Does a California lawyer's duty of confidentiality protect publicly available information about a current or former client?
State Bar of California COPRAC Formal Opinion 2016-195: Client Secrets and Publicly Available Information
Short answer: The opinion concludes that the duty of confidentiality under Business and Professions Code section 6068(e)(1) and former Rule 3-100 is broader than the attorney-client privilege and covers all information about the client obtained during representation that the client has requested be kept secret or whose disclosure is likely to be embarrassing or detrimental, even when that information is publicly available; the duty survives the termination of the relationship for information acquired by virtue of the prior representation.
Currency note
This opinion was issued in 2016, before the State Bar of California's adoption of the November 1, 2018 revisions to the Rules of Professional Conduct. The opinion interprets former Rule 3-100 (Confidential Information of a Client), which has since been replaced by Rule 1.6. Subsequent rule amendments or later opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current guidance. Verify against current rules before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or requirement mentioned here.
Disclaimer: This is an advisory ethics opinion. Advisory opinions are not binding; they interpret the State Bar of California's rules of professional conduct and are persuasive authority. This summary is for research purposes only and is not legal advice. Verify current rules before acting on any specific guidance.
About this page: The plain-English summary and Q&A below were written by Ezel based on the official opinion. The opinion text is reproduced at the bottom; the official source (linked) controls.
Plain-English summary
The opinion analyzes a hypothetical in which Lawyer represents Hedge Fund Manager in defending a fraud action by investors; Hedge Fund Manager admits in confidence to past liberties with investor money; Lawyer interviews Former Investor, who tells Lawyer about an earlier fraud accusation Hedge Fund Manager paid $100,000 to resolve and forwards Lawyer a link to her blog post about it; Lawyer forwards the blog link to friends with the comment "interesting reading"; the case settles with each of sixteen investors paid $250,000 under a non-confidential agreement filed with the court; the local newspaper reports the settlement; months later, after termination of the representation, Lawyer writes a Wall Street Journal letter to the editor about Former Investor's WSJ interview, identifying his prior representation and saying he "did a great job of getting Hedge Fund Manager out of the lawsuit for only a seven-figure settlement"; years later, after Hedge Fund Manager is arrested for DUI, Lawyer posts on Facebook that "drinking and driving is irresponsible."
On the framework, the opinion concludes that under Business and Professions Code section 6068(e)(1) and former Rule 3-100, the duty of confidentiality is distinct from and broader than the attorney-client privilege under Evidence Code sections 952 and 954. The committee anchors the duty in Wutchumna Water Co. v. Bailey (1932), In re Jordan (1974), and In the Matter of Johnson (Cal. State Bar Ct. Rev. Dept. 2000), holding that "client secrets" include any information about the client obtained during the professional relationship that the client requested be kept secret or whose disclosure would be embarrassing or detrimental, even publicly available information that requires searching to find. The committee notes that ABA Model Rule 1.9(c)(1) excludes "generally known" information from the duty as to former clients, but California has no analogous rule, and the opinion declines to take a position on whether truly generally-known information loses confidentiality.
On disclosures during representation, the opinion concludes that Hedge Fund Manager's confidential admission of past liberties is protected by both confidentiality and the privilege. The Former Investor information is not privileged because it was not communicated in confidence by the client, but is a client "secret" because Lawyer obtained it in the course of representation and disclosure would be embarrassing or detrimental. The opinion holds that Lawyer's forwarding of Former Investor's blog post to friends, even with only "interesting reading," violated the duty of confidentiality, citing Matter of Johnson, Cal. State Bar Formal Op. 2004-165, Cal. State Bar Formal Op. 1996-146, and LACBA Formal Op. 386.
On post-termination disclosures, the opinion concludes that the duty of confidentiality survives termination, citing Wutchumna, Oasis West Realty, LLC v. Goldman (2011), City National Bank v. Adams (2002), Cal. State Bar Formal Op. 1993-133, and LACBA Formal Op. 409. The committee holds that Lawyer's WSJ letter to the editor, which discussed the lawsuit and settlement and suggested the settlement was favorable to Hedge Fund Manager, disclosed client secrets even though the settlement was technically a public-record document. The committee draws on ABA Model Rule 1.6 Comment [20] for the consistent ABA position.
