DCBAR August 2025

When a lawyer's own prior work for a client becomes an issue in later litigation, can the lawyer keep representing that client or must the lawyer step aside?

Short answer: The opinion concludes that a personal-interest conflict under Rule 1.7(b)(4) can arise when the lawyer's prior work is at issue; the lawyer may continue only on a reasonable belief that she can provide competent, diligent representation plus the client's informed consent after full disclosure. Under Rule 3.7, a lawyer likely to be a necessary witness may not act as trial advocate unless one of the rule's three exceptions applies.

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This page answers the general question as of 2025. Ezel answers yours: whether it's allowed on your facts, under the current rules of professional conduct in your state, with citations.

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About this page: The plain-English summary, reader guidance, and Q&A below were written by Ezel based on the official ethics opinion. The original opinion (linked on this page) is the authoritative source for any reliance.

Plain-English summary

Opinion 390 (published August 2025) addresses what a lawyer must consider when the lawyer's own prior work for a client later becomes an issue in litigation or other representation for that same client, for example when tax advice becomes the subject of an IRS dispute or drafted contract language becomes the subject of litigation. The Committee answers three inquiries: when Rule 1.7 precludes the representation, when Rule 3.7 precludes the lawyer from advocating at trial, and what the lawyer's obligations are when attorney-client privilege issues arise from the prior work.

On Rule 1.7, the opinion treats Rule 1.7(b)(4) as the threshold: the lawyer must decide whether her professional judgment will be or reasonably may be adversely affected by an interest in her prior work, such as a temptation to choose a strategy that avoids exposing the work's shortcomings. If the conflict exists, the lawyer may proceed only under Rule 1.7(c), which requires both a reasonable belief that she can provide competent and diligent representation and the client's informed consent after full disclosure of the conflict's existence, nature, and possible adverse consequences. The Committee states that written disclosure and consent, while not required, are prudent, and that the lawyer should consider advising the client to obtain independent advice on whether to retain her.

On Rule 3.7, the opinion concludes that a lawyer who is likely to be a necessary witness may not act as advocate at trial unless the testimony relates to an uncontested issue, relates to the nature and value of legal services rendered in the case, or disqualification would work substantial hardship on the client. The opinion notes that Rule 3.7 reaches only trial advocacy (not pre-trial work, per D.C. Opinion 228) and carries no general imputation, so other firm lawyers may serve as advocate unless Rule 1.7 or Rule 1.9 bars them. Finally, the opinion explains that a client's decision to assert an advice-of-counsel or good-faith defense can waive privilege over the lawyer's prior communications, which can sharpen the Rule 1.7 conflict and make the lawyer more likely to be a necessary witness.

In practice

Under this opinion, a lawyer whose prior work becomes an issue in a later matter for the same client works through Rules 1.7 and 3.7 in sequence. The opinion concludes that Rule 1.7(b)(4) is the starting point: the lawyer must determine whether an interest in defending her own prior work will or reasonably may adversely affect her judgment. If it will, the lawyer may continue only under Rule 1.7(c), on a reasonable belief that she can provide competent and diligent representation and the client's informed consent after full disclosure; the opinion states that written disclosure and consent are prudent and that suggesting independent counsel may be appropriate.

On the witness question, the opinion concludes that under Rule 3.7 a lawyer likely to be a necessary witness may not act as trial advocate unless the testimony is on an uncontested issue, concerns the nature and value of legal services in the case, or disqualification would work substantial hardship on the client. The opinion states that Rule 3.7 does not reach pre-trial work and carries no general imputation, so another firm lawyer may still serve as advocate unless Rule 1.7 or 1.9 precludes it. It also notes that asserting an advice-of-counsel or good-faith defense can waive privilege over the lawyer's prior communications, increasing the likelihood the lawyer becomes a necessary witness.

Common questions

Q: My prior work for a client is now disputed in new litigation. Can I keep representing the client?

