How did the Commission originally treat a judge’s accounts and loans with a bank appearing as a party?

Plain-English summary

A circuit judge asked whether checking accounts and secured and unsecured loans with a bank disqualified the judge from a case involving that bank. The 1995 opinion says those relationships alone do not require recusal. It identifies personal bias or an interest that could be substantially affected by the case as grounds for disqualification.

The 1995 Commission also said the judge should disclose the relationship and recuse if a party requested it, even when technical disqualification was absent. The official PDF marks the opinion as modified by Opinion 09-903. In that later opinion, the Commission rejected an inference that ordinary bank accounts or loans alone create a reasonable question of impartiality and directed consideration of all circumstances of the bank relationship and the case.

Currency note

The official 1995 PDF is marked “Modified by 09-903.” Opinion 09-903, issued December 11, 2009, rejects an inference that ordinary bank accounts or loans alone reasonably question impartiality and directs the judge to assess the totality of the circumstances. The Alabama Supreme Court adopted the Alabama Canons of Judicial Ethics in 1975. Treat this page as historical context and check the later opinion and current Canons before relying on the 1995 recusal-on-request passage.

Common questions

Q: Did an ordinary account or loan alone disqualify the judge under the 1995 opinion?

A: No. The Commission distinguished ordinary customer and debtor relationships from actual bias or an interest substantially affected by the case.

Q: Is the 1995 direction to recuse whenever a party requests it still the Commission’s analysis?

A: Opinion 09-903 reevaluated that language and rejected the inference that an ordinary account or loan alone reasonably questions impartiality. It calls for assessment of the totality of circumstances.

Background and rules framework

The 1995 opinion discusses Canon 3C(l) on questioned impartiality, Canon 3C(1)(d)(ii) on substantially affected interests, Canon 3D on remittal, and Canon 2 on the appearance of impropriety. Opinion 09-903 revisits the inference drawn from ordinary bank relationships.

Citations and references

Alabama Canons of Judicial Ethics:

• Canon 3C(l), Canon 2, Canon 3D, Canon 3C(1)(d)(ii).

Other opinions cited:

• Alabama JIC Opinions 76-5, 86-249, 86-260, 86-276, 89-367, 89-369, 95-555, and 95-558, prior bank-relationship rulings; Opinion 09-903, later modification.

See also

• AL Judicial Ethics Op. 95-585: Utility Customer
• AL Judicial Ethics Op. 96-617: Former Bank Stock

Source

• Landing page: Alabama JIC advisory opinions
• Original PDF: Advisory Opinion 95-571
• Later modifying opinion: Alabama JIC Opinion 09-903
• Canon history: Alabama JIC, Canons of Judicial Ethics

Original opinion text

Reproduced from the official source for research purposes. The linked source is authoritative.

95-571
[Modified by 09-903]
Judicial Inquiry Commission
800 SOUTH MCDONOUGH STREET
SUITE 201
MONTGOMERY, ALABAMA 36104
August 11, 1995
The Judicial Inquiry Commission had considered your request for an advisory opinion concerning whether a circuit judge may preside over a case in which a bank is a party where the judge has a long standing relationship with that bank involving checking accounts and both secured and unsecured loan business. You requested clarification of JIC Advisory Opinion 76-5 in this regard, and you noted that disqualification of all local judges would be a strong possibility in a rural circuit if such a relationship caused disqualification. JIC Advisory Opinion 76-5 was the first opinion of the Commission concerning disqualification in a case in which a bank is a party. It dealt with the situation in which a judge is indebted to a bank with which he regularly transacts business in the form of loans evidenced by promissory notes. The Commission decided that this fact alone would not cause disqualification unless the relationship actually created some personal bias in favor of the bank, but that a judge should reveal the relationship to counsel and recuse himself or herself if either counsel interposes an objection, in order to avoid the appearance of impropriety. In Advisory Opinions 86-249, 86-260, 89-367, and 95-555, the Commission held that a judge’s ownership of a bank account creating a bank/customer relationship with the bank did not itself disqualify the judge from sitting in all proceedings involving the bank as a party, but that disqualification would occur if the judge’s bank account or bank/customer relationship could be substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding, but that any such disqualification could be remitted under Canon 3D. In Advisory Opinion 86-276, the Commission reaffirmed that the mere existence of a debtor/creditor relationship with a bank due to secured or unsecured loans does not cause disqualification, but in Advisory Opinions 89-369 and 95-558 the Commission cautioned that disqualification would exist if there were additional circumstances such as the granting of special favors or the creation of a personal bias either in favor of or against the bank, and that any disqualification due to personal bias could not be remitted. The Commission also noted in Advisory Opinion 95-558 that disqualification would occur under Canon 3C(1)(d)(ii) if the debt could be substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding, but that such disqualification may be remitted under Canon 3D. Under the general terms of Canon 3C(l), a judge must disqualify himself whenever his impartiality might reasonably be questioned. While disqualification is not technically required in situations involving the mere existence of a bank/customer relationship or a debtor/creditor relationship, 95-571 Page 2 the Commission has previously ruled that the judge should advise the parties of the relationship, and to avoid even the appearance of impropriety, should recuse himself if requested to do so. Canons 2 and 3C(l). Advisory Opinions 76-5, 86- 287 and 89-371. Advisory Opinion 95-558. While a judge may have a long-standing relationship with a bank involving accounts and secured and unsecured loans, these facts alone do not cause disqualification unless the relationship creates some personal bias for or against the bank or if the relationship could be substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding; however, even in the absence of a disqualification, the judge should advise the parties of the relationship and, to avoid even the appearance of impropriety, recuse himself if requested to do so. The Rule of Necessity does not require an alteration of the Commission’s conclusions in this regard despite the fact that all of the judges in a rural circuit might have to recuse themselves where the bank is a party since the law provides for the assignment of a circuit judge from another circuit or a supernumerary judge in such a situation.