On unrelated post-termination conduct, the opinion concludes that the duty does not reach Hedge Fund Manager's later DUI arrest, because Lawyer did not learn about the DUI in the course of representation, and the conduct bears no relationship to the prior matter. The committee notes in a footnote that the analysis would change had Lawyer learned the DUI information during the representation, because the duty of loyalty under Flatt v. Superior Court (1994) might then preclude public comment.
In practice
Under this opinion, conduct that was consistent with California's Rules of Professional Conduct as they stood at the time of the opinion (former Rule 3-100, since superseded by Rule 1.6) is conduct in which the lawyer treats as confidential any information about the client obtained during the representation when the client requested it be kept secret or its disclosure would be embarrassing or detrimental, even when the information is publicly available; treats the duty as surviving termination of the engagement for information acquired by virtue of the prior representation; and treats post-termination conduct unrelated to the prior representation, where the underlying information was not learned in the course of representation, as outside the duty. Verify against current Rule 1.6 before relying on this framework.
Common questions
Q: Is information that the client never told the lawyer also a "client secret"?
A: Per the opinion, yes. The committee holds that "client secrets" cover any information obtained during the professional relationship that the client requested be kept secret or whose disclosure would be embarrassing or detrimental, regardless of source. The committee cites Matter of Johnson, Cal. State Bar Formal Op. 1996-146, and LACBA Formal Op. 386 for the proposition that confidentiality applies even where the lawyer obtained the information from a non-client.
Q: Does the duty cover information that is already publicly available?
A: Per the opinion, yes. The committee holds that "client information does not lose its confidential nature merely because it is publicly available," citing Matter of Johnson and Cal. State Bar Formal Ops. 2004-165, 2003-161, 1993-133, and 1976-37. The committee declines to take a position on whether truly "generally known" information (under the ABA Model Rule 1.9(c)(1) standard) loses confidentiality in California.
Q: Does the duty survive the end of the representation?
A: Per the opinion, yes. The committee anchors the post-termination duty in Wutchumna Water Co. v. Bailey (1932), Oasis West Realty, LLC v. Goldman (2011), City National Bank v. Adams (2002), Cal. State Bar Formal Op. 1993-133, LACBA Formal Op. 409, and ABA Model Rule 1.6, Comment [20].
Q: Can the lawyer comment on a former client's matter that was reported in the press?
A: Per the opinion, not when the comment discloses information learned during representation that would be embarrassing or detrimental to the client. The committee holds that Lawyer's WSJ letter to the editor about the settlement disclosed a client secret even though the settlement agreement was a public-record exhibit, and suggested Lawyer was privy to bad facts about the client's defense by characterizing a "seven-figure settlement" as a good result.
Q: What about commenting on a former client's later, unrelated arrest?
A: Per the opinion, the duty does not apply. The committee holds that because Lawyer did not learn about the DUI in the course of representing Hedge Fund Manager and the DUI bears no relationship to the prior representation, the duty of confidentiality does not preclude public comment. The committee notes in a footnote that the analysis would differ if the information had been acquired during representation, in which case the duty of loyalty under Flatt v. Superior Court would likely preclude even commentary on the DUI.
Background and rules framework
The opinion interprets former California Rule 3-100 (Confidential Information of a Client, including Discussion paragraphs [1] and [2]) and Business and Professions Code section 6068(e)(1), together with California Evidence Code sections 952 (defining "confidential communication") and 954 (the attorney-client privilege). The committee identifies the central distinction between the ethical duty of confidentiality (broad in scope, source-indifferent) and the evidentiary privilege (limited to confidential communications between lawyer and client), drawing on the long line of California authority from In the Matter of Soale (1916) forward.
