Must a Maryland judge recuse from every case involving an attorney who opposed the judge's appointment and criticized the judge?

Plain-English summary

An attorney asked a judge to recuse from the day's case and all future matters involving that attorney. The attorney said they had opposed the judge's appointment and criticized the judge's ethics, honesty, candor, and prior professional conduct. The judge stated on the record that fair and impartial handling remained possible, assigned the day's matter to another judge, and sought the Committee's view about future matters.

The Committee answered that recusal is not necessarily required. It assumed the judge's stated confidence in continued impartiality. If that confidence wavers in a particular matter, the opinion says recusal is required in that matter. Even when the judge remains confident, the judge must assess whether a reasonable person aware of all relevant facts would question impartiality.

The attorney's opposition and criticism alone do not settle that objective inquiry. The Committee distinguished this record from its earlier opinion about a litigant's complaints against a judge: this attorney and judge had a relationship predating judicial service, and the criticism included specific personal allegations. The Committee left the overall objective assessment to the requesting judge and said its opinion neither compels nor forecloses recusal.

In practice

For the facts presented, the opinion permits a matter-by-matter assessment. It says the availability of another judicial officer does not change either impartiality inquiry, though it means recusal in a particular matter would not leave the parties without a tribunal.

Common questions

Q: Does an attorney's opposition to a judge's appointment automatically disqualify the judge?

A: No. The Committee says that opposition and criticism, standing alone, do not conclusively establish an objective basis for recusal.

Q: What if the judge no longer feels able to remain impartial?

A: The opinion says recusal is required in that particular matter if the judge's confidence in personal impartiality wavers, regardless of the objective inquiry.

Q: Does the judge's own confidence end the recusal inquiry?

A: No. The judge must also assess whether a reasonable person with knowledge of all relevant facts would question impartiality.

Q: Did the Committee decide that this judge must hear every future case involving the attorney?

A: No. It said the prior relationship and specific personal allegations call for careful application of both inquiries and that its opinion neither compels nor forecloses recusal.

Background and rules framework

The opinion applies Maryland Code of Judicial Conduct Rules 18-101.2, 18-102.2(a), 18-102.7, and 18-102.11(a)(1). It describes the duty to preside when qualified alongside the duty to recuse when impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including personal bias concerning an attorney. It also discusses constitutional and common-law disqualification grounds, which the Committee found inapplicable to the facts reported.

Citations and references

Maryland Code of Judicial Conduct:

• Rules 18-101.2, 18-102.2(a), 18-102.7, and 18-102.11(a)(1).

Cases:

• In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1955), interest in the outcome and due process.
• Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 (2009), objective potential for bias.
• Matter of Russell, 464 Md. 390 (2019), reasonable observer's assessment of impartiality.
• Jefferson-El v. State, 330 Md. 99 (1993), duty to preside when qualified.

Other opinions cited:

• Maryland Judicial Ethics Opinions 2026-22, 2025-32, and 2021-11, on recusal inquiries discussed by the Committee.

See also

• NE Judicial Ethics Op. 05-2: Litigant Complaint
• DC Judicial Ethics Op. 13: Former Clerk Recusal

Source

• Landing page: Maryland Judicial Ethics Committee opinion index
• Original PDF: Opinion 2026-28

Original opinion text

Reproduced from the official source for research purposes. The linked source is authoritative.

Maryland Judicial Ethics Committee
Opinion Request Number: 2026-28
Date of Issue: September 28, 2026
☒Published Opinion ☐ Unpublished Opinion ☐Unpublished Letter of Advice

Recusal Based on Attorney’s Opposition to Judicial Appointment and Personal Criticism of the Judge
Issue: Must a judge recuse from all matters in which an attorney appears because the attorney moved for the judge’s recusal, disclosing that the attorney had actively opposed the judge’s appointment to the bench and describing a longstanding, contentious professional relationship that included criticism of the judge’s work ethic, ethics, honesty, candor, and professional conduct as an attorney?

