Does a subrogated insurer become a client of the lawyer who represents the insured plaintiff?

Plain-English summary

The Committee was asked whether, when a lawyer represents an injured plaintiff whose losses were partly paid by the plaintiff's own insurer (giving the insurer a subrogation right to proceeds), the insurer becomes a "client" of the insured's lawyer under the Alaska rules. It concludes that the subrogated insurer's right to receive proceeds does not make it a client.

The opinion explains why the answer matters: if the insurer were automatically a client, the defendant's lawyer could not contact it directly under Rule 4.2, and the insured's lawyer would owe it the full set of client duties on fees (Rule 1.5), communication (Rule 1.4), and conflicts (Rules 1.7, 1.8, 1.9). Applying the rules' definition of "client" (one who is rendered legal services or who consults with a view to obtaining them), the opinion reasons this is not a consultation that creates the relationship, and the controlling Alaska case, Ruggles v. Grow, requires no communication at all between the insured's lawyer and the insurer about the lawsuit.

The opinion concludes a lawyer is not "rendering professional legal services" to the insurer merely because a successful outcome benefits the insurer financially; otherwise any lienholder with a claim against the proceeds could be deemed a client. It cites decisions from several jurisdictions refusing to find an attorney-client relationship based on foreseeable economic impact alone, and it relies on the Alaska Supreme Court's analogous Alaska Native Tribal Health Consortium decision, which rejected a similar argument and found the lawyer's duty satisfied by complying with the disputed-funds procedure of Opinion 92-3. The opinion cautions in a footnote that an attorney-client relationship could still be established by independent evidence in an appropriate case, and that even without one, the insured's lawyer may owe the insurer duties as an interested third party, such as safekeeping disputed funds under Rule 1.15.

In practice

Under this opinion, as the Alaska rules stood at the time, the lawyer who pursues an insured plaintiff's claim that includes a subrogated portion does not thereby take on the insurer as a client, and the insurer's financial interest in the recovery is not enough to create the relationship. The opinion notes a defendant's lawyer may therefore contact the insurer directly without a Rule 4.2 violation absent actual knowledge that the insurer is separately represented, and that the insured's lawyer's duties to the insurer are generally those owed an interested third party, including safekeeping disputed funds under Rule 1.15 per Opinion 92-3. It leaves open that an attorney-client relationship could be shown by independent evidence in a particular case.

Common questions

Q: Is a subrogated insurer automatically the insured's lawyer's client?

A: No. The opinion concludes that pursuing the insurer's subrogated claim on the insured's behalf does not, standing alone, make the insurer a client of the insured's lawyer.

Q: Why doesn't the insurer's financial stake make it a client?

A: The opinion reasons a lawyer is not rendering legal services to the insurer just because a successful outcome benefits it financially; otherwise any lienholder on the proceeds could be deemed a client.

Q: Can the defendant's lawyer contact the insurer directly?

A: Per the opinion, yes, without violating Rule 4.2, absent actual knowledge that the insurer is also represented by counsel in the matter.

Q: Could the insurer ever be the lawyer's client?

A: The opinion notes an attorney-client relationship could still be established by independent evidence in an appropriate case, and that the lawyer may owe the insurer third-party duties, such as safekeeping disputed funds under Rule 1.15.

Background and rules framework

The opinion interprets the Alaska rules' definition of "client" (RPC 9.1(b)) and applies Rules 4.2 (communication with represented persons), 1.5 (fees), 1.7/1.8/1.9 (conflicts), and 1.15 (safekeeping third-party funds, analog of Model Rule 1.15). It relies on Ruggles v. Grow and Alaska Native Tribal Health Consortium and the disputed-funds procedure of the Committee's Opinion 92-3.

Citations and references

Rules of Professional Conduct:

• Alaska RPC 9.1(b) (definition of "client")
• Alaska RPC 4.2 (communication with represented persons); RPC 1.5 (fees); RPC 1.7, 1.8, 1.9 (conflicts)
• Alaska RPC 1.15 (safekeeping third-party funds)

Cases:

• Ruggles v. Grow, 984 P.2d 509 (Alaska 1999)
• Alaska Native Tribal Health Consortium v. Settlement Funds..., 84 P.3d 418 (Alaska 2004)
• Continental Cas. Co. v. Pullman Comley, 929 F.2d 103 (2d Cir. 1991)

Other opinions cited:

• Alaska Ethics Opinions 92-3, 98-1

See also

• ABA Formal Op. 05-435: Lawyer Suing the Insured of a Client-Insurer
• ABA Formal Op. 03-430: Insurance Staff Counsel Representation

Source

• Landing page: https://alaskabar.org/ethics-discipline/ethics-opinions/adopted-ethics-opinions-chronological/
• Original PDF: https://alaskabar.org/wp-content/uploads/2008-2.pdf

Original opinion text

Reproduced from the official source for research purposes. The linked source is authoritative.

