Must a university trustee judge recuse from a malpractice suit against doctors employed by its hospital?

Short answer Yes. Though the university was not a party, the case involved its hospital's employees and could reflect on the hospital or clinic, creating a reasonable question about the trustee judge's impartiality.
Bar
JUDICIAL-AL
Issued
March 8, 2001

Apply this to your situation

This page answers the general question as of 2001. Ask about yours and see what the current rules of professional conduct in your state say for your facts, with citations.

Disclaimer: Advisory only. Not binding precedent.
About this page: The plain-English summary, reader guidance, and Q&A below were written by Ezel based on the official ethics opinion. The original opinion (linked on this page as a PDF) is the authoritative source for any reliance.
View original ethics opinion (PDF)

Plain-English summary

A circuit judge was a university trustee. A birth-injury tort case before him named doctors employed by the university hospital, their insurers, and a university clinic. A university foundation had been removed as a defendant. Counsel did not object and the judge reported no bias or disputed-fact knowledge.

The Commission found recusal required under Canon 3C(1)'s general impartiality standard. The university was not a party, so the specific trustee-of-a-party ground did not apply; nevertheless, the litigation could reflect on its hospital or clinic and reasonably call the trustee judge's impartiality into question.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 2001, after the Alabama Supreme Court's 1975 adoption of the Alabama Canons of Judicial Ethics. Subsequent amendments or later opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context and verify the current Canons and linked opinion before relying on its conclusions.

Common questions

Q: Did the university have to remain a named party for recusal?

A: No. The Commission found a reasonable question even though the university itself was not a party.

Q: Did the lawyers' lack of objection change the result?

A: No. The opinion recorded that no lawyer objected but still concluded the judge was disqualified.

Background and rules framework

Alabama Canon 3C(1)(d)(i) addresses a judge who is trustee of a party. Since the university was not itself a party, the Commission instead applied Canon 3C(1)'s general reasonable-question standard to the university hospital relationship.

Citations and references

The opinion cites Alabama Canons 3C(1) and 3C(1)(d)(i); Matter of Sheffield, 465 So. 2d 350 (Ala. 1984); and Ex parte Duncan, 638 So. 2d 1332 (Ala. 1994).

See also

Source

Original opinion text

Reproduced from the official source for research purposes. The linked source is authoritative.

JUDICIAL INQUIRY COMMISSION
DATE ISSUED: MARCH 8, 2001 ADVISORY OPINION 01-774
DISQUALIFICATION WHEN THE JUDGE
IS A TRUSTEE OF THE ENTITY THAT
GOVERNS THE DEFENDANTS’
EMPLOYERINANACTIONRELATEDTO
THE EMPLOYMENT
ISSUES
Is a judge disqualified to hear a personal
injury action in which the doctor defendants
are employed by a university hospital when
the judge is a trustee for the university?
Answer: Yes, the circumstances create a
reasonable question as to the judge’s
impartiality.
FACTS
A circuit judge has been assigned a tort action
involving birth injuries that names as
defendants three doctors employed by a
university’shospital,twoinsurancecompanies
whoinsurethedoctors,andauniversityclinic.
The judge is a trustee of the university; the
university is the governing body for the
hospital. When the case was originally filed,
the university’s health services foundation
also was named as a defendant, but the
plaintiff has amended the complaint to delete
the foundation as a party. None of the
attorneys in the case object to the judge
hearing the case. The judge states that he has
no personal bias or prejudice that would affect
his judgment, and he has no knowledge of
disputed evidentiary facts concerning the
proceeding.
DISCUSSION
None of the specific grounds of
disqualification stated in the subsections of
Canon 3C(1) apply to the question presented.
Thus, the issue is whether the judge is
disqualified under that canon’s general
provision requiring disqualification when the
judge’s “impartiality might reasonably be
questioned.”
“Recusal is required under Canon
3C(l) when ‘facts are shown which
make it reasonable for members of the
public or a party, or counsel opposed
to question the impartiality of the
judge.’ Acromag-Viking v. Blalock,
420, So.2d 60, 61 (Ala. 1982). See,
also, Wallace [v. Wallace, 352 So.2d
1376, 1379, (Ala.Civ.App. 1977)].
Specifically, the Canon 3C(l) test is:
‘Would a person of ordinary prudence
in the judge’s position knowing all of
the facts known to the judge find that
there is a reasonable basis for
questioning the judge’s impartiality?’
Thode, The Code of Judicial Conduct

  • The First Five Years in the
    Courts,1977 Utah L.Rev. 395, 402.”
    Matter of Sheffield, 465 So.2d 350, 355-356
    (Ala. 1984). The issue under Canon 3C(1) is
    not whether the judge is impartial in fact, but
    rather whether another person, knowing all of
    the circumstances, might reasonably question
    the judge’s impartiality. Ex parte Duncan,
    638 So.2d 1332, 1334 (Ala. 1994). The
    recusal test stated in Canon 3C(1) sometimes
    bars trial by a judge who has no actual bias in
    the case. Matter of Sheffield, 465 So.2d at
    356.
    Canon 3C(1)(d)(i) requires disqualification
    whenever a judge is a trustee of a party.
    Although the university of which the judge is
    ADVISORY OPINION 01-774
    PAGE 2
    a trustee is not a party to the case, the suit
    involves the professional conduct of
    employees of the university’s hospital. The
    facts and issues presented may reflect upon
    the university’s hospital and/or its clinic.
    Under these circumstances, it is the opinion of
    the Commission that a person of ordinary
    prudence might reasonably question the
    impartiality of the judge. Thus, the
    Commission concludes that the judge is
    disqualified to hear the case.
    REFERENCES
    Alabama Canons of Judicial Ethics, Canons
    3C(1) and 3C(1)(d)(i).
    Ex parte Duncan, 638 So.2d 1332 (Ala.
    1994).
    Matter of Sheffield, 465 So.2d 350 (Ala.
    1984).
    This opinion is advisory only and is based on
    the specific facts and questions submitted by
    the judge who requested the opinion pursuant
    to Rule 17 of the Rules of Procedure of the
    Judicial Inquiry Commission. For further
    information, you may contact the Judicial
    Inquiry Commission, 800 South McDonough
    Street, Suite 201, Montgomery, Alabama
    36104; tel.: (334) 242-4089; fax: (334) 240-
    3327; E-mail: [email protected].

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