Do an alleged friendship, small campaign donations, shared political party, and law school require recusal?

Plain-English summary

A divorce litigant sought recusal because opposing counsel was supposedly a close friend of the judge, counsel and his firm had each donated $100 to the judge's 1994 campaign, and counsel and the judge shared a political party and law school. The judge described no social relationship with counsel.

The Commission found neither the donations nor ordinary political and educational associations sufficient to raise a reasonable question of impartiality. It treated the disputed friendship claim as an unfounded accusation and found no close personal friendship. Considering the facts together, it found no disqualification unless the judge had developed personal bias or prejudice.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 2001, after the Alabama Supreme Court's 1975 adoption of the Alabama Canons of Judicial Ethics. Subsequent amendments or later opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context and verify the current Canons and linked opinion before relying on its conclusions.

Common questions

Q: Did the two $100 donations require recusal?

A: No. The Commission found those contributions did not reasonably call impartiality into question on these facts.

Q: Did the alleged friendship and shared affiliations change the result?

A: No. It found no close friendship, and neither shared political party nor law school caused recusal, even considered with the other facts.

Background and rules framework

The Commission applied Alabama Canon 3C(1)'s reasonable-question standard. It distinguished ordinary lawyer associations and unfounded accusations from close personal friendship, bias, or special circumstances.

Citations and references

The opinion cites Alabama Canon 3C(1); In re Sheffield, 465 So. 2d 350 (Ala. 1984); Ex parte Hill, 508 So. 2d 269 (Ala. Civ. App. 1987); Bryars v. Bryars, 485 So. 2d 1187 (Ala. Civ. App. 1986); Murphy v. State, 455 So. 2d 924 (Ala. Crim. App. 1984); and Advisory Opinions 85-235, 95-541, 96-607, 96-613, 98-698, 99-722, 99-725, 99-729, 00-752, and 00-761.

See also

• AL Judicial Ethics Op. 01-783: Contributions and Endorsement

Source

• Landing page: Alabama JIC advisory opinions

• Original PDF: Advisory Opinion 01-776

• Canon history: Alabama JIC, Canons of Judicial Ethics

Original opinion text

Reproduced from the official source for research purposes. The linked source is authoritative.

JUDICIAL INQUIRY COMMISSION
DATE ISSUED: APRIL 26, 2001 ADVISORY OPINION 01-776
DISQUALIFICATION ON ALLEGATION
OF FRIENDSHIP WITH, AND/OR DUE TO
CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS FROM,
POLITICAL AFFILIATION OF, AND LAW
SCHOOLATTENDEDBYANATTORNEY
IN THE CASE
ISSUES
Is a circuit judge disqualified to hear a divorce
action due to:

