Must a judge recuse when a party’s attorney signed a bond in an election contest against the judge?

Short answer Opinion 95-578 finds recusal unnecessary on the stated facts unless the judge actually harbors bias or prejudice toward a party; the attorney entered the case before signing the election-contest bond.
Bar
JUDICIAL-AL
Issued
October 6, 1995

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This page answers the general question as of 1995. Ask about yours and see what the current rules of professional conduct in your state say for your facts, with citations.

Disclaimer: Advisory only. Not binding precedent.
About this page: The plain-English summary, reader guidance, and Q&A below were written by Ezel based on the official ethics opinion. The original opinion (linked on this page as a PDF) is the authoritative source for any reliance.
View original ethics opinion (PDF)

Plain-English summary

A party’s lawyer in a divorce case signed cost bonds for an election contest against the judge after the lawyer had entered the divorce case. The lawyer sought recusal months later, after the judge had made multiple rulings.

The Commission says actual bias or prejudice toward a party would require recusal under Canon 3C(l)(a). It finds that the bond signatures do not otherwise require recusal on these facts. It notes the lawyer’s earlier appearance, the delayed motion, and the absence of any allegation of actual bias, and cites opinions and cases distinguishing ordinary political opposition from a reasonable question about impartiality.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 1995, after the Alabama Supreme Court's 1975 adoption of the Alabama Canons of Judicial Ethics. Subsequent amendments or later opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context and verify the current Canons and linked opinion before relying on its conclusions.

Common questions

Q: Did the lawyer’s election-contest bond itself require recusal?

A: No. On the stated facts, the Commission finds recusal unnecessary unless the judge has actual bias or prejudice toward a party.

Q: Why did the sequence of events matter?

A: The lawyer was already representing the party before signing the bond, and the recusal motion followed months after several rulings.

Background and rules framework

The opinion applies Canon 3C(l)’s reasonable-question standard and Canon 3C(l)(a)’s actual-bias provision. It discusses judicial election realities and earlier opinions and cases involving political opponents or supporters.

Citations and references

Alabama Canons of Judicial Ethics:

  • Canon 3C(l), Canon 3C(l)(a).

Cases:

  • Clontz v. State, 531 So.2d 60, 62 (Ala. Crim. App. 1988), political involvement and impartiality.
  • Miller v. Miller, 385 So.2d 54, 55 (Ala. Civ. App. 1980), political involvement and impartiality.
  • Reach v. Reach, 378 So.2d 1115, 1117 (Ala. Civ. App. 1979), political involvement and impartiality.

Other opinions cited:

  • Alabama JIC Opinions 91-420, 84-219, and 94-520, political supporters, opponents, and later candidacy.

See also

Source

Original opinion text

Reproduced from the official source for research purposes. The linked source is authoritative.

95-578
Judicial Inquiry Commission
800 SOUTH MCDONOUGH STREET
SUITE 201
MONTGOMERY, ALABAMA 36104
October 6, 1995
The Judicial Inquiry Commission has considered your request for an advisory opinion as to whether your disqualification is required by the Canons of Judicial Ethics under the following circumstances: An election contest was filed in the Probate Court of Jefferson County contesting your election as a circuit court judge in November, 1994, and a local attorney was one of the signatories on December 2, 1994, to the bond for costs concerning this contest. After a ruling in your favor, the contestants appealed to the Alabama Supreme Court, and on July 10, 1995, the same local attorney signed again as a surety for the costs of the appeal. The attorney in question represents the plaintiff in a divorce proceeding that was initiated close to six weeks before the attorney signed the December, 1994, bond for costs. On August 22, 1995, he filed a motion for your recusal, after you had already heard numerous motions in the proceeding and had issued temporary orders and orders to compel. The Canons which appear possibly relevant to your inquiry are Canons 3C(l) and 3C(l)(a). Canon 3C(l)(a) requires recusal in the event that a judge harbors a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, for any reason. If you have any actual bias or prejudice concerning a party due to the circumstances described above, you are disqualified under Canon 3C(l)(a). Canon 3C(l) provides that a judge should disqualify himself in a proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned. The Commission has previously decided that this provision must be considered in light of the reality that judges in Alabama are subject to nomination and election through political campaigns. Both this Commission and the appellate courts in this state have generally held that mere representation of a party by a political opponent or a supporter does not cause a judge’s impartiality to be reasonably questioned. See, e.g., Advisory Opinions 91-420 and 84-219; Clontz v. State, 531 So.2d 60, 62 (Ala.Crim.App. 1988); Miller v. Miller, 385 So.2d 54, 55 (Ala.Civ.App. 1980); and Reach v.Reach, 378 So.2d 1115, 1117 (Ala.Civ.App. 1979). Where an attorney representing a party is himself an opposing candidate of the judge in an ongoing judicial election campaign, the Commission has held that a judge need not disqualify himself where the attorney’s initial appearance in the case predated the announcement of his candidacy. Advisory Opinion 94-520. This opinion was due, in part, to the principle that a party should not be able to engage in “judge-shopping” by manufacturing bias or prejudice that previously did not exist. 95-578 Page 2 From the facts provided with your opinion request, the attorney in question was already involved in the litigation in question before he signed the bond for costs. The Commission also finds it significant that the motion for recusal was not made until months later, after numerous rulings and without any allegation of actual bias or prejudice. It is the opinion of the Commission that your recusal is not required in this case unless you have an actual bias or prejudice concerning a party to the case.

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