May a Maryland judge retain property that requires a quiet-title suit in the judge’s court?

Plain-English summary

A judge owned unimproved property in the court’s jurisdiction and expected that a quiet-title action would be needed. The judge said he would take no judicial role in the litigation.

Canon XXVIII allowed a judge to have personal litigation in the judge’s own court but required abstention from any judicial act in that controversy. The Committee also concluded that the expected single quiet-title suit did not make the property an investment apt to be involved frequently in litigation under Canon XXV.

The Committee concluded that the judge could keep the property and take action to perfect title if he abstained from performing or taking part in any judicial act in the title proceeding. The opinion identifies 1984-08 as the request number and January 3, 1985 as the date of issue.

Currency note

This opinion discusses the Maryland judicial ethics provisions in force at the time it was written. Its analysis is historical; verify the current Maryland Code of Judicial Conduct and the linked opinion before relying on a cited provision.

Common questions

Q: Must the judge dispose of the property merely because a quiet-title suit is needed?

A: No. The Committee said ownership and a single title action were not improper per se on the facts presented.

Q: May the judge act judicially in the quiet-title proceeding?

A: No. The opinion conditions its answer on abstention from every judicial act in that proceeding.

Q: Did the Committee treat this as frequent litigation by an investment enterprise?

A: No. It described the expected title action as a single lawsuit, outside the frequent-litigation concern it quoted from Canon XXV.

Background and rules framework

The opinion applies the then-cited Maryland Canons of Judicial Ethics, particularly Canon XXVIII on a judge’s personal litigation and Canon XXV on investments apt to involve frequent litigation. It also mentions Real Property Article § 14-108 as the title-action procedure.

Citations and references

• Maryland Canons of Judicial Ethics, Canons XXV and XXVIII.
• Md. Real Property Article § 14-108.
• In Re Foster, 271 Md. 449 (1974), discussed as a distinct investment issue.
• Maryland JEC Opinion Requests 1975-06, 1976-11, 1977-06, 1981-14 and 1982-05.

See also

• MD Judicial Ethics Op. 1984-05
• MD Judicial Ethics Op. 2019-35

Source

• Landing page: Maryland Judicial Ethics Committee opinion index
• Original PDF: Opinion 1984-08

Original opinion text

Reproduced from the official source for research purposes. The linked source is authoritative.

Maryland Judicial Ethics Committee

Opinion Request Number: 1984-08

Date of Issue: January 3, 1985

O Published Opinion G Unpublished Opinion G Unpublished Letter of Advice

Judge May Continue to Own Real Property Where it Is Necessary to Institute Suit to Quiet Title

A judge ... has asked the Committee for an opinion as to whether the judge may continue to maintain an interest in unimproved real estate within his court’s jurisdiction where a suit to quiet title will be necessary.
The judge’s interest in the real property is not described beyond that set forth above.
The defect in the title of the real property was brought about by a defective conveyance in
1898. Efforts to locate heirs has proven unsuccessful.
The judge does not intend to take an active participation in the litigation as an owner of the
real property and will abstain from any judicial function involving the litigation.
Procedure for bringing an action to quiet title has been simplified by § 14-108 of the Real
Property Article and its predecessor statutes. Since the heirs cannot be located, service of process will be by posting or publication. The judgment of the court will be solely to determine that the judge receive absolute ownership of the property. Presumably, the necessary evidence will be by affidavit following a default.
Canon XXVIII states:
A judge should abstain from performing or taking part in any judicial act in which
his personal interests are involved. If he has personal litigation in the court of which
he is judge, he need not resign his judgeship on that account, but he should, of
course, refrain from any judicial act in such a controversy.
The judge making the inquiry has already indicated that he will recuse himself from the
action to quiet title. Nor does the inquiry in this case implicate the considerations discussed in such opinions as [Opinion Request Nos. 1975-06, 1976-11, 1977-06, 1981-14, and 1982-05], all of which relate to commercial use of property or to some action that would greatly enhance the value of the property. Neither is the judge’s proposed action in this case prohibited by the considerations discussed at some length in In Re Foster, 271 Md. 449 (1974).
We are also aware that Canon XXV provides in pertinent part:
A judge should abstain from making personal investments in enterprises which are
apt frequently to be involved in litigation in the courts; and, after his accession to the
Bench, he should not retain such investments previously made, longer than a period
sufficient to enable him to dispose of them without serious loss. It is desirable that
he should, so far as reasonably possible, refrain from all relations which would
normally tend to arouse the suspicion that such relations warp or bias his judgment,
or prevent his impartial attitude of mind in the administration of his judicial duties.
The action the judge desires to take is the institution of a proceeding to quiet title. So far as
appears from his inquiry, this will be a single lawsuit. Therefore, his ownership of the property in question cannot be considered an investment in an enterprise which is “apt frequently to be involved in litigation in the court ...” Moreover, his participation in this single lawsuit would not, in our Maryland Judicial Ethics Committee Opinion Request Number: 1984-08 Date of Issue: January 3, 1985 O Published Opinion G Unpublished Opinion G Unpublished Letter of Advice Page 2 of 2

opinion, tend to arouse any suspicion as to “his impartial attitude of mind in the administration of his judicial duties.” Since it is not per se improper for a judge to own property, it is not improper per se for him to take action that may be required to perfect the title to that property provided he abstains “from performing or taking part in any judicial act” involved in that procedure.