Can a lawyer for a closely held company also represent the majority owners against a minority owner?

Plain-English summary

The Committee was asked about the ethical duties of counsel for a small, closely held corporation or LLC when the interests of the organization and its majority owners are adverse to a minority owner, especially where the closely held structure may leave no disinterested owner to waive a conflict. It concludes that counsel must make a fact-based analysis of whether a conflict exists and, if so, whether it can be waived; as a general rule, representing the organization does not also imply representing an individual owner, but a conflict can arise from the lawyer's prior dealings with an owner.

The opinion grounds the analysis in Rule 1.13: a lawyer for an organization represents the entity acting through its constituents, and under Rule 1.13(f) must clarify the client's identity when the organization's interests are adverse to a constituent's. Rule 1.13(g) permits dual representation of the organization and its constituents subject to Rule 1.7, with any required organizational consent given by someone other than the individual being represented. The opinion explains why these conflicts are hard in closely held entities: owners often deal directly with counsel, may have used the lawyer on personal matters, and it can be unclear who speaks for the entity, sometimes making a genuinely disinterested approver impossible to find.

The opinion offers general observations. When an owner, acting as a constituent, consults the organization's lawyer and shares confidential information, no attorney-client relationship with the constituent forms, and no conflict arises if interests later diverge. But when the lawyer gives a constituent advice on the constituent's individual legal issues, an actual or implied attorney-client relationship may form that bars the lawyer from acting against that constituent. Where a conflict cannot be reconciled or it is impossible to determine who decides for the client, the lawyer must withdraw rather than favor one client. It illustrates the line with two examples: forming a corporation and later suing a shareholder on the shareholder agreement (no disqualification, no individual relationship) versus advising a CEO on a dispute and later opposing the former CEO (disqualification, because the CEO reasonably believed the firm acted for him). The opinion directs counsel to Rules 1.7, 1.9, and 1.13 and stresses the lawyer must protect the clients' interests, not ignore the conflict.

In practice

Under this opinion, as the Alaska rules stood at the time, a lawyer for a closely held entity should make clear at the outset that the lawyer represents the organization and not the individual owners, and should explain that one owner's communications may not be protected from the others. The opinion treats the threshold question as fact-based: whether the lawyer's prior dealings created an actual or implied attorney-client relationship with an owner. If they did, or if a conflict otherwise cannot be reconciled under Rules 1.7, 1.9, and 1.13, or it is impossible to identify who speaks for the entity, the opinion says the lawyer must withdraw rather than prefer one client over another.

Common questions

Q: Does representing a closely held company mean I represent its owners?

A: Generally no. The opinion concludes that representing the organization does not by itself imply representing an individual owner, so no conflict arises merely because the owner shared information as a constituent.

Q: When does a conflict with an owner arise?

A: Per the opinion, when the lawyer has given the owner advice on the owner's individual legal issues, or otherwise acted so the owner reasonably believed the lawyer was their personal counsel, creating an actual or implied attorney-client relationship.

Q: What if there is no disinterested owner to waive the conflict?

A: The opinion notes the closely held structure may leave no disinterested constituent to approve dual representation under Rule 1.13(g); where the conflict cannot be reconciled, the lawyer must withdraw.

Q: Are one owner's communications confidential from the others?

A: The opinion says communications from one owner to the organization's lawyer about the business are not likely to be protected from the other owners, and the lawyer should make that clear.

Background and rules framework

The opinion interprets Alaska Rule of Professional Conduct 1.13 (organization as client, analog of Model Rule 1.13), including 1.13(f) (clarifying client identity) and 1.13(g) (dual representation subject to Rule 1.7), together with Rule 1.7 (current-client conflicts) and Rule 1.9 (former-client duties). It draws on case law on when an implied attorney-client relationship forms with an organizational constituent.

