Do past employment by parties and earlier campaign contributions require a judge to recuse?

Plain-English summary

The judge was asked to hear a suit involving former candidates for public office. Years earlier, the judge had worked for two plaintiffs, the judge's spouse had served in a governor's cabinet, and both had contributed to some plaintiffs' campaigns.

Applying Canon 3C(1), the Commission found no disqualification from the former employment unless the judge had acted as a party's legal adviser when this dispute arose or was pending. The spouse's former cabinet service did not disqualify the judge unless the spouse had participated in the case or related controversy.

The Commission also found the past campaign contributions insufficient for recusal. It said the judge was not beholden to anyone because of those contributions and could ordinarily set political preferences aside.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 1998, after the Alabama Supreme Court's 1975 adoption of the Alabama Canons of Judicial Ethics. Subsequent amendments or later opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context and verify the current Canons and linked opinion before relying on its conclusions.

Common questions

Q: Did prior employment by plaintiffs require recusal?

A: No, absent legal-adviser work for a party when the present case arose or was pending.

Q: When could the spouse’s cabinet service matter?

A: The opinion said participation by the spouse in this case or a related controversy could change the result.

Q: Did the past campaign contributions require recusal?

A: No. The Commission held that the described contributions did not disqualify the judge.

Background and rules framework

The opinion applied Alabama Canon 3C(1)’s reasonable-question test, citing Acromag-Viking v. Blalock and Matter of Sheffield. It treated former employment, spouse participation, and past campaign contributions separately.

Citations and references

Alabama Canon 3C(1); Acromag-Viking v. Blalock, 420 So. 2d 60 (Ala. 1982); Matter of Sheffield, 465 So. 2d 350 (Ala. 1984); Ex parte Melof, 553 So. 2d 554 (Ala. 1989); Jacobs v. State, 343 So. 2d 1243 (Ala. Crim. App. 1977); Advisory Opinions 89-359 through 89-362 and 97-645.

See also

• AL Judicial Ethics Op. 97-645: Campaign Contribution and Recusal

• AL Judicial Ethics Op. 89-359: Governor as Party

• AL Judicial Ethics Op. 89-360: Governor as Party in Later Case

Source

• Landing page: Alabama JIC advisory opinions

• Original PDF: Advisory Opinion 98-700

• Canon history: Alabama JIC, Canons of Judicial Ethics

Original opinion text

Reproduced from the official source for research purposes. The linked source is authoritative.

98-700
Judicial Inquiry Commission
800 SOUTH MCDONOUGH STREET
SUITE 201
MONTGOMERY, ALABAMA 36104
June 26, 1998
The Judicial Inquiry Commission has considered your request for an advisory opinion whether a judge is disqualified to hear a case against various radio and television stations who sold advertising to the plaintiffs, who were candidates for public office in the late 1980's through mid-1990's, when the judge was an employee of two of the plaintiffs several years ago when they held office, and the judge’s spouse served in the cabinet of one of the candidates who later became governor. In addition, the judge and her spouse have made campaign contributions over the years to some of the plaintiffs, ranging from $100 to over $1,000. The judge is confident that the described involvement with some of the plaintiffs would not affect her ability to hear the matter impartially. Under Canon 3C(1), Alabama Canons of Judicial Ethics, recusal is required when “facts are shown which make it reasonable for members of the public or a party, or counsel opposed to question the impartiality of the judge.” Acromag-Viking v. Blalock, 420 So.2d 60, 61 (Ala. 1982). Specifically, the test under Canon 3C(1) is: “Would a person of ordinary prudence in the judge’s position knowing all of the facts known to the judge find that there is a reasonable basis for questioning the judge’s impartiality?” Matter of Sheffield, 465 So.2d 350, 356 (Ala. 1984). The mere fact that the judge and her spouse have in the past been employed by some of the plaintiffs does not cause the judge to be disqualified. It is the opinion of the Commission that the judge is not disqualified on account of her former employment by a party unless the judge was employed as legal advisor to a party at a time when the present case arose or was pending. The Commission also finds that the judge is not disqualified on account of the former cabinet appointment of her spouse unless her spouse participated in some way in the case or a related controversy while so employed. See Advisory Opinions 89-359 through 89-362; and, Ex parte Melof, 553 So.2d 554, 556-558 (Ala. 1989). It is also the opinion of this Commission that the judge is not disqualified on account of the described past campaign contributions made by her and her spouse to some of the plaintiffs. A judge is not beholden to anyone as a result of such contributions, and a judge may be expected in the usual case to put aside any consideration of political preferences that such contributions suggest. See Advisory Opinion 97-645; and, Jacobs v. State, 343 So.2d 1243 (Ala. Crim. App. 1977). Yours truly, JUDICIAL INQUIRY COMMISSION