Citations and references
Rules of Professional Conduct (former, in effect at time of opinion):
- Former California Rule 3-100 (including 3-100(A), Discussion paragraphs [1] and [2])
- ABA Model Rule 1.6 (Comments [3] and [20]) (referenced for comparison)
- ABA Model Rule 1.9 (including 1.9(c)(1)) (referenced for comparison)
Statutes:
- California Business and Professions Code section 6068(e)(1)
- California Evidence Code sections 952 and 954
- California Code of Civil Procedure section 282 (predecessor to section 6068(e)(1))
Cases:
- Wutchumna Water Co. v. Bailey, 216 Cal. 564 (Cal. 1932), foundational duty of confidentiality
- In re Jordan, 12 Cal.3d 575 (Cal. 1974), confidentiality as public-policy obligation
- In re Jordan, 7 Cal.3d 930 (Cal. 1972), confidential communication
- Mitchell v. Superior Court, 37 Cal.3d 591 (Cal. 1984), purpose of attorney-client privilege
- Solin v. O'Melveny & Myers, 89 Cal.App.4th 451 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001), confidential communication
- In the Matter of Johnson, 4 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 179 (Cal. State Bar Ct. Rev. Dept. 2000), confidentiality covers publicly available facts
- In the Matter of Soale, 31 Cal.App. 144 (Cal. Ct. App. 1916), historical confidentiality duty
- Dietz v. Meisenheimer & Herron, 177 Cal.App.4th 771 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009), duty broader than privilege
- Goldstein v. Lees, 46 Cal.App.3d 614 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975), confidentiality scope
- Oasis West Realty, LLC v. Goldman, 51 Cal.4th 811 (Cal. 2011), duty after termination
- City National Bank v. Adams, 96 Cal.App.4th 315 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002), no use to former client's detriment
- Yorn v. Superior Court, 90 Cal.App.3d 669 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979), former-client information
- City & County of San Francisco v. Cobra Solutions, Inc., 38 Cal.4th 839 (Cal. 2006), confidences and loyalty
- Flatt v. Superior Court, 9 Cal.4th 275 (Cal. 1994), duty of loyalty
- In re Gonzalez, 773 A.2d 1026 (D.C. 2001), source-indifferent duty
- Lawyer Disciplinary Board v. McGraw, 194 W.Va. 788 (W. Va. 1995), public-record information
Other opinions cited:
- Cal. State Bar Formal Op. 1976-37: confidentiality of public information
- Cal. State Bar Formal Op. 1987-93: "confidence" as trust
- Cal. State Bar Formal Op. 1993-133: confidentiality after termination; definition of client secrets
- Cal. State Bar Formal Op. 1996-146: source-indifferent confidentiality
- Cal. State Bar Formal Op. 2003-161: public-source confidentiality
- Cal. State Bar Formal Op. 2004-165: publicly available facts
- LACBA Formal Op. 386: confidentiality of public-record information
- LACBA Formal Op. 409: post-termination disclosure
- Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers § 59 (and Comment d) (generally known information)
See also
- CA COPRAC Op. 2020-203: Data Breaches and Rule 1.6 Confidentiality
- CA COPRAC Op. 2019-200: Perjured Testimony and Candor versus Confidentiality
- CA COPRAC Op. 2020-201: Departing Lawyer Confidentiality in Transition
Source
- Landing page: https://www.calbar.ca.gov/legal-professionals/ethics-compliance-practice-resources/ethics/ethics-opinions
- Original PDF: https://www.calbar.ca.gov/sites/default/files/portals/0/documents/ethics/Opinions/CAL-2016-195-(13-0005).pdf
Original opinion text
Reproduced from the official source for research purposes. The linked source is authoritative.
THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA
STANDING COMMITTEE ON
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND CONDUCT
FORMAL OPINION NO. 2016-195
ISSUE: What duties does a lawyer owe to current and former clients to refrain from disclosing
potentially embarrassing or detrimental information about the client, including publicly
available information the lawyer learned during the course of his representation?
DIGEST: A lawyer may not disclose his client's secrets, which include not only confidential
information communicated between the client and the lawyer, but also publicly available
information that the lawyer obtained during the professional relationship which the client
has requested to be kept secret or the disclosure of which is likely to be embarrassing or
detrimental to the client. Even after termination of the attorney-client relationship, the
lawyer may not disclose potentially embarrassing or detrimental information about the
former client if that information was acquired by virtue of the lawyer's prior
representation.
AUTHORITIES
INTERPRETED: Business and Professions Code section 6068(e)(1).
Evidence Code sections 952 and 954.
Rule 3-100 of the Rules of Professional Conduct of the State Bar of California.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Lawyer is hired by Hedge Fund Manager to defend him against a fraud claim brought by several of his investors.
The investors alleged that Hedge Fund Manager was operating a Ponzi scheme or similar financial fraud. During
the representation, Hedge Fund Manager acknowledged in confidence to Lawyer that earlier in his career he had
taken certain liberties with his investors' money, but assured Lawyer he had been completely above board in his
dealings with the investors who now were suing him.