A: The opinion concludes you must first ask under Rule 1.7(b)(4) whether your interest in defending your own prior work will or reasonably may adversely affect your judgment; if it will, you may continue only if you reasonably believe you can give competent, diligent representation and the client gives informed consent after full disclosure.

Q: If I am likely to be a witness, can I still try the case?

A: The opinion concludes that under Rule 3.7 a lawyer likely to be a necessary witness may not act as advocate at trial unless the testimony relates to an uncontested issue or to the nature and value of legal services in the case, or disqualification would work substantial hardship on the client.

Q: Does Rule 3.7 stop me from handling pre-trial work too?

A: No. The opinion concludes, consistent with D.C. Opinion 228 and ABA Informal Opinion 89-1529, that Rule 3.7 applies only to advocacy at trial; a lawyer may generally work on and appear in pre-trial matters even if disqualified from advocating at trial.

Q: Are my partners disqualified if I am a witness?

A: Not automatically. The opinion concludes there is no general imputed disqualification under Rule 3.7, so other lawyers in the firm may act as advocates unless Rule 1.7 or Rule 1.9 independently precludes them.

Q: How does a privilege waiver factor in?

A: The opinion concludes that if the client asserts an advice-of-counsel or good-faith defense that waives privilege over the lawyer's prior communications, the Rule 1.7 conflict can sharpen and the lawyer becomes more likely to be a necessary witness, so the lawyer must fully inform the client and reassess whether she can still provide competent, diligent representation.

Background and rules framework

The opinion addresses situations where a lawyer's prior work for a client becomes an issue in a later matter for the same client. Rule 1.7(b)(4) bars representation when the lawyer's professional judgment will be or reasonably may be adversely affected by the lawyer's own interests, and Rule 1.7(c) permits it despite the conflict only on the client's informed consent plus the lawyer's reasonable belief that competent and diligent representation is possible. Rule 3.7(a) bars a lawyer who is likely to be a necessary witness from acting as advocate at trial, subject to three exceptions, and Rule 3.7(b) addresses when another firm lawyer may serve as advocate.

The opinion also draws on Rule 1.9 (former-client conflicts), Rule 1.10 (imputation), Rule 1.6(e)(1) (use or revelation of client confidences and secrets), Rule 1.4(b) (communication), and the Rule 1.0(e) definition of informed consent.

Citations and references

Rules of Professional Conduct:

  • D.C. RPC 1.7(b)(4), (c) / Model Rule 1.7 (conflicts of interest: general rule)
  • D.C. RPC 3.7 / Model Rule 3.7 (lawyer as witness)
  • D.C. RPC 1.9 / Model Rule 1.9 (former-client conflicts)
  • D.C. RPC 1.10 / Model Rule 1.10 (imputed disqualification)
  • D.C. RPC 1.6(e)(1) / Model Rule 1.6 (confidentiality of information)
  • D.C. RPC 1.4(b) / Model Rule 1.4 (communication)
  • D.C. RPC 1.0(e) / Model Rule 1.0 (terminology; informed consent)

Cases:

  • In re Conduct of Kluge, 335 Or. 326 (2003), lawyer's interest in defending his prior work created a conflict requiring disclosure and consent
  • In re Kieler, 290 Kan. 397 (2010), Rule 1.7 violation where the lawyer continued after a malpractice claim ripened without informed consent
  • In re Marriage of Wixom, 182 Wash. App. 881, actual conflict over fee responsibility that the client could not waive
  • Ambush v. Engelberg, 282 F. Supp. 3d 58 (D.D.C. 2017), lawyer could continue where the client consented after advice from another attorney
  • United States v. Bilzerian, 926 F.2d 1285 (2d Cir. 1991), attorney-client privilege implicitly waived when the defendant raised a good-faith defense

Other opinions cited:

  • D.C. Bar Ethics Op. 228: Rule 3.7 applies only to advocacy at trial, not pre-trial matters
  • ABA Informal Op. 89-1529 (1989): same
  • Iowa Ethics Op. 09-03 (2009): conflicts and the lawyer-as-witness rule where prior work is at issue

See also

Source

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