When a paralegal switches firms, can the new firm screen her from a conflicted matter, and does a job-switching lawyer need the former client's consent?
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This page answers the general question as of 1992. Ask about yours and see what the current District of Columbia Rules of Professional Conduct say for your facts, with citations.
Plain-English summary
Opinion 227 (approved April 21, 1992) considered a paralegal who joined Law Firm B after two years at Law Firm A. Firm B represented a wife in a divorce against her husband, the principal owner of ABC Company. At Firm A the paralegal had worked on ABC Company's pension and profit-sharing plans and had helped prepare the Summary Plan Descriptions, though Firm B represented that she "does not recall" access to the underlying financial data and never met the husband. As Firm B's only litigation paralegal, she was to be assigned to the divorce, and Firm B proposed to screen her only from the plan-related aspects, which it described as a small and easily segregated part of the case.
The committee held that the paralegal's plan work at Firm A was "substantially related" to the divorce under Rules 1.9 and 1.10(b), and that under Rule 1.9 the substantial relationship ended the analysis regardless of whether she actually held confidential information. Although Rule 1.10's strict imputed-disqualification rule by its terms reaches only lawyers, Rule 5.3(a) requires a firm to make reasonable efforts to ensure that nonlawyers' conduct is compatible with the lawyers' obligations, including preserving the confidences of current and former clients, which supported considering a screen. The committee concluded a screen was permissible only if it isolated the paralegal from the entire divorce matter; it declined to approve a "partial screen" that would let her work on assertedly unrelated portions of the same matter without the husband's consent.
Adopting the pro-screening approach of ABA Informal Opinion 88-1526 (1988), the committee concluded that if the paralegal was effectively isolated from all aspects of the divorce, Firm B could continue representing the wife whether or not the husband consented, and it suggested precautions: written instructions to the paralegal and to all firm personnel not to discuss the matter, "stickering" the divorce files, and checking whether she brought any related files from Firm A. The committee distinguished the migratory-lawyer situation: under Rule 1.10 and the Court of Appeals' Comment [15], screening alone does not avoid imputed disqualification for a lawyer, so the former client's consent is also required (citing Opinion 174). It also noted the D.C.-specific provisions in Rule 1.10(b) and Rule 1.6(g) for someone who assisted a lawyer before being admitted to the Bar, and Rule 1.11 for former government lawyers.
Currency note
This opinion was issued in 1992, before the District of Columbia's adoption of the 2007 revisions to the Rules of Professional Conduct. Subsequent rule amendments or later opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current guidance. Verify against current rules before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or requirement mentioned here.
Common questions
Q: Could the new firm screen the paralegal and keep the case?
A: Yes, if the screen was complete. The committee concluded that screening a personally disqualified paralegal could avoid imputed disqualification, but only if it isolated her from the entire matter.
Q: Could the firm screen her from just the related part and use her on the rest?
A: No. The committee declined to approve a "partial screen," holding that, absent the former client's consent, the paralegal had to be isolated from the entire divorce matter.
Q: Did the firm need the former client's consent to screen the paralegal?
A: Not for a nonlawyer, if the screen was effective. The committee concluded Firm B could continue representing the wife whether or not the husband consented, provided the paralegal was effectively isolated from the whole matter.
Q: Is the rule different for a lawyer who changes firms?
A: Yes. The committee concluded that for a migratory lawyer, screening alone is not enough under Rule 1.10; the former client's consent is also required.
Background and rules framework
The opinion interpreted D.C. Rules 1.9, 1.10, and 5.3. Rule 1.9 bars representation adverse to a former client in a substantially related matter; Rule 1.10 imputes one lawyer's disqualification to the firm but by its terms reaches only lawyers; and Rule 5.3(a) requires a firm to ensure that nonlawyers' conduct is compatible with the lawyers' professional obligations, including confidentiality. The committee also discussed the D.C.-specific provisions in Rule 1.10(b) and Rule 1.6(g) for a person who assisted a lawyer before admission, and Rule 1.11 for former government lawyers.
Citations and references
Rules of Professional Conduct:
- D.C. RPC 1.9 / Model Rule 1.9 (duties to former clients)
- D.C. RPC 1.10 / Model Rule 1.10 (imputed disqualification)
- D.C. RPC 5.3 / Model Rule 5.3 (responsibilities regarding nonlawyer assistants)
Other opinions cited:
- ABA Informal Op. 88-1526 (1988): a firm may screen a migratory nonlawyer to continue an adverse representation
- D.C. Opinion No. 158 (1985): the substantial-relationship analysis
- D.C. Opinion No. 174 (1986): screening plus the former client's consent is required for a migratory lawyer
See also
- DC Ethics Op. 279: Screening as a Cure for Imputed Disqualification
- DC Ethics Op. 273: Lawyers Moving From One Private Law Firm to Another
- DC Ethics Op. 285: Nonlawyer Former Government Employee Working for a Lawyer
Source
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