses?

Answer:

Yes, subject to the cautions set forth below.

Question 2:

May the lawyer pass the interest on the loan (along with other related fees)
on to the client by deducting them from the proceeds of a judgment or
settlement before computing the net sum owed to the client?

Answer:

Yes, subject to the cautions set forth below.

Question 3:

May the lawyer give a lender a security interest in the contingent fee in a
particular case?

Answer:

No, for reasons set forth below.

Principal References:
Utah State Bar Ethics Advisory Opinion 02-01 (2002); Ohio Board of
Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline Opinion 2001-3 (2001); Utah State
Bar Ethics Advisory Opinion 97-11 (1997); KBA Ethics Opinions E-216 (1979);
Chittenden v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 788 So.2d 1140 (La.
2001); S.C.R. 3.130 [Kentucky Rules of Professional Conduct], Rules 1.4, 1.5,
1.6, 1.7, 1.8, 5.4.

OPINION
The inquiry before the Committee raises the question of whether, in a contingent fee case,
a lawyer may borrow funds from a lending institution to pay litigation costs. The inquiry raises a
further issue as to whether the lawyer may pass the interest and related loan fees on to the client,

deducting them from the proceeds of the judgment or settlement in the same manner as other
disbursements. The final question raised is whether the lawyer may grant the lender a security
interest in the lawyer’s contingent fee as collateral for the loan.
I. Borrowing Litigation Costs from a Lending Institution
We begin with the issues of financial assistance to clients and lawyer borrowing. Rule
1.8 reflects the common law rule against providing financial support to a client “in connection
with pending or contemplated litigation.” The concern is that if a lawyer acquires a stake in the
outcome, his or her ability to exercise independent judgment on behalf of the client may be
impaired. Yet, despite this potential conflict, the prohibition has never been absolute. Rule
1.8(e)(1) embodies a long-standing exception to this general principle by providing that “[a]
lawyer may advance court costs and expenses of litigation….” This exception reflects the reality
that, without financial assistance to cover litigation costs and expenses, some clients would be
unable to pursue their claims.
The inquiry before the Committee adds an additional layer of complexity to the
transaction by interjecting a third party – the lending institution – into the relationship. The
inquiry contemplates that rather than the lawyer lending his or her own funds to cover litigation
costs and expenses, the lawyer will borrow the money from a lending institution. Upon
conclusion of the case, the client will be obligated to reimburse the lawyer for the advanced
litigation costs, along with interest charges and any related lender fees.
Although nothing in Rule 1.8(e) specifically prohibits a lawyer from borrowing money to
cover litigation costs and expenses on behalf of a client, other relevant ethical rules, particularly
those relating to personal conflicts of interest, client confidentiality and the lawyer’s independent
judgment, must be considered.
By borrowing money from a lending institution to cover advancements for costs and
expenses, the lawyer assumes both a financial obligation and a debt management responsibility
in the litigation. If these burdens become too great, particularly if a case becomes protracted, the
lawyer’s fidelity to the client could be compromised by the lawyer’s perceived need to conclude
the representation on a basis that will allow the loan to be paid and the attendant burdens to be
lifted. These same observations might be made of any situation in which the lawyer has
advanced costs and expenses to a client from personal funds or where a contingent fee is
involved. Although we recognize the potential personal conflicts inherent with advancement of
litigation costs and contingent fees, we permit these arrangements – subject to Rule 1.7 -because they benefit the client and may provide the only means by which a client can pursue his
or her claim.
But borrowing money from a lending institution to finance litigation expenses raises
additional risks not present when the lawyer merely advances personal funds or takes a case on a
contingent fee. Where a lending institution is involved, it might attempt to influence the
lawyer’s handling of a case in order to ensure timely repayment of the loan. Similarly, it might
seek information about a case or its status and the client’s right to confidentiality under Rule 1.6
might be jeopardized. These risks are substantially reduced if the loan is not tied to a particular
case, but rather is a line of credit upon which the lawyer may draw upon for any case. In any
event, the Committee recognizes that there are some risks, but also recognizes the client’s

