Ezel / Ethics Opinions / JUDICIAL-IL

Did an Illinois judge have to recuse when the judge’s active campaign chair or a colleague represented a party?

Short answer The Committee required recusal when the active campaign chair personally represented a party, but not merely because another lawyer in that firm appeared. It regarded disclosure of the chair’s firm connection as advisable, including in cases with a pro se party.
Bar
JUDICIAL-IL
Issued
September 16, 1996

Apply this to your situation

This page answers the general question as of 1996. Ask about yours and see what the current rules of professional conduct in your state say for your facts, with citations.

Disclaimer: Advisory only. Not binding precedent.
About this page: The plain-English summary, reader guidance, and Q&A below were written by Ezel based on the official ethics opinion. The original opinion (linked on this page) is the authoritative source for any reliance.

Plain-English summary

An associate judge running for circuit court had a lawyer chairing the election committee. The Committee distinguished that lawyer’s appearance from an appearance by another lawyer in the same firm.

During the campaign, the chair’s personal representation of a party required recusal because impartiality could reasonably be questioned. Another lawyer’s representation did not automatically require recusal absent additional circumstances; the former Code did not generally impute a lawyer’s connection to the whole firm for judicial disqualification.

The Committee said disclosure of the chair’s presence at the firm was advisable but voluntary, even when another party appeared without counsel. It found no Code violation merely from declining that disclosure.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 1997 under the 1993 Illinois Code of Judicial Conduct. The Committee’s page says that Code was superseded on January 1, 2023, and does not assess the effect of the 2023 Code. Treat this page as historical context and verify the current Code before relying on its analysis.

Common questions

Q: Was recusal required when the active campaign chair appeared?

A: Yes. The Committee required it during the election campaign.

Q: Did another lawyer at the chair’s firm trigger automatic recusal?

A: No, absent additional facts raising a reasonable impartiality question.

Q: Was disclosure of the firm connection required?

A: No. The Committee recommended it but said disclosure was voluntary, including with a pro se party.

Background and rules framework

The Committee applied former Illinois Supreme Court Rule 63C(1)’s general impartiality standard. It distinguished attorney conflict imputation under Illinois Rule of Professional Conduct 1.10(a) from judicial disqualification.

Citations and references

  • Illinois Supreme Court Rules 63C(1), 63C(1)(a), 63C(1)(c), and 63C(1)(e)(ii).
  • Illinois Rule of Professional Conduct 1.10(a).
  • Gluth Brothers Construction, Inc. v. Union National Bank, 192 Ill. App. 3d 649, 548 N.E.2d 1364 (2d Dist. 1989).
  • People v. McClain, 226 Ill. App. 3d 892, 589 N.E.2d 1116 (2d Dist. 1992).
  • IJEC Opinions 93-11, 94-18, and 95-2.

See also

Source

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