May an Alabama judge reject reassigned cases because of a heavy regular workload?

Plain-English summary

The inquiry asked whether a judge with a heavy regular workload could decline cases reassigned after another judge’s recusal. The Commission answered that a judge may not peremptorily reject properly assigned cases.

Canon 3A(5) requires prompt disposition of court business. The Commission recognizes that filings may be outside a judge’s control and that heavy workload can mitigate a failure-to-dispose charge. It says workload is not a complete defense and cites earlier Opinion 94-539, which rejected a district judge’s refusal to handle assigned domestic relations cases.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 1997, after the Alabama Supreme Court's 1975 adoption of the Alabama Canons of Judicial Ethics. Subsequent amendments or later opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context and verify the current Canons and linked opinion before relying on its conclusions.

Common questions

Q: Can workload excuse all delay in handling assigned cases?

A: No. The opinion allows it as a mitigating factor, not a complete defense to a prompt-disposition charge.

Background and rules framework

The Commission applies Canon 3A(5) to the specific conduct in the request. Its conclusion follows the conditions described in the official letter.

Citations and references

Alabama Canons of Judicial Ethics:

• Canon 3A(5).

Other opinions cited:

• Alabama JIC Opinion 94-539, refusal to handle designated domestic relations cases.

See also

• AL Judicial Ethics Op. 97-654: Cousin Withdraws

Source

• Landing page: Alabama JIC advisory opinions
• Original PDF: Advisory Opinion 97-651
• Canon history: Alabama JIC, Canons of Judicial Ethics

Original opinion text

Reproduced from the official source for research purposes. The linked source is authoritative.

97-651
Judicial Inquiry Commission
800 SOUTH MCDONOUGH STREET
SUITE 201
MONTGOMERY, ALABAMA 36104
June 27, 1997
The Judicial Inquiry Commission has reviewed your letter of April 2, 1997, and has construed it, in part, as a request for an advisory opinion as to whether a judge’s heavy regular workload justifies recusal from cases assigned to that judge by a presiding judge as the result of another judge’s recusal. It is the opinion of the Commission that a judge may not peremptorily reject cases properly assigned to him or her by a presiding judge. A judge’s heavy workload may be considered in mitigation of a charge of failure to dispose of cases promptly, but will not constitute a complete defense. Canon 3A(5) provides, “A judge should dispose promptly of the business of the court, being ever mindful of matters taken under submission.” The canon goes on to call for judges to submit periodic reports of the cases under submission or advisement for six months or longer, with the report to include the date the case was taken under submission or advisement “and the reasons for the failure of the judge to decide such matters or cases.” The Commentary to Canon 3A(5) explains, “Prompt disposition of the court’s business requires a judge to devote adequate time to his duties ...” What time is adequate depends, in part, on the number of cases filed, a matter which is beyond the control of the judge. Nonetheless, if the number of cases increases, Canon 3 A(5) requires a judge to apply his or her best efforts to handle that caseload. In Advisory Opinion 94-539, the Commission concluded that a district judge could not refuse to handle domestic relations cases where, pursuant to § 12-17-70, Code of Alabama, the presiding circuit judge had designated that all domestic relation cases be handled by that district judge. The Commission characterized such a peremptory refusal as “highly improper and unethical.” A judge who fails to dispose of the cases assigned to him or her promptly may be charged with and disciplined for violation of Canon 3A(5). Press of cases may be raised as a defense to such a charge. One treatise explains: Reviewing courts generally have been sympathetic to the pressures caused by heavy workloads and inadequate staffing arrangements, sometimes even suggesting that they might have considered workload as a mitigating factor even if it was not raised in the judge’s defense. However, heavy workload generally has been considered only in mitigation and not as a complete defense for failure of prompt disposition charges. Shaman, Lubet, Alfini, Judicial Conduct and Ethics, 2d ed., § 6.06, at 183 (footnotes omitted).