interest in having adequate funds available to cover litigation costs and expenses. As a recent
Ohio opinion observed:
Since clients are not always financially able to obtain a loan to finance the
expenses of litigation, the clients look to lawyers to advance the expenses of
litigation. Depending upon the lawyer’s financial position, a lawyer may need to
obtain a loan in order to advance the litigation expenses. As a fiduciary for the
client, the lawyer must negotiate appropriate and reasonable loan terms. Ohio
Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline Opinion 2001-3 (2001)
A number of other jurisdictions have addressed litigation-financing arrangements similar
to those described above. Although many have acknowledged the potential problems discussed
here, the overwhelming majority has concluded that such arrangements are permissible. See,
e.g.,Chittenden v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 788 So.2d 1140 (La. 2001);
Utah State Bar Ethics Advisory Opinion 02-01 (2002); Ohio Board of Commissioners on
Grievances and Discipline Opinion 2001-3 (2001); Association of the Bar of the City of New
York Committee on Professional and Judicial Ethics Opinion 1997-1 (1997); Georgia Advisory
Opinion 92-1 (1992). State Bar of Texas Opinion 465 (1990); New Jersey Supreme Court
Advisory Committee on Professional Ethics Opinion 603 (1987).
The committee is in agreement with those jurisdictions that have authorized the lawyer to
borrow funds to finance litigation costs and expenses. In our view, the rules do not prohibit such
a loan transaction, as long as the lawyer guards against improper influences and improper
disclosure of client confidences.
II. Charging the Client Interest on the Loan and Deducting It from Proceeds
The next question is whether a lawyer who borrows money from a lending institution can
pass the interest charges and other related expenses on to the client. In KBA E-216, this
Committee decided that with “full consent and disclosure” the lawyer could charge interest on
advancements made from the lawyer’s own funds. In the Committee’s view, “an interest charge
on advancements would seem to be only a further expense of the litigation and as such could be
charged against the client.” From the client’s financial perspective, there is no difference
between charging the client interest on the lawyer’s money and charging the client interest on the
financial institution’s money – both are expenses occasioned by the litigation. See also, Ohio
Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline Opinion 2001-3 (2001).
But the inquiry does not end here. Recent decisions from other jurisdictions, as well as
the current Rules of Professional Conduct, suggest that much more is required that mere consent
and disclosure. Of particular importance are the rules dealing with client communications,
business transactions and fees.
We begin with Rule 1.4, which addresses the importance of keeping the client informed
and of explaining matters to the extent reasonably necessary to permit a client to make informed
decisions. Thus, in the context of this inquiry, it would appear that the loan and other fees, along
with the interest rate and its method of calculation, must be explained fully to the client and the
client must consent. See, e.g., New Jersey Supreme Court Advisory Committee on Professional
Ethics Opinion 603 (1987).

