If a junior lawyer discovers that the supervising lawyer faked correspondence to a client, must she tell the client and report the supervisor, even after she quits?
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This page answers the general question as of 1997. Ezel answers yours: whether it's allowed on your facts, under the current rules of professional conduct in your state, with citations.
Plain-English summary
Opinion 270 (adopted March 19, 1997) addressed a lawyer hired through a temporary agency to work for a sole practitioner. Within her first days, the employing lawyer told her that, when a client insisted on sending an aggressive letter he thought imprudent, his practice was to draft the letter to satisfy the client but not send it, then send the client a copy to make it look as though it had gone out. Uncomfortable, the inquirer withdrew from the matter and resigned at the end of the first week. Weeks later she told the employing lawyer she believed he had seriously violated the rules and asked that the client be informed; he then told the client the letters were false and withdrew. She asked whether, after leaving, she had a duty to assure the client was told and a duty to report the employing lawyer. The committee answered yes to both.
On disclosure to the client, the committee explained that the employing lawyer's conduct was dishonesty under Rule 8.4(c) and breached the Rule 1.4 duty of honest communication. While the duty of ongoing communication generally does not survive a lawyer's withdrawal, Rule 1.16(d) requires a withdrawing lawyer to take timely, practicable steps to protect the client's interests. On these unusual facts, with the inquirer's involvement so brief, the committee concluded that one such step was to assure the client learned of the deceptions, and that the inquirer acted properly by first approaching the employing lawyer and securing his commitment to tell the client. Had he refused or left real doubt that he would, the inquirer would have had to inform the client directly.
On reporting, the committee applied the four-part test from its Opinion 246 for Rule 8.3: knowledge of the violation, ability to report without disclosing client confidences, involvement of a disciplinary rule, and a substantial question as to honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness. It found all four met. "Actual knowledge" did not require firsthand observation; the employing lawyer's frank admission that he had sent multiple fictitious letters sufficed. Reporting required no client confidences (the only secret was the deception itself), and deliberately lying to a client plainly raises a substantial question of fitness. The employing lawyer's later disclosure to the client did not cure the violation. The committee also noted that Rule 5.2 binds a subordinate lawyer to comply with the rules even when acting under another lawyer's direction.
Currency note
This opinion was issued in 1997, before the District of Columbia's adoption of the 2007 revisions to the Rules of Professional Conduct. Subsequent rule amendments or later opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current guidance. Verify against current rules before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or requirement mentioned here.
Common questions
Q: Did the subordinate lawyer's duties end when she quit?
A: No. The committee concluded that both the duty to assure the client was informed of the deception (under Rule 1.16(d)) and the duty to report the employing lawyer (under Rule 8.3) continued after she resigned.
Q: How was she supposed to make sure the client learned the truth?
A: The committee concluded she should act in the least disruptive way: she properly approached the employing lawyer and secured his commitment to tell the client, and would have had to inform the client directly only if he refused or left real doubt he would do so.
Q: Did she have "actual knowledge" if she never saw the fake letters?
A: Yes. The committee concluded that Rule 8.3's actual-knowledge requirement does not demand firsthand observation; the employing lawyer's unambiguous admission that he sent multiple fictitious letters was enough.
Q: Did the supervisor's later disclosure to the client excuse reporting?
A: No. The committee concluded the violation, deliberately lying to a client, was serious enough that the employing lawyer's eventual disclosure did not relieve the subordinate lawyer of the duty to report.
Background and rules framework
The opinion interpreted D.C. Rule 8.3 (reporting professional misconduct that raises a substantial question of honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness), applying the four-part test of D.C. Opinion 246, together with Rule 1.16(d) (steps to protect a client's interests on withdrawal), Rule 1.4 (honest client communication), Rule 8.4(c) (dishonesty), and Rule 5.2 (a subordinate lawyer's independent duty to follow the rules).
Citations and references
Rules of Professional Conduct:
- D.C. RPC 8.3 / Model Rule 8.3 (reporting professional misconduct)
- D.C. RPC 1.16(d) / Model Rule 1.16 (protecting client interests on withdrawal)
- D.C. RPC 1.4, 8.4(c), 5.2 / Model Rules 1.4, 8.4, 5.2 (communication; dishonesty; subordinate lawyer)
Other opinions cited:
- D.C. Ethics Op. 246 (four-part test for the Rule 8.3 reporting duty)
See also
- ABA Formal Op. 04-433: Reporting Misconduct of a Non-Practicing Lawyer
- ABA Formal Op. 03-431: Reporting an Impaired Lawyer Outside the Firm
- DC Ethics Op. 377: Duties When a Lawyer Is Impaired
Source
- Landing page: https://www.dcbar.org/for-lawyers/legal-ethics/ethics-opinions-210-present/ethics-opinion-270
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