Must a D.C. judge recuse when a litigant university awarded the judge's child a large scholarship?
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This page answers the general question as of 2002. Ask about yours and see what the current rules of professional conduct in your state say for your facts, with citations.
Plain-English summary
A Superior Court judge's minor child accepted a substantial, renewable university scholarship. The university's affiliated hospital could participate in matters before the judge. The Committee considered both acceptance of the scholarship and the judge's ability to hear cases involving the donor.
Canon 4D(5)(g), as applied in the 2002 opinion, allowed a scholarship awarded on the same terms and criteria as for other applicants. The Committee said accepting it was not improper. It nevertheless considered the award's substantial value, competitive selection, and continuing benefit to the child. Those circumstances could make an informed observer question the judge's impartiality toward the donor under Canon 3E(1).
The Committee concluded that the judge should be disqualified from proceedings involving the university and its hospital. Because the basis was an appearance concern rather than personal bias, the opinion said Canon 3F permitted remittal of disqualification after disclosure to the parties, if the judge chose that procedure.
In practice
Under the Code provisions discussed in this 2002 opinion, permission to accept the scholarship did not resolve the judge's separate recusal question. The Committee's conclusion concerned a substantial, competitively awarded, continuing scholarship to a minor child and proceedings involving the donor university or its affiliated hospital.
Common questions
Q: Did the Code provision applied in the opinion prohibit the child's scholarship?
A: No. The Committee said Canon 4D(5)(g) allowed a scholarship awarded on the same terms and criteria applied to other applicants.
Q: Why did the Committee call for recusal anyway?
A: It concluded that the award's substantial value and continuing benefit could make a fully informed person reasonably question the judge's impartiality in a case involving the donor.
Q: Did the conclusion cover the university's hospital?
A: Yes. The opinion treated the university and its affiliated hospital alike for its recusal analysis because of the university's significant interest in the hospital.
Q: Could the parties consent to the judge's participation?
A: The opinion says the appearance-based disqualification was subject to Canon 3F's remittal procedure after disclosure to the parties, at the judge's discretion.
Background and rules framework
The opinion applies the then-cited Code's Canon 4D(5)(g) on scholarships, Canon 3E(1) on disqualification when impartiality might reasonably be questioned, Canon 2A on public confidence, and Canon 3F on remittal after disclosure. Its analysis concerns the Code in force at issuance.
Citations and references
D.C. Code of Judicial Conduct cited in the opinion:
- Canon 4D(5)(g), scholarships awarded on ordinary terms and criteria.
- Canon 3E(1), disqualification.
- Canon 2A, public confidence in judicial integrity and impartiality.
- Canon 3F, remittal of disqualification.
Cases:
- Scott v. United States, 559 A.2d 745 (D.C. 1989), the fully informed observer's assessment of impartiality.
- Public Utilities Comm'n v. Pollack, 343 U.S. 451 (1952), appearance of disinterested justice.
Other opinions cited:
- D.C. Courts Advisory Committee on Judicial Conduct Opinion No. 9, remittal after disclosure.
See also
Source
- Landing page: D.C. Code of Judicial Conduct and advisory opinions
- Original PDF: Advisory Opinion No. 11
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