Moreover, once the advancement authorized by 1.8(e) take the form of a loan with
interest, it takes on the characteristics of a business transaction and is subject to the mandates of
Rule 1.8(a). See, American Law Institute, Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers §
36, comment c (lawyer may advance costs and expenses of litigation, with client to repay the
advance from proceeds of case, but any greater obligation on the part of the client, such as
payment of interest, subjects the arrangement to rules governing business transactions between a
lawyer and client).
Business transactions covered by Rule 1.8(a) must be “fair and reasonable.” This
assumes, among other things, that the charges to the client are reasonable in amount, that they do
not exceed those paid by the lawyer, and that the lawyer does not have an interest in the financial
institution that would violate Rule 1.7(b). See, e.g., Association of the Bar of the City of New
York Op. 1997-1 (1997). Moreover, Rule 1.8(a) requires that the arrangement be “fully
disclosed and transmitted in writing to the client in a manner which can be reasonably
understood by the client.” In addition, the client must have a “reasonable opportunity to seek the
advice of independent counsel” and must “consent in writing.” See, e.g. Ohio Board of
Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline Opinion 2001-3 (2001).
This particular inquiry relates to a contingent fee case. Consequently, Rule 1.5(c) must
be considered, because it sets out certain requirements about both the agreement’s form and its
content. Specifically, it provides as follows:
A contingent fee agreement shall be in writing and should state the method by
which the fee is to be determined, including the percentage or percentages that
shall accrue to the lawyer in the event of settlement, trial or appeal, litigation and
other expenses to be deducted from the recovery, and whether such expenses are
to be deducted before or after the contingent fee is calculated.
Thus, in the context of this inquiry, the contingent fee agreement must be in writing and
must explain how the interest will be calculated, and that the interest and other loan related
expenses will be deducted from the settlement or judgment as an expense of litigation. The
contingent fee agreement also must clearly state whether contingent fee percentages are
computed before or after the deduction of these expenses. Finally, the agreement must advise
the client of whether the duty to repay litigation expenses (including interest) is contingent upon
the outcome of the case. See, e.g., Ohio Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline
Opinion 2001-3 (2001); Chittenden v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, 788
So.2d 1140 (La. 2001); Association of the Bar of the City of New York Formal Opinion 1997-1
(1997).
The duty to inform the client about fees and other charges extends beyond the initial
agreement. Once there has been a recovery, Rule 1.5 obligates the lawyer to provide the client
with a written statement “showing remittance to the client and the method of determination,”
which would include deductions for the advances, interest and other reimbursable charges. This
written statement should be sufficiently detailed so that the client can understand what costs,
including loan-related expenses, the client has been charged. See, ABA Formal Opinion 93-379
(1993).

Therefore, upon review of the applicable rules and the opinions from other jurisdictions,
the Committee finds no specific prohibition against a lawyer obtaining a third-party loan to cover
litigation expenses and later deducting expenses – including interest and lender fees – from the
proceeds recovered on behalf of the client. However, the lawyer is cautioned that several Rules
of Professional Conduct are implicated in such a transaction, and the lawyer must consider each
one of them carefully before entering into a loan transaction to finance the litigation expenses of
a client.
Granting the Lender a Security Interest in the Lawyer’s Contingent Fee
The final question -- whether the lawyer may grant a security interest in his or her
contingent fee as collateral for the loan – is more problematic. One of the primary purposes of
the conflict of interest rules (Rule 1.7 – 1.12) is to protect the lawyer’s independent judgment.
Under these rules, the lawyer must avoid representations where the lawyer’s own interest or
those of another person may impair the lawyer’s judgment on behalf of a client. If a loan is tied,
either formally or informally, to a specific case the lender may try to protect its investment by
attempting to influence the lawyer’s management of the case. This is always a risk, but it
becomes even more so when the lawyer’s prospective fee in a specific case serves as collateral
for the loan. The fact that the agreement with the lender might recite a disavowal that the lender
would interfere with the lawyer’s independent judgment, or that the client has consented to the
loan arrangement, does not alter the economic reality that the lawyer could feel pressured to
bring the case to conclusion -- thereby turning the unearned fee expectancy into an earned fee -in order to satisfy the claim of a creditor with a security interest in that specific fee. In addition,
a secured creditor might deem itself insecure if the lawyer missed one or more monthly interest
payments, and might seek to accelerate the loan, bringing even greater pressure on the lawyer to
conclude the matter quickly or, perhaps, to relinquish control to another lawyer.
The Committee recognizes that lawyers and law firms borrow money from lending
institutions every day and, in some cases, they secure those loans with various firm assets. But
this is far different than the arrangement under consideration here. The circumstances in which a
lawyer would borrow money and grant a security interest in the fee are those in which neither the
lawyer nor the client has other access to funds (or other security) – thus setting the stage for the
economic pressure that may compromise the lawyer’s judgment.
For the above reasons, the Committee is of the view that it would be unethical for a
lawyer to borrow funds to pay litigation expenses in a particular case and grant a security interest
in the lawyer’s contingent fee as collateral for the loan.

Note to Reader
This ethics opinion has been formally adopted by the Board of Governors of the Kentucky
Bar Association under the provisions of Kentucky Supreme Court Rule 3.530 (or its predecessor
rule). The Rule provides that formal opinions are advisory only.