Was an Illinois judge disqualified when a former spouse’s divorce lawyer appeared in unrelated cases?

Short answer The Committee found no automatic disqualification after a concluded, nonacrimonious divorce, absent objectively reasonable doubt about impartiality or personal hostility toward the lawyer. It prescribed no fixed time limit.
Bar
JUDICIAL-IL
Issued
September 16, 1996

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This page answers the general question as of 1996. Ask about yours and see what the current rules of professional conduct in your state say for your facts, with citations.

Disclaimer: Advisory only. Not binding precedent.
About this page: The plain-English summary, reader guidance, and Q&A below were written by Ezel based on the official ethics opinion. The original opinion (linked on this page) is the authoritative source for any reliance.

Plain-English summary

A lawyer who had represented the judge’s former spouse in a completed, nonacrimonious divorce appeared before the judge for other clients. The Committee considered both an informed observer’s view and the judge’s personal attitude toward the lawyer.

It found no automatic disqualification on the stated facts. Recusal would be required if conduct during the divorce reasonably raised doubt about impartiality or if the judge had personal hostility that prevented impartial judging.

The Committee did not impose a fixed period of recusal. It said the same analysis would apply if the lawyer had represented the judge’s children, while individual facts could change the outcome.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 1997 under the 1993 Illinois Code of Judicial Conduct. The Committee’s page says that Code was superseded on January 1, 2023, and does not assess the effect of the 2023 Code. Treat this page as historical context and verify the current Code before relying on its analysis.

Common questions

Q: Did the ended divorce representation automatically disqualify the judge?

A: No. The Committee found no automatic disqualification on the nonacrimonious facts described.

Q: When could recusal be required?

A: If an informed observer could reasonably doubt impartiality or the judge had disqualifying personal hostility toward the lawyer.

Q: Was there a fixed recusal period?

A: No. The Committee declined to establish a time limit.

Background and rules framework

The Committee applied former Illinois Supreme Court Rule 63C(1)(a), addressing reasonable questions about impartiality and personal bias toward a party’s lawyer. It discussed IJEC Opinions 95-2 and 95-5.

Citations and references

  • Illinois Supreme Court Rules 63C(1) and 63C(1)(a).
  • Pepsico, Inc. v. McMillen, 764 F.2d 458 (7th Cir. 1985).
  • People v. Brandshaw, 171 Ill. App. 3d 971, 525 N.E.2d 1098 (1st Dist. 1988).
  • IJEC Opinions 95-2 and 95-5.

See also

Source

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