Citations and references

Rules of Professional Conduct:

• Alaska RPC 1.13, 1.13(f), 1.13(g) (organization as client) and comment
• Alaska RPC 1.7(a), 1.7(b) (current-client conflicts); RPC 1.9 (former clients)

Cases:

• McKinney v. Means, 147 F. Supp. 2d 898 (W.D. Tenn. 2001)
• Home Care Indus., Inc. v. Murray, 154 F. Supp. 2d 861 (D.N.J. 2001)
• In re Banks, 584 P.2d 284 (Or. 1978)

Other opinions cited:

• Alaska Ethics Opinion 84-2 (partnership representation); D.C. Ethics Op. 2005-10

See also

• ABA Formal Op. 91-361: Representation of a Partnership
• ABA Formal Op. 95-390: Conflicts in the Corporate-Family Context
• AK Bar Ethics Op. 2020-1: Representing a Non-Party Deposition Witness

Source

• Landing page: https://alaskabar.org/ethics-discipline/ethics-opinions/adopted-ethics-opinions-chronological/
• Original PDF: https://alaskabar.org/wp-content/uploads/2012-3.pdf

Original opinion text

Reproduced from the official source for research purposes. The linked source is authoritative.

ALASKA BAR ASSOCIATION
ETHICS OPINION NO. 2012-3
REPRESENTATION OF CLOSELY HELD ORGANIZATION AND ITS
MAJORITY OWNERS WHEN THEIR INTERESTS MAY BE ADVERSE TO
THOSE OF MINORITY OWNERS
Question Presented
What are the ethical duties of counsel for a small closely held
organization when the interests of the organization and its majority owners are
adverse to the interests of minority owners?
Conclusion
Counsel must make a fact-based analysis to determine whether a conflict
exists and, if it does, whether it can be waived. As a general rule,
representation of the organization does not also imply representation of an
individual owner or owners. However, a conflict can arise if the attorney has
represented an individual owner in other legal matters or in such a way that
might cause that individual to believe that the attorney was acting on his or
her separate behalf. The ultimate resolution of the question relies heavily on
the specific facts of the situation.
Discussion
The Committee has been asked to review the ethical issues that arise
when an attorney is asked to represent the interests of both a closely held
corporation or LLC and the majority owner or owners of the company, in
circumstances where their interests may be adverse to the position of a
minority owner or owners. Because of the closely held nature of the business,
there may be no “disinterested” owner from whom counsel or the company can
obtain a waiver of any conflict. Under such circumstances, can the attorney
represent the business and the majority owner or owners?
Alaska Rules of Professional Conduct address the ethical position of a
lawyer who represents an organization. ARPC 1.13(a) states the general rule:
(a) A lawyer employed or retained by an organization represents that
organization acting through its duly authorized constituents.
Rule 1.13 makes clear that the ethical duties of the lawyer are to the
organization itself and not the “constituents” with whom the lawyer deals. Rule
1.13(f) provides:

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(f)

In dealing with the organization’s directors, officers, employees,
members, shareholders or other constituents, a lawyer shall
explain the identity of the client when the lawyer knows or
reasonably should know that the organization’s interests are
adverse to those of the constituents with whom the lawyer is
dealing.

Nevertheless, the Rule also recognizes that the “constituents” of the
organization may have interests that are closely tied to or identical to those of
the organization itself. ARPC 1.13(g) allows dual representation of the
organization and
its officers, directors, shareholders or other constituents, subject to the
provisions of Rule 1.7. If the organization’s consent to the dual
representation is required by Rule 1.7, the consent shall be given by an
appropriate official of the organization other than the individual who is to
be represented, or by the shareholders.
Rule 1.7 deals with conflicts of interest between current clients. The
Rule allows dual representation so long as the lawyer concludes that it is
possible to represent both interests diligently and competently, the
representation does not involve the assertion of a claim by one client directly
against the other client, and both parties give informed consent in writing. See
ARPC 1.7(a), (b). 1
When conflict issues arise in the context of a small closely held business
entity, for a number of reasons they can be very difficult to resolve. In a small,
closely held organization, unlike a larger organization, each of the owners may
have a direct and intimate responsibility for the operation of the business.2
The attorney for the organization may have dealt directly with each owner on a
regular basis on many matters, or even with respect to the particular legal
matter at issue. The constituent may have used the legal services of the
attorney on unrelated matters or in circumstances in which it was reasonable
for the constituent to conclude that the attorney was acting as the
1