Answer: Not necessarily.

Facts: The Requester relates that an attorney appeared before the Requester for the first time since the Requester’s appointment to the bench and orally moved that the Requester recuse from the attorney’s case that day and from all future cases in which the attorney appears. The attorney stated that the attorney had actively opposed the Requester’s appointment and had openly contacted members of the judicial nominating commission and anyone else who would listen regarding the attorney’s opposition to the judge’s appointment. The attorney also described what the attorney characterized as a contentious professional relationship with the Requester over the years and identified criticisms and allegations the attorney had previously expressed concerning the Requester’s work ethic, ethics, honesty, candor, and professional conduct when the Requester was an attorney. Prior to the hearing, the Requester knew the attorney had contacted at least one member of the judicial nominating commission, but the Requester was not advised of the substance of the attorney’s communications, other than that they were unfavorable. The Requester was not previously aware of the full extent or nature of the attorney’s opposition as the attorney described at the hearing, did not share the belief that they had a contentious professional relationship, and categorically denied the allegations of professional impropriety.

Following a recess, the Requester stated on the record that the Requester believed the Requester could be fair and impartial and did not have personal knowledge of all the matters the attorney had described. The Requester further stated that, even after hearing the attorney’s allegations and criticisms, the Requester believed the Requester could preside fairly and impartially over matters involving the attorney. Nevertheless, out of an abundance of caution, the Requester advised the parties that another member of the court would resolve the matter scheduled for that day and that the Requester would seek an ethics Maryland Judicial Ethics Committee Opinion Request Number: 2026-28 Date of Issue: September 28, 2026
☒ Published Opinion ☐ Unpublished Opinion ☐ Unpublished Letter of Advice Page 2 of 6 opinion on whether future recusal is appropriate or required. The Requester submitted an audio recording of the proceeding.

Analysis:

The Maryland Code of Judicial Conduct (the “Code”), Title 18, Chapter 100 of the Maryland Rules, establishes the standards for the ethical conduct of judges. The following Rules are implicated here:

Rule 18-101.2 provides in part:

(a) Promoting Public Confidence. A judge shall act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the independence, integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary.

(b) Avoiding Perception of Impropriety. A judge shall avoid conduct that would create in reasonable minds a perception of impropriety.

Rule 18-102.2(a) makes clear that “[a] judge shall uphold and apply the law and shall perform all duties of judicial office impartially and fairly.”

Rule 18-102.7 requires that “[a] judge shall hear and decide matters assigned to the judge unless recusal is appropriate.”

Rule 18-102.11(a) addresses disqualification and provides in part:

(a) A judge shall recuse in any proceeding in which the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including the following circumstances:

(1) The judge has a personal bias or prejudice concerning … a party’s attorney…

As the Committee has recently reiterated, a judge considering recusal must consider several issues with both subjective and objective components. First, the judge must identify whether the judge previously served as counsel in the matter, has an interest in the case, or has a family or prior business relationship with one of the parties such that recusal is mandatory under Article IV of the Maryland Constitution. Ethics Opinion No. 2025-32. Common law also requires recusal under principles of due process when the judge “has an interest in the outcome.” In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955); see Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 876-77 (2009) (explaining that the constitutional recusal inquiry is objective and does not require proof of actual bias; rather, the question is whether Maryland Judicial Ethics Committee Opinion Request Number: 2026-28 Date of Issue: September 28, 2026
☒ Published Opinion ☐ Unpublished Opinion ☐ Unpublished Letter of Advice Page 3 of 6 circumstances create an unconstitutional “potential for bias”) (quoting Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455, 465–66 (1971)).

