Could an Illinois judicial candidate publicize an opponent’s private sexual conduct without a likely criminal or disciplinary violation?

Plain-English summary

A judicial candidate claimed reliable information about a sitting-judge opponent’s private sexual conduct and asked whether the campaign could disclose it to voters.

The Committee concluded that former Rule 67A(3)(a)’s dignity standard barred the disclosure, even if factually accurate, where the alleged conduct was unlikely to lead to criminal prosecution or judicial discipline. It viewed the proposed revelation as campaign advantage rather than improvement of the legal system.

The opinion acknowledged judicial candidates’ speech interests while holding that this allegation, on the stated premise, fell outside acceptable campaign conduct under the former Code.

Currency note

The Committee’s page states that this opinion interprets the 1993 Illinois Code of Judicial Conduct, which was superseded on January 1, 2023. It does not assess whether the 2023 Code changes the analysis. Verify the current Code before relying on it.

In practice

The conclusion was expressly limited to the absence of a likely criminal or judicial disciplinary violation connected to the alleged conduct.

Common questions

Q: Did factual accuracy alone permit disclosure?

A: No. The conclusion expressly covered factually accurate information.

Q: What qualification did the Committee state?

A: Its bar applied absent a likely criminal or judicial disciplinary violation connected to the conduct.

Background and rules framework

The Committee applied former Illinois Supreme Court Rules 67A(3)(a) and 67D to judicial campaign conduct. It discussed In re Buckley, 997 F.2d 224, concerning candidate speech.

Citations and references

• Illinois Supreme Court Rules 67A(3)(a) and 67D.
• In re Buckley, 997 F.2d 224.

See also

• IL Judicial Ethics Op. 2007-03: Spouse’s lawyer

Source

• Landing page: Illinois Judicial Ethics Committee Opinion 2003-01