An attorney also owes a duty to former clients as well as current clients. Conflicts can arise in
the business context when a former owner or employee with whom the attorney has had a close
professional relationship becomes adverse to the organization. ARPC 1.9 provides guidance for dealing
with conflicts between current and former clients.
2

“[A] closely held business is a business whose ‘distinguishing characteristic . . . is that management
and shareholding are not separated functions.’ Other characteristics of closely held businesses include
the issuance of private equity (stock or interests that are not publicly-traded) and the significant personal
investment of both time and capital by shareholders.” Darien Ibrahim, Solving the Everyday Problem of
Client Identity in the Context of Closely Held Businesses, 56 Ala. L. Rev. 181, 188, Fall 2004 (quoting
Michael P. Dooley, Fundamentals of Corporation Law at 1011 (1995) (footnotes omitted).

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constituent’s attorney. When owners in a small closely held organization clash,
there is a high likelihood that the attorney will previously have received
information or given advice to all concerned that is relevant to the dispute.
Finally, when the owners have equal or nearly equal ownership rights and
responsibilities, and where each may have been directly involved in giving
instructions to the attorney in the past, the attorney may find that it is hard to
know who speaks for the business entity and thus who gives direction on
behalf of the “client.” Although ARPC 1.13(g) allows dual representation if the
organization consents, it may be impossible to find an “appropriate individual”
or shareholder who is genuinely disinterested and who can thus approve dual
representation.
Resolving these issues requires the attorney to consider two issues. First
the attorney must determine whether an attorney client relationship has arisen
with the individual owners that would make representation of the business and
the majority owners adverse to a minority owner a violation of the duty owed by
an attorney to all clients. Second, if no attorney client relationship has arisen
with the individual owners, then the attorney must determine whether he or
she can satisfy the dual representation test of ARPC 1.13 (g). Some general
observations are appropriate.
First, when an owner of a closely held organization, acting in a capacity
as a representative or “constituent” of the organization, consults with the
organization’s attorney, receives legal advice or provides confidential
information no attorney client relationship is formed with the constituent. No
conflict of interest arises if the interests of the constituent and the
organization later diverge.3
Second, and conversely, advice given by counsel to a constituent
regarding the constituent’s individual legal issues (including, for example, legal
advice regarding the constituent’s rights or claims against the organization)
may create either an actual or an implied attorney client relationship that gives
rise to an impermissible conflict that precludes the attorney from representing
the corporation on an issue adverse to the constituent’s interests.4 Finally, to
3

See, e.g., McKinney v. Means, 147 F.Supp.2d 898 (W.D. Tenn. 2001) (lawyer not disqualified from
defending close corporation in suit brought by one of two owners, since lawyer represents corporation,
not owners); Nilavar v. Mercy Health System-Western Ohio, 143 F.Supp.2d 909, 913 (S.D. Ohio 2001)
(mere exchange of confidential information between counsel and organization’s officers and directors
about matters of interest to the corporation does not create attorney client relationship with officer or
director); D.C. Ethics Op. 2005-10 (2005) (lawyer may represent corporation against one of two 50%
shareholders).
4

See, e.g. Home Care Indus., Inc., v. Murray (154 F.Supp.2d. 861 (D.N.J., 2001) (attorney’s receipt of
confidences from and substantial dealings with one corporate constituent created an implied attorney
client relationship with that constituent).

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the extent that it is not possible to reconcile the conflict under the Rules of
Professional Conduct, or it is not possible to determine who can make
decisions on behalf of the client, the attorney must withdraw, rather than
express a preference for one client over another.5
The attorney for a closely held business entity can and should make
clear that the attorney represents the organization, and not the individual
owners.6 The attorney can and should make the implications of this clear as
well. Any communications from one owner to the attorney regarding the affairs
of the business are not likely to be protected from the other owner.7 The
attorney may not favor the interests of one owner over another during the
course of representing the business.8 If a conflict should arise among the
owners the attorney may be required to withdraw from representing any party
if the owners cannot agree on a waiver or some method of resolving the
conflict.9
Several examples illustrate these principles. An attorney prepares the
5

See Alaska Bar Association Ethics Opinion No. 84-2 (attorney for partnership cannot represent one
partner against another in partnership dispute); In re: Banks, 584 P.2d 284, 292 (Or. 1978) (only ethical
position for attorney to adopt when substantially identical interests which he has represented become
divergent is to represent neither the individual nor the corporation).