While the lawsuit was pending, Lawyer interviewed several former investors in Hedge Fund Manager's fund,
including Former Investor. Former Investor told Lawyer that, several years earlier, she had accused Hedge Fund
Manager of fraud in connection with the fund, and that Hedge Fund Manager paid her $100,000 to resolve their
dispute before she filed a lawsuit. After they spoke, Former Investor forwarded Lawyer a link to a blog post she had
written about her accusations against Hedge Fund Manager. Lawyer forwarded the link to several friends, saying
only "interesting reading."
After exchanging a limited amount of discovery, Hedge Fund Manager settled the lawsuit by paying each of the 16
investor plaintiffs $250,000. The parties documented the settlement in a non-confidential settlement agreement,
which was submitted to the court in connection with a motion for determination of good faith settlement. After the
court granted the motion, the lawsuit was dismissed, and Lawyer's representation of Hedge Fund Manager
concluded. The settlement was reported in a small article in a local newspaper, but not picked up by the national
press.
Several months after the settlement and the conclusion of Lawyer's representation, Lawyer read an interview with
Former Investor in the Wall Street Journal in which Former Investor recited the details of her prior dispute with
Hedge Fund Manager. In response, Lawyer wrote a letter to the editor of the Journal, noting he represented Hedge
Fund Manager in connection with the recent investor lawsuit, and stating, "I did a great job of getting Hedge Fund
Manager out of the lawsuit for only a seven-figure settlement."
Several years after the second investor lawsuit settled, Hedge Fund Manager was arrested for driving under the
influence of alcohol. Lawyer commented on the arrest on his Facebook page, stating, "Drinking and driving is
irresponsible."
DISCUSSION
- The Duty of Confidentiality and the Attorney-Client Privilege
One of the most important duties of an attorney is to preserve the secrets of his client. "No rule in the ethics of the
legal profession is better established nor more rigorously enforced than this one." (Wutchumna Water Co. v. Bailey
(1932) 216 Cal. 564, 572 [15 P.2d 505] ("Wutchumna").) "A member's duty to preserve the confidentiality of client
information involves public policies of paramount importance." (In re Jordan (1974) 12 Cal.3d 575, 580 [116
Cal.Rptr. 371].) Preserving the confidentiality of client information contributes to the trust that is the hallmark of
the client-lawyer relationship." (Rule 3-100, Discussion paragraph [1].)
Business and Professions Code section 6068, subdivision (e)(1) states that it is the duty of an attorney "[t]o maintain
inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to himself or herself to preserve the secrets, of his or her client." (Bus. &
Prof. Code § 6068(e)(1).) As this Committee has explained, "Client secrets means any information obtained by the
lawyer during the professional relationship, or relating to the representation, which the client has requested to be
inviolate or the disclosure of which might be embarrassing or detrimental to the client." (Cal. State Bar Formal
Opn. No. 1993-133.)
As noted above, the duty of confidentiality – that is, the duty to maintain client secrets – is set forth in the State Bar
Act and included as an express ethical obligation. By contrast, the attorney-client privilege is a statutorily created
evidentiary rule that protects from disclosure a "confidential communication" between a lawyer and his or her client.
(Cal. Evid. Code § 954; see also Solin v. O'Melveny & Myers (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 451, 456-57 [107 Cal.Rptr.2d
456].) For purposes of the attorney-client privilege, "confidential communication" is defined in the Evidence Code
to be "information transmitted between a client and his or her lawyer in the course of that relationship and in
confidence. . . ." (Cal. Evid. Code § 952; see also In re Jordan (1972) 7 Cal.3d 930, 939-40 [103 Cal.Rptr. 849].)
The attorney-client privilege has been described as necessary to "safeguard the confidential relationship between
clients and their attorneys so as to promote full and open discussion of the facts and tactics surrounding individual
legal matters." (Mitchell v. Superior Court (1984) 37 Cal.3d 591, 599 [208 Cal.Rptr. 886].) While the ethical duty
of confidentiality applies to information about the client, whatever its source, the attorney-client privilege is
expressly limited to confidential communications between a lawyer and his or her client.