Next, the judge must undertake two additional inquiries with both subjective and objective aspects. Ethics Opinion 2026-22 at 2, citing Ethics Opinion 2021-11 at 2. Subjectively, the judge examines the judge’s own ability to remain impartial despite the potentially disqualifying influence. Ethics Opinion 2021-11 at 2. If the judge is not confident in the judge’s own subjective impartiality, recusal is required on that basis alone. Id; Rule 18- 202.11(a). Even if the judge is confident in the judge’s ability to remain impartial, the judge must also evaluate the situation objectively to ensure that participation will not “create in reasonable minds a perception of impropriety.” Rule 18-101.2(b). A judge must recuse when “a reasonable person with knowledge and understanding of all the relevant facts would question the judge’s impartiality.” Matter of Russell, 464 Md. 390, 402 (2019); accord Ethics Opinion 2026-22 at 2. The judicial process must “not only be fair, but [must also] appear to be fair.” Boyd v. State, 321 Md. 69, 85-86 (1990). At the same time, a judge’s “duty to preside when qualified is as strong as [the] duty to refrain from presiding when not qualified.” Jefferson-El v. State, 330 Md. 99, 107 (1993).

The circumstances reported by Requester do not implicate the constitutional grounds for disqualification. The Committee cannot resolve the subjective component of Requester’s inquiry; only the Requester can determine whether the Requester can remain fair and impartial toward this attorney and the attorney’s clients. Ethics Opinion 2026-22 at 2-3; Ethics Opinion 2021-11 at 2. The Requester has represented, on the record, a good-faith belief that the Requester can do so, and nothing gives the Committee reason to question that representation. This Opinion assumes its continued accuracy. If, in any particular matter, the Requester’s confidence in the Requester’s own impartiality wavers, including as a result of anything further the attorney says or does, or based on other information that comes to light, recusal is required in that matter regardless of the objective analysis that follows. See Ethics Opinion 2021-11 at 2.

Assuming the Requester’s continued subjective impartiality, the Committee turns to the objective inquiry: whether a reasonable person, aware of all the relevant facts, would question the Requester’s impartiality in matters where this attorney appears. Maryland Judicial Ethics Committee Opinion Request Number: 2026-28 Date of Issue: September 28, 2026
☒ Published Opinion ☐ Unpublished Opinion ☐ Unpublished Letter of Advice Page 4 of 6 A. An attorney’s opposition to a judge’s appointment, and an attorney’s personal criticism of a judge, do not by themselves establish dispositively an objective basis for recusal.

Rule 18-102.11(a)(1) speaks to a judge’s personal bias or prejudice concerning an attorney. Nothing in the Requester’s account suggests that the Requester harbors bias against this attorney; to the contrary, the Requester has represented an ability to set any history aside. The audio confirms that the Requester was professional, respectful, and patient in the face of the surprising and personal allegations being hurled at the Requester. The pertinent question is whether a reasonable, informed observer would question the Requester’s impartiality where the attorney has been openly hostile toward the Requester.

The Committee addressed an analogous dynamic in Ethics Opinion 2026-22, where a litigant sought to disqualify a judge by disclosing that the litigant had filed complaints and other actions against the judge. The Committee concluded that the litigant’s own hostile or adversarial conduct toward the judge did not, standing alone, create an objective appearance problem, because a reasonable person would understand that the litigant’s complaints reflected the litigant’s own dissatisfaction with adverse rulings rather than any partiality on the judge’s part, and because a contrary rule would let a party manufacture recusal simply by attacking the judge. Ethics Opinion 2026-22 at 3. The Committee cautioned that “[j]udges have a responsibility to resist such tactics if they are able to maintain the necessary subjective impartiality.” Id.