1. An unfounded allegation that the judge is
   close friends with one of the attorneys in
   the case? Answer: No.
2. The same attorney and his law firm each
   having made a $100 contribution to the
   judge’s 1994 campaign fund? Answer:
   No.
3. The judge and the same attorney both
   being Democrats? Answer: No.
4. The judge and the same attorney both
   having graduated from the University of
   Alabama Law School? Answer: No.
5. The totality of the above circumstances?
   Answer: No.
   FACTS
   A circuit judge has been asked to recuse
   himself from a divorce action.
   The defendant was allegedly told by the
   plaintiff that there is no way he will prevail
   because her attorney is a “good friend” of the
   judge. The plaintiff denies having said this,
   and counsel for plaintiff denies having made
   such a statement to his client. The judge
   considers plaintiff’s counsel to be an excellent
   attorney, but he does not consider him a “good
   friend.” They have no social relationship; they
   have never been to each other’s homes and
   have never engaged in any recreational activity
   together.
   Plaintiff’s attorney contributed $100 to the
   judge’s 1994 election campaign fund, and the
   law firm in which he is a partner contributed
   another $100 to the judge’s 1994 campaign
   fund. Another partner in the same firm
   contributed to the judge’s opponent in the 1994
   election.
   The defendant also alleges as grounds for
   recusal that both the judge and plaintiff’s
   counsel are Democrats, and that both are
   graduates of the University of Alabama School
   of Law.
   DISCUSSION
   The inquiring judge notes that prior Advisory
   Opinions 96-607, 98-698, and 99-725 have
   indicated that mere receipt of campaign
   contributions such as those at issue does not
   cause disqualification, but that Advisory
   Opinion 99-725 states there may be “other
   facts” which would cause the judge’s
   impartiality to reasonably be questioned. He
   specifically asks for guidance as to whether the
   additional facts in this case bring his
   impartiality into reasonable question.
   Under the Alabama Canons of Judicial Ethics,
   disqualification is required when the judge’s
   “impartialitymightreasonablybequestioned.”
   Canon 3C(1). The test to determine whether a
   judge’s impartiality might reasonably be
   ADVISORY OPINION 01-776
   PAGE 2
   questioned is “would a person of ordinary
   prudence in the judge’s position knowing all
   of the facts known to the judge find that there
   is a reasonable basis for questioning the
   judge’s impartiality?” In re Sheffield, 465 So.
   2d 350, 356 (Ala. 1984).
   Consistent with its prior opinions on the
   subject, the Commission finds that the
   campaigncontributions atissuedonot present
   a reasonable basis to question the judge’s
   impartiality. Likewise, a judge’s impartiality
   cannot be reasonably questioned merely
   because the judge and an attorney in the case
   belong to the same political party.
   As the Commission has previously observed,
   judges necessarily will have associations and
   even friendships with attorneys and parties
   coming before their courts, and a judge is not
   disqualified for such ordinary relationships
   with fellow citizens. Whether or not a judge
   is disqualified based on friendship depends on
   how personal the relationship is between the
   judgeand the person connected to the lawsuit.
   Advisory Opinions 95-541, 99-722, 99-729,
   and 00-752. See also, J. Shaman, S. Lubet, J.
   Alfini, Judicial Conduct and Ethics, § 4.15 at
   137 (3rd ed. 2000); and Ex parte Hill, 508
   So.2d 269, 272 (Ala. Civ. App. 1987). The
   type of close personal friendship that would
   require disqualification under Canon 3C(1) is
   not present in this case. Compare, Bryars v.
   Bryars, 485 So. 2d 1187 (Ala. Civ. App.
   1986). “The fact that one of the parties before
   the court is known to and thought well of by
   the judge is not sufficient to show bias.
   Duncan v. Sherrill, 341 So. 2d 946 (Ala.
   1977).” Murphy v. State, 455 So. 2d 924, 929
   (Ala. Cr. App. 1984).
   The statement allegedly made by the plaintiff
   concerning friendship between the judge and
   an attorney in the case amounts to an
   accusation that the judge will act in a biased
   fashion. Thus, the Commission finds it
   appropriate to also observe that it has long
   held that a judge is not disqualified on the
   basis of accusations by litigants or their
   attorneys unless 1) the judge develops a
   personal bias or prejudice concerning a party
   as a result, or 2) special circumstances exist
   such that the making of the particular
   complaint actually causes the judge’s
   impartiality to be reasonably questionable.
   See Advisory Opinion 00-761 and prior
   opinions cited therein. As the Commission
   commented in AdvisoryOpinion 85-235, “[I]t
   is difficult to imagine an independent
   judiciary governed merely by . . . unfounded
   accusations.” The accusation made in the
   present case does not itself create a reasonable
   question as to the judge’s impartiality. Thus,
   the Commission is of the opinion that the
   judge is not disqualified unless he has actually
   been influenced and has developed a personal
   bias or prejudice concerning a party.
   The Commission also is of the opinion that a
   judge’s impartiality may not reasonably be
   questioned on the ground that he and an
   attorney in the case both attended the same
   law school. See, Advisory Opinion 96-613
   (the judge and a party both attended the Air
   Force Academy); and Advisory Opinion 95-
   541 (the judge and a party attend the same
   Sunday school class).
   Finally, upon consideration of the totality of
   the circumstances in this case, the
   Commission finds no reasonable question as
   to the judge’s impartiality. Thus, the
   Commission concludes that, unless the judge
   has developed a personal bias or prejudice, the
   canons do not require his disqualification.
   ADVISORY OPINION 01-776
   PAGE 3
   REFERENCES
   Alabama Advisory Opinions 85-235, 95-541,
   96-607, 96-613, 98-698, 99-722, 99-725, 99-
   729, 00-752, and 00-761.
   Alabama Canons of Judicial Ethics, Canon
   3C(1).
   Bryars v. Bryars, 485 So. 2d 1187 (Ala. Civ.
   App. 1986).
   Ex parte Hill, 508 So.2d 269 (Ala. Civ. App.
   1987).
   In re Sheffield, 465 So. 2d 350 (Ala. 1984).
   J. Shaman, S. Lubet, J. Alfini, Judicial
   Conduct and Ethics, § 4.15 at 137 (3rd ed.
   2000)
   Murphy v. State, 455 So. 2d 924 (Ala. Cr.
   App. 1984).
   This opinion is advisory only and is based on
   the specific facts and questions submitted by
   the judge who requested the opinion pursuant
   to Rule 17 of the Rules of Procedure of the
   Judicial Inquiry Commission. For further
   information, you may contact the Judicial
   Inquiry Commission, 800 South McDonough
   Street, Suite 201, Montgomery, Alabama
   36104; tel.: (334) 242-4089; fax: (334) 240-
   3327; e-mail: [email protected].