Does a prior recusal or ordinary acquaintance with a party require recusal in a later case?

Plain-English summary

A circuit judge had recused from an earlier case because her husband held stock in a corporate defendant. A current plaintiff's husband was connected to that corporation, but the corporation itself was not a party in the new case. The judge also knew the current parties through old political and occasional social contacts.

The Commission found the earlier financial-interest ground absent from the current case, regardless of disputed claims about the plaintiff's husband's interest. It also found that the ordinary acquaintanceships described were not the close personal friendships requiring recusal. The judge's prior recusal and these social contacts did not disqualify her on the stated facts.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 2001, after the Alabama Supreme Court's 1975 adoption of the Alabama Canons of Judicial Ethics. Subsequent amendments or later opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context and verify the current Canons and linked opinion before relying on its conclusions.

Common questions

Q: Did the earlier recusal carry into the new case?

A: No. The stock-holding corporation was not a party to the new suit, so the earlier ground was absent.

Q: Were occasional social encounters enough for disqualification?

A: No. The Commission found no close personal friendship in the described contacts.

Background and rules framework

The opinion contrasted the earlier Canon 3C(1)(c) financial-interest ground with the current Canon 3C(1) reasonable-question standard. It treated ordinary acquaintance and close personal friendship differently.

Citations and references

The opinion cites Alabama Canons 3C(1) and 3C(1)(c); Acromag-Viking v. Blalock, 420 So. 2d 60 (Ala. 1982); Matter of Sheffield, 465 So. 2d 350 (Ala. 1984); Ex parte Hill, 508 So. 2d 269 (Ala. Civ. App. 1987); Clemmons v. State, 469 So. 2d 1324 (Ala. Crim. App. 1985); Bryars v. Bryars, 485 So. 2d 1187 (Ala. Civ. App. 1986); and Advisory Opinions 93-510, 93-511, 95-541, 96-613, 99-729, and 01-776.

See also

• AL Judicial Ethics Op. 96-613: Old Acquaintance and Contributions

Source

• Landing page: Alabama JIC advisory opinions

• Original PDF: Advisory Opinion 01-782

• Canon history: Alabama JIC, Canons of Judicial Ethics

Original opinion text

Reproduced from the official source for research purposes. The linked source is authoritative.

JUDICIAL INQUIRY COMMISSION
DATE ISSUED: JULY 13, 2001 ADVISORY OPINION 01-782
DIS QUALIFIC A T IO N DUE TO
ACQUAINTANCE WITH A PARTY
AND/OR PRIOR RECUSAL FROM
ANOTHER CASE
ISSUES
Is a judge disqualified to hear a particular
case, either on account of acquaintance with
partiesand/ordueto havingrecusedin another
case in which a party’s husband was a
defendant? Answer: No.
FACTS
A circuit judge has been asked to recuse
herself from a case in which a particular
person is a plaintiff on the ground that the
judge had previously recused herself from a
case in which that person’s spouse was a
defendant. Another defendant in the former
case was a corporation of which the current
party’s husband is president and CEO. There
are disputed assertions in the present case that
the current party’s husband may have a
financial interest in the matter and that he may
be the real party in interest.
The basis for the judge’s recusal in the former
case was that the judge’s husband owned
stock in the corporate defendant in that case.
The corporation is not involved in the current
case. The judge states that the number of
shares of the corporation her husband owns
would be considered de minimis under the
current Canon 3C(3)(c).
The judge has been acquainted with the
current partyandtheparty’shusbandfor many
years. More than twenty years ago, she
attended a couple of political functions held in
their home for a gubernatorial candidate, and
she saw them on many other occasions during
the course of that campaign. Several years
ago, the judge attended an engagement party
the couple hosted for the son of one of the
judge’s friends. She occasionally sees them at
social and public engagements and exchanges
brief pleasantries with them. In addition, the
judge’s husband occasionally sees another
party plaintiff at a local popular breakfast
restaurant.
The judge states that she knows she can be fair
and impartial in the case pending before her.
DISCUSSION
Under the facts presented, the Commission
can find no basis for disqualification of the
judge related to her recusal from an earlier
case in which the spouse of a current party
was a defendant. Recusal in the earlier case
wasbasedonthejudge’shusband’sownership
of a financial interest in a corporation that was
also a party in that case. This disqualification
was specifically required by the terms of
Canon 3C(1)(c) in effect at the time. The
judge believes that her husband’s ownership
interest would not be disqualifying were the
former case to be before her now since the
definition of disqualifying financial interest
has been amended to exclude ownership of a
de minimis portion of the securities of a
publiclytraded corporation. The Commission
need not consider what constitutes a de
minimis interest, since the facts before the
Commission do not indicate that the
corporation is a party in the present suit. The
basis for disqualification under Canon
3C(1)(c) that existed in the former suit simply
does not exist in the present one.
ADVISORY OPINION 01-782
PAGE 2
Under Canon 3C(1), Alabama Canons of
JudicialEthics,recusalisrequiredwhen“facts
are shown which make it reasonable for
members of the public or a party, or counsel
opposed to question the impartiality of the
judge.” Acromag-Viking v. Blalock, 420
So.2d 60, 61 (Ala. 1982). Specifically, the
test under Canon 3C(1) is: “Would a person
of ordinary prudence in the judge’s position
knowing all of the facts known to the judge
find that there is a reasonable basis for
questioning the judge’s impartiality?” Matter
of Sheffield, 465 So.2d 350, 356 (Ala. 1984).
In the opinion of the Commission, neither the
fact that the spouse of the current plaintiff is
president and CEO of the corporation
involved in the former case nor the spouse’s
possible personal interest in the present case
create a reasonable question as to the judge’s
impartiality.
The Commission has addressed questions
involving a judge’s friendship or other
association with a party on a number of prior
occasions. See, e.g., Advisory Opinions 93-
510, 93-511, 95-541, 96-613, 99-729, and 01-