Thus, "client secrets" covers a broader category of information than do confidential attorney-client communications;
confidential communications are merely a subset of what are considered client secrets. Indeed, "client secrets"
include not only confidential attorney-client communications, but also information about the client that may not
have been obtained through a confidential communication. Yet rule 3-100(A), which provides, "A member shall not
reveal information protected from disclosure by Business and Professions Code section 6068, subdivision (e)(1)
without the informed consent of the client . . .", recognizes no such distinction and applies to both the broad
category of client secrets and the subset of confidential attorney-client communications. As stated in rule 3-100,
Discussion paragraph [2]:
The principle of client-lawyer confidentiality applies to information relating to the representation,
whatever its source, and encompasses matters communicated in confidence by the client, and
therefore protected by the attorney-client privilege, matters protected by the work product
doctrine, and matters protected under the ethical standards of confidentiality, all as established in
law, rule and policy.
See also In the Matter of Johnson (Rev. Dept. 2000) 4 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 179, 189 ("Matter of Johnson") [The
ethical duty of confidentiality "prohibits an attorney from disclosing facts and even allegations that might cause a
client or a former client public embarrassment"]; Dietz v. Meisenheimer & Herron (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 771, 786
[99 Cal.Rptr.3d 464] ["The duty of confidentiality is broader than the attorney-client privilege."], citing Goldstein v.
Lees (1975) 46 Cal.App.3d 614, 621 [120 Cal.Rptr. 253].) Thus, information protected by the ethical duty of
confidentiality is broader than what is protected as attorney-client privileged under the Evidence Code. (See Matter
of Johnson, supra, 4 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. at p. 189.)
In Matter of Johnson, an attorney had told one of his clients, in the presence of others, about another client's
previous felony conviction. That conviction was a matter of public record, but, as indicated by the state bar court, it
was not easily discovered. The court found that the disclosure of the client's publicly available conviction
constituted a violation of the lawyer's duty of confidentiality. "The ethical duty of confidentiality is much broader
in scope and covers communications that would not be protected under the evidentiary attorney-client privilege."
(Id. at p. 189; see also Cal. State Bar Formal Opn. No. 2004-165 ["The duty [of confidentiality] has been applied
even when the facts are already part of the public record or where there are other sources of information."]; Los
Angeles County Bar Association Formal Opn. No. 386 [finding duty of confidentiality applies "even where the facts
are already part of the public record or where there are other sources of information"]; see also Cal. State Bar
Formal Opn. Nos. 2004-165; 2003-161; 1993-133; 1976-37.)
- Disclosures During Representation
During Lawyer's representation of Hedge Fund Manager, Hedge Fund Manager told Lawyer in confidence that he
had taken certain liberties with previous investors' money. Such information is protected both by Lawyer's ethical
duty to maintain client secrets and by the attorney-client privilege because it was confidentially communicated by
Hedge Fund Manager to Lawyer during the course of the representation.
Lawyer also learned information about Hedge Fund Manager from Former Investor. That information was not
learned through a confidential communication with Hedge Fund Manager, so the information is not protected by the
attorney-client privilege. (See Cal. Evid. Code § 954; see also Cal. Evid. Code § 952 [defining "confidential
communication" as "information transmitted between a client and his or her lawyer in the course of that relationship
and in confidence . . ."]; Solin v. O'Melveny & Myers, supra, 89 Cal.App.4th at pp. 456-57.) It was obtained,
however, in the course of Lawyer's representation of Hedge Fund Manager, and disclosure likely would be
embarrassing or detrimental to Hedge Fund Manager. Thus, this information constitutes a client "secret" that must
be protected by Lawyer under his duty of confidentiality. Even though Former Investor made her information
publicly available by writing a blog post about it, Lawyer had a duty to protect that information as a client secret,
and not disseminate or further publicize it by forwarding the blog post to friends. Just as the state bar court
concluded in Matter of Johnson, Lawyer's disseminating or commenting on information he learned from Former
Investor during his representation of Hedge Fund Manager – including forwarding the blog post to several friends –
violates his ethical duty of confidentiality.
- Post-Termination Disclosures about Alleged Fraudulent Scheme
After the termination of his representation, Lawyer wrote a letter to the Wall Street Journal commenting on the
interview with Former Investor and discussing the lawsuit he handled for Hedge Fund Manager concerning similar
allegations, including the settlement of that matter. Even though Hedge Fund Manager was a former client at the
time Lawyer made those comments, we conclude that Lawyer violated the duty of confidentiality, as discussed
below.