The same principle applies here. An attorney's aggressive opposition to a judicial candidate’s appointment, including communicating openly with members of a judicial nominating commission, and public comments on the judge’s character, are legitimate exercises of the attorney’s rights as a citizen and member of the bar. Whether a reasonable, informed observer would question whether the judge could be fair to that attorney or the attorney’s clients, given the attorney’s opposition to the judge’s appointment and negative comments about the judge, depends on the circumstances. If the Rule were interpreted or applied otherwise, an attorney dissatisfied with a judicial appointment, a judge’s election over another candidate, or a judge’s rulings once on the bench, could judge shop simply by voicing that dissatisfaction on the record. This might come through a complaint to a disciplinary body, as in Ethics Opinion 2026-22, through opposition to an appointment, or through an oral recusal motion of the kind made here. That result would invert Rule 18- 102.7’s presumption in favor of a judge’s “duty to preside when qualified,” Jefferson-El, 330 Md. at 107, and would hand litigants and lawyers a tool to select their own judge (or at least narrow the list). As a trial judge, the Requester is well-positioned to make an objective assessment of whether a reasonable person, aware of all the relevant facts, would Maryland Judicial Ethics Committee Opinion Request Number: 2026-28 Date of Issue: September 28, 2026
☒ Published Opinion ☐ Unpublished Opinion ☐ Unpublished Letter of Advice Page 5 of 6 question the Requester’s impartiality under the circumstances overall. The Committee notes that, unlike in Opinion 2026-22, this request involves a single attorney in a jurisdiction with other judicial officers available to hear the attorney’s cases. Although the availability of another judge does not bear on the Requester’s subjective or objective assessments, it does confirm that recusal, if warranted in a given matter, would not leave the parties without a tribunal, supporting that the Requester has latitude to recuse on a case- by-case basis.

B. This record differs from the Committee’s prior opinions.

Two features distinguish this request from Opinion 2026-22 and Opinion 2021-11, and counsel against reading this Opinion to foreclose recusal in every matter involving this attorney.

First, in Ethics Opinion 2026-22, the judge’s knowledge of the litigant arose entirely from prior judicial proceedings, which the Committee, following Jefferson-El, treated as not “personal” under the Code. Ethics Opinion 2026-22 at 3. Here, the relationship between the Requester and the attorney predates the Requester’s judicial service, the attorney’s criticisms concern the Requester when the Requester was an attorney, and the attorney’s opposition to the appointment was communicated outside of, and before, any proceeding involving the Requester as a judge. That history is more readily characterized as personal to the Requester and the attorney than the record in Ethics Opinion 2026-22, even though it does not fit the specific relationships (family, financial, or employment) addressed in Ethics Opinion 2021-11.

Second, the attorney’s stated criticisms here go beyond generalized hostility or litigiousness; they include specific, personal allegations about the Requester’s honesty, candor, and ethics, which are the exact qualities Rule 18-101.2 asks the Requester to project to the public. The audio recording indicates the attorney was well prepared for the recusal argument: the attorney used quotations from the Rule and provided the Requester with copies of judicial disability cases in support of the recusal effort. The Requester represents that the Requester lacks “personal knowledge of all of the matters the attorney described” and disputes the allegations with which the Requester is familiar. The fact that more detailed criticism surfaced for the first time at a hearing where the attorney also sought disqualification underscores that this is an evolving relationship with a specific member of the bar whom the Requester will likely encounter again and not a one-off interaction as in Ethics Opinion 2026-22. Maryland Judicial Ethics Committee Opinion Request Number: 2026-28 Date of Issue: September 28, 2026
☒ Published Opinion ☐ Unpublished Opinion ☐ Unpublished Letter of Advice Page 6 of 6 These distinctions do not change the Committee’s conclusion that recusal is not necessarily required. They do mean that the Requester should carefully apply the required subjective and objective inquiries described above and not treat this Opinion as compelling or foreclosing recusal. Application: The Maryland Judicial Ethics Committee cautions that this Opinion is applicable only prospectively and only to the conduct of the Requester described herein, to the extent of the Requester’s compliance with this opinion. Omission or misstatement of a material fact in the written request for opinion negates reliance on this Opinion. Additionally, this Opinion should not be considered to be binding indefinitely. The passage of time may result in amendment to the applicable law and/or developments in the area of judicial ethics generally or in changes of facts that could affect the conclusion of the Committee. If the request for advice involves a continuing course of conduct, the Requester should keep abreast of developments in the area of judicial ethics and, in the event of a change in that area or a change in facts, submit an updated request to the Committee.