Could a Maryland judge own an office building leased to a lawyer who appeared before the judge?

Plain-English summary

A judge leased part of an office building, with furnishings and library, to a local lawyer who had appeared before the judge. The judge asked whether the lease affected those cases and whether a later election would require relinquishing the building.

The Committee found no violation of the then-cited Maryland judicial ethics provisions so long as the relationship with the lawyer was strictly landlord and tenant. It did not find reasonable suspicion that the judge was using the office to promote the lawyer's practice on those facts, while warning that a closer relationship could invite criticism.

The Committee declined to decide whether the judge must give up the building after a future election, saying that question would depend on circumstances existing then. Later Opinion 1979-03 revisited the lease and clarified the earlier opinion's discussion of a judge's own property management.

Currency note

This opinion discusses the Maryland judicial ethics provisions in force at the time it was written. Its analysis is historical; verify the current Maryland Code of Judicial Conduct and the linked opinion before relying on a cited provision.

Common questions

Q: Did the lease itself disqualify the judge from the tenant lawyer's cases?

A: The Committee found no violation on the described facts so long as the connection remained strictly that of landlord and tenant.

Q: Did the Committee decide whether the building must be sold after the election?

A: No. It declined to rule on that future factual situation.

Q: Did a later opinion revisit the property-management discussion?

A: Yes. Maryland JEC Opinion Request 1979-03 clarified the earlier language while considering the same lease.

Background and rules framework

The opinion discusses Maryland's then-cited Canon XXIV, ABA Canon 5C(2), and the committee's earlier Opinion Request 1975-06. It cites In re Foster for limits on a judge's management of owned real estate; Opinion 1979-03 later clarified that discussion.

Citations and references

• Maryland Canon of Judicial Ethics XXIV and ABA Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 5C(2).
• In re Foster, 271 Md. 449, 474-475.
• Maryland JEC Opinion Request 1975-06.

See also

• MD Judicial Ethics Op. 1979-03
• MD Judicial Ethics Op. 1976-13

Source

• Landing page: Maryland Judicial Ethics Committee opinion index
• Original PDF: Opinion 1976-11

Original opinion text

Reproduced from the official source for research purposes. The linked source is authoritative.

Maryland Judicial Ethics Committee

Opinion Request Number: 1976-11

Date of Issue: October 4, 1976

O Published Opinion G Unpublished Opinion G Unpublished Letter of Advice

Judge May Own Building Leased to Lawyer;
Not Disqualified from Hearing Cases in Which Tenant Is Counsel

This is to acknowledge your letter of September 21, 1976, in which you advised that shortly after your appointment to [the bench,] you leased the first floor of your office building, fully equipped including library, to a member of the County Bar, one X, at and for the sum of $300 a month. You advise that this attorney has appeared before you on several occasions including a trial by jury, and that you have never been asked to disqualify yourself in these cases. Further, you advise that this law office building was built only for that purpose and cannot be converted for any other purpose without a large expenditure.
For the further information of this committee, you have informed us that if you should be unsuccessful in the election for your judicial office in 1978, you will necessarily be forced to return to and reoccupy your building for the practice of law, and you ask the ruling of this committee which “would cover my present circumstances concerning my relationship with Mr. X.” You also ask whether you must relinquish ownership of this building if elected to your judicial office in 1978.
The subject of the ownership of real estate by a judge was discussed by this committee in [Opinion Request No. 1975-06,] dated May 22, 1975 ... . It was there pointed out that there is no specific provision in the Maryland Canons or Rules of Judicial Ethics which would prohibit the ownership or acquisition of real estate by a judge. Reference was made to Canon 5C(2) of the American Bar Association’s Code of Judicial Ethics providing that a judge may hold and manage investments, including real estate, provided that this does not tend to reflect adversely on his impartiality, interfere with the proper performance of his judicial duties, exploit his judicial position or involve him in frequent transactions with lawyers or persons likely to come before his court.
Maryland Canon XXIV is in the same spirit, although real estate is not specifically mentioned.
[Opinion Request No. 1975-06] also refers to In re Foster, 271 Md. 449, with particular reference to pages 474-475, making it quite clear that a judge should take no active part in the management of real estate in which he has an interest and that this prohibition would extend to his participation in negotiations looking toward a sale or other disposition.
We find nothing in the facts that you have related to us that would constitute a violation of
either the Maryland Canons or Rules so long as your relationship with the attorney mentioned is one strictly of landlord and tenant. We believe that this relationship would not give rise to reasonable suspicion that you are utilizing the prestige of your office to persuade or coerce others to patronize this attorney or to promote his business interests. As was pointed out in [Opinion Request No. 1975- 06], however, this committee cannot insulate you from criticism that may be directed at your relationship with this attorney if that relationship should now be or become more than one of landlord and tenant. Maryland Judicial Ethics Committee Opinion Request Number: 1976-11 Date of Issue: October 4, 1976 O Published Opinion G Unpublished Opinion G Unpublished Letter of Advice Page 2 of 2

With respect to your second inquiry, we prefer to refrain from ruling on a future factual situation that may or may not arise. We believe that the question should then be answered in the light of the then existing circumstances.