6

See Alaska Rule of Professional Conduct 1.13, comment:
There are times when the organization’s interest may be or become adverse to those of one or
more of its constituents. In such circumstances the lawyer should advise any constituent, whose
interest the lawyer finds adverse to that of the organization of the conflict or potential conflict of
interest, that the lawyer cannot represent such constituent, and that such person may wish to
obtain independent representation. Care must be taken to assure that the individual understands
that, when there is such adversity of interest, the lawyer cannot provide legal representation for
that constituent individual, and that discussions between the lawyer for the organization and the
individual may not be privileged.

7

See, e.g., Cohen v. Acorn International Ltd., 921 F.Supp.1062 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (motion to disqualify
counsel denied; former client could not reasonably believe that an attorney client relationship existed
when his only communications with counsel were in the course of managing the business; former client
had no reasonable expectation that the communications would be kept confidential from the current
business and its directors); MacKenzie-Childs LLC v. Mackenzie-Childs, 262 F.R.D. 241, 254 (W.D.N.Y.
2009); Nilavar v. Mercy Health System-Western Ohio, 143 F.Supp.2d 909, 913 (S.D. Ohio 2001) (mere
exchange of confidential information between counsel and organization’s officers and directors about a
matter of interest to the organization does not, by itself, create an attorney client relationship with officer
or director.)
8

In re: Banks, 584 P.2d at 292 (Or. 1978); see also, Morris v. Morris, 306 A.D.2d 449-452 (N.Y. App.
2003).

9

Reed v. Hoosier Health Systems, Inc., 325 N.E.2d 408, 412 (Ind. App. 2005) (counsel may not resolve
conflict by “firing” the disfavored client).

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necessary legal documents to create a corporation, including the shareholder
agreement to be signed by the two shareholders of the new business. At no
time does the attorney meet with either of the individual shareholders to
discuss the shareholder’s personal legal rights or responsibilities under the
agreement. The corporation pays for the legal services involved and there was
no prior attorney-client relationship with either shareholder. Later, the
attorney, on behalf of the corporation, sues one of the shareholders for
violation of the shareholder agreement. Disqualification is not required
because there was no attorney client relationship with the individual
shareholder. See McKinney v. Means, 147 F.Supp.2d 898, 901 (W.D. Tenn.
2001).
In contrast, a CEO of a corporation has a dispute with an employee. The
CEO contacts a law firm and asks for representation in dealing with this
dispute. The law firm interviews the CEO, and, in the course of the
investigation, provides legal advice to the CEO. Eventually, the dispute results
in termination of the CEO under a termination agreement. In litigation
regarding enforcement of the termination agreement, the law firm enters an
appearance on behalf of the corporation against the former CEO. The law firm
is disqualified from representing the corporation. Regardless of whether the
law firm understood it had previously represented the corporation or the CEO,
the law firm provided legal advice to the CEO, was given confidential
information by him, and failed to make clear that the firm was representing the
interests of the corporation and not the CEO with respect to the incident. It
was reasonable for the CEO to believe that the law firm was acting on his
behalf as well as on behalf of the corporation. See Home Care Industries, Inc. v.
Murray, 154 F.Supp.2d 861, 869 (D.N.J. 2001).
In resolving these kinds of issues, the attorney must refer to the
provisions of ARPC 1.7, 1.9 and 1.13. To the extent that there are
“independent decision makers” to whom the attorney can turn for guidance as
to the best interests of the business, the attorney may do so pursuant to
1.13(g). However, if, a conflict is determined to exist, the attorney cannot
ignore the conflict and must take steps to ensure that the interests of the
clients are recognized and protected.
Approved by the Alaska Bar Association Ethics Committee on October
12, 2012.
Adopted by the Board of Governors on October 26, 2012.

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