Although most of an attorney's duties to his client terminate at the conclusion of the representation, the duty of
confidentiality does not. As the California Supreme Court stated, "[A]n attorney is forbidden to do either of two
things after severing his relationship with a former client. He may not do anything which will injuriously affect his
former client in any matter in which he formerly represented him nor may he at any time use against his former
client knowledge or information acquired by virtue of the previous relationship." (Wutchumna, supra, 216 Cal. at
pp. 573-74; see also Oasis West Realty, LLC v. Goldman (2011) 51 Cal.4th 811, 822-23 [124 Cal.Rptr.3d 256] ["It is
well established that the duties of loyalty and confidentiality bar an attorney . . . from using a former client's
confidential information . . . ."]; City Nat'l Bank v. Adams (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 315, 324 [117 Cal.Rptr.2d 125]
[attorney may not use information to former client's detriment]; Cal. State Bar Formal Opn. 1993-133 ["The
obligation to protect client confidences continues notwithstanding the termination of the attorney-client
relationship."]. The Los Angeles County Bar Association stated in its Formal Opinion No. 409 that the duty to a
former client forbids "'use against the former client of any information acquired during such relationship.'" (quoting
Yorn v. Superior Court (1979) 90 Cal.App.3d 669, 675 [90 Cal.App.3d 669]).
Here, Lawyer's letter to the newspaper, which included discussion about the settlement Lawyer obtained for Hedge
Fund Manager, constituted a disclosure of a client secret because it likely caused Hedge Fund Manager harm or
embarrassment. Although Hedge Fund Manager's settlement agreement resides in the court file (as it was an exhibit
to the motion for determination of good faith settlement) and, thus, is publicly available, Lawyer's statements
nonetheless could be considered a disclosure of a client "secret," as was the disclosure in Matter of Johnson, where
the lawyer disclosed publicly available information about the client's prior conviction. Moreover, not only did
Lawyer disclose facts about the settlement (and, by necessity, the existence of the lawsuit), but he also suggested he
was privy to bad facts about Hedge Fund Manager's defense such that a "seven-figure settlement" was a good one.
Under these facts, we conclude that Lawyer's disclosures would cause Hedge Fund Manager harm or
embarrassment and, thus, Lawyer breached his duty of confidentiality.
The fact that Lawyer made the comments after termination of the attorney-client relationship does not change the
result because Lawyer learned about the lawsuit and settlement through his representation of Hedge Fund Manager;
thus, the information was "acquired by virtue of the previous relationship." (Wutchumna, supra, 216 Cal. at pp.
573-74.)
- Disclosures about Arrest for Driving under the Influence
In addition to writing a letter to the editor commenting on Hedge Fund Manager's alleged fraud against Former
Investor, several years later Lawyer posted a comment about Hedge Fund Manager's drunk driving arrest. Unlike
the letter to the editor about Hedge Fund Manager's alleged financial fraud, a comment about Hedge Fund
Manager's drunk driving arrest bears no relationship to Lawyer's prior representation of Hedge Fund Manager.
Because drunk driving is unrelated to the prior representation, and Lawyer learned nothing about that issue in the
course of his representation of Hedge Fund Manager, Lawyer owes no duty to Hedge Fund Manager to maintain in
confidence anything he thereafter learns about Hedge Fund Manager's arrest. Neither the duty of confidentiality nor
any other duty that may survive termination of the attorney-client relationship would preclude posting of or
commenting on such a story.
CONCLUSION
A lawyer's duty of confidentiality is broader than the attorney-client privilege, and embarrassing or detrimental
information learned by a lawyer during the course of his representation of a client must be protected as a client
secret even if the information is publicly available. A lawyer's duty to preserve his client's secrets survives the
termination of the representation. If, however, otherwise embarrassing or detrimental information was not learned
by the lawyer by virtue of his representation of the client, it is not a client secret, and the lawyer is not bound to
preserve it in confidence.
This opinion is issued by the Standing Committee on Professional Responsibility and Conduct of the State Bar of
California. It is advisory only. It is not binding upon the courts, the State Bar of California, its Board of Trustees,
any persons, or tribunals charged with regulatory responsibilities, or any member of the State Bar.