Ezel / Ethics Opinions / JUDICIAL-IL

Did an unsolicited substantive email from a litigant require an Illinois judge to recuse?

Short answer Generally no, if the judge ended the ex parte contact, disregarded its contents and promptly disclosed it to the parties; other circumstances showing bias could require recusal.
Bar
JUDICIAL-IL
Issued
2021

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This page answers the general question as of 2021. Ask about yours and see what the current rules of professional conduct in your state say for your facts, with citations.

Disclaimer: Advisory only. Not binding precedent.
About this page: The plain-English summary, reader guidance, and Q&A below were written by Ezel based on the official ethics opinion. The original opinion (linked on this page) is the authoritative source for any reliance.

Plain-English summary

A self-represented litigant used a judge's scheduling email address to send substantive case information without copying opposing counsel. The judge believed the contents could be disregarded and immediately notified the other party.

The Committee said former Rule 63A(5) barred considering the email. It found that merely receiving an unsolicited ex parte communication did not automatically require recusal. The answer depended on whether the judge stopped the contact when recognized, disregarded the information and promptly disclosed it, and whether other circumstances reasonably called impartiality into question.

The opinion distinguished cases where a judge delayed disclosure or participated in the contact, and said actual bias would require recusal.

Currency note

The Committee’s page states that this opinion interprets the 1993 Illinois Code of Judicial Conduct, which was superseded on January 1, 2023. It does not assess whether the 2023 Code changes the analysis. Verify the current Code before relying on it.

In practice

On the described facts, the opinion did not require recusal after prompt disclosure and disregard of the unsolicited email.

Common questions

Q: Did receiving the litigant’s email itself disqualify the judge?

A: No. The Committee distinguished mere receipt from considering an ex parte communication or creating an appearance of bias.

Q: What made prompt disclosure relevant?

A: The Committee cited cases in which delayed disclosure contributed to an appearance of impropriety.

Background and rules framework

The Committee applied former Illinois Supreme Court Rules 63A(5) and 63C(1), and discussed People v. Bradshaw, In re Marriage of Wheatley and In re Marriage of O’Brien.

Citations and references

  • Illinois Supreme Court Rules 63A(5), 63C(1).
  • People v. Bradshaw, 171 Ill. App. 3d 971 (1988); In re Marriage of Wheatley, 297 Ill. App. 3d 854 (1998); In re Marriage of O’Brien, 2011 IL 109039.

See also

Source

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