776. “Whether or not disqualification is
     required when a friend appears as a party to a
     suit before a judge depends on how personal
     the relationship is between the judge and the
     party.” J. Shaman, S. Lubet, J. Alfini,
     Judicial Conduct and Ethics §4.15 at 137 (3rd
     ed. 2000). “[I]t is an inescapable fact of life
     that judges serving throughout the State will
     necessarily have had associations and
     friendships with parties coming before their
     courts. A judge should not be subject to
     disqualification for such ordinary relations
     with his fellow citizens.” See, Ex parte Hill,
     508 So. 2d 269, 272 (Ala. Civ. App. 1987)
     (judge’s recusal upheld where judge recused
     himself because “there has been a long
     association between the parties and this judge
     and his wife, from living together at an early
     age in an apartment complex to
     communication and schooling of the children,
     church affiliation and manyother associations
     over the years”). See also, Clemmons v. State,
     469 So. 2d 1324 (Ala. Crim. App. 1985)
     (“that the trial judge and victim knew each
     other and possibly enjoyed a friendship both
     professionally and socially is not reason
     enough to require the judge to recuse
     himself”).
     The type of close personal friendship that
     would require disqualification of a judge
     under Canon 3C(1) is not present in this case.
     Compare, Bryars v. Bryars, 485 So.2d 1187
     (Ala. Civ. App. 1986). Thus, the Commission
     concludes that the Canons of Judicial Ethics
     do not require disqualification of the judge on
     account of the acquaintanceships in this case.
     REFERENCES
     Alabama Advisory Opinions 93-510, 93-511,
     95-541, 96-613, 99-729, and 01-776.
     Alabama Canons of Judicial Ethics, Canon
     3C(1) and 3C(1)(c).
     Acromag-Viking v. Blalock, 420 So.2d 60
     (Ala. 1982).
     Bryars v. Bryars, 485 So.2d 1187 (Ala. Civ.
     App. 1986).
     Clemmons v. State, 469 So. 2d 1324 (Ala.
     Crim. App. 1985).
     Ex parte Hill, 508 So. 2d 269 (Ala. Civ. App.
     1987).
     ADVISORY OPINION 01-782
     PAGE 3
     J. Shaman, S. Lubet, J. Alfini, Judicial
     Conduct and Ethics §4.15 (3rd ed. 2000).
     Matter of Sheffield, 465 So.2d 350 (Ala.
     1984).
     This opinion is advisory only and is based on
     the specific facts and questions submitted by
     the judge who requested the opinion pursuant
     to Rule 17 of the Rules of Procedure of the
     Judicial Inquiry Commission. For further
     information, you may contact the Judicial
     Inquiry Commission, 800 South McDonough
     Street, Suite 201, Montgomery, Alabama
     36104; tel.: (334) 242-4089; fax: (334) 240-
     3327; E-mail: [email protected].