ALASKA BAR ASSOCIATION
ETHICS OPINION NO. 2008-2
Where A Lawyer Represents An Insured Party Whose Claim Is Subrogated
To A Third Party Insurer, Does The Insurer Become A “Client” Of The
Insured’s Lawyer Under Alaska’s Rules Of Professional Conduct?

Conclusion
The subrogated insurer’s right to receive proceeds from the insured
plaintiff’s recovery in a lawsuit does not make the insurer a “client” of the
lawyer under the ethics rules.
Background
It is not uncommon for a lawyer to represent a plaintiff who has been
injured by a third party, but has had some portion of his or her losses (such as
medical expenses) paid by their own insurer. In such cases, the insurer may
be entitled under the insurance policy, or by law, to “subrogation” of the claim,
that is, the right to either (1) step into the plaintiff’s shoes to sue the third
party defendant directly as a means of recovering of its own payments to
plaintiff or (2) let plaintiff bring suit against the third party and receive
repayment from the proceeds of any recovery by plaintiff. The Alaska Supreme
Court has recognized the right of the insurance company to take either course,
at its option. In Ruggles v. Grow, 984 P.2d 509 (Alaska 1999), the Court
stated:
When an insurer pays expenses on behalf of an insured
it is subrogated to the insured’s claim. The insurer
effectively receives an assignment of its expenditure by
operation of law and contract. If the insurer does not
object, the insured may include the subrogated claim in
its claim against a third-party tortfeasor. Any proceeds
recovered must be paid to the insurer, less pro rata
costs and fees incurred by the insured in prosecuting
and collecting the claim. But the subrogated claim
belongs to the insurer. The insurer may pursue a direct
action against the tortfeasor, discount and settle its
claim, or determine that the claim should not be
pursued.
Id. At 512 (emphasis added).

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The question presented here is whether an attorney pursuing an insurer’s
subrogated claim at the request of the insured may also be said to “represent”
the insurer for purposes of the Alaska Rules of Professional Conduct, at least
in the absence of an express disclaimer of such representation by the insurer
itself. 1
The question is significant. For example, if the insurer were
automatically deemed a “client” in this context, a lawyer for the defendant
would be prohibited, without the consent of the lawyer, from directly contacting
the insurer to discuss settlement or other matters. ARPC 4.2. Likewise, the
lawyer for the insured plaintiff would, with regard to the insurer, be subject to
all of the ethical responsibilities owed to other clients, including obligations
regarding fees and fee agreements (ARPC 1.5), communication (ARPC 1.4) and
conflicts of interest (ARCP 1.7; ARCP 1.8; ARCP 1.9). Obviously, such
questions can affect the way the underlying legal matter is handled on both
sides.
Discussion
The Alaska Rules of Professional Conduct define a “client” as:
[A] person, public officer, or corporation, association or other
organization or entity, either public or private, who is
rendered professional legal services by a lawyer, or who
consults a lawyer with a view to obtaining professional legal
services.
ARPC 9.1(b) (emphasis added). This is not a circumstance in which
“consultation” creates the lawyer-client relationship.
Ruggles does not
mandate any communication at all between the insured plaintiff’s lawyer and
the subrogated insurer about the third party lawsuit, either before or after it is
1

The Court, in Ruggles, held that plaintiff was not permitted to proceed with the subrogated claim “against the
insurer’s wishes.” Id. at 512. Accordingly, the Court found that “[w]hen [insurer] instructed [insured] not to
pursue its subrogation claim, [insured] lacked authority to pursue it.” Id. (emphasis added). Such an instruction
by an insurer has come to be known as a “Ruggles letter,” and would constitute clear proof that an attorneyclient relationship is lacking. See Alaska Bar Association Ethics Op. 98-1 (plaintiff’s counsel may, without
violating ARPC 4.2, contact the claims representative or other agent of defendant’s insurer absent “actual
knowledge” that defendant’s counsel also represents the insurer). A “Ruggles letter” may also
impose other ethical obligations on the insured’s attorney, including an obligation under ARCP 4.1
(truthfulness to third parties) and ARCP 3.4. (fairness to opposing party and counsel) not to falsely
state or imply that such authority continues to exist.

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filed. Indeed, as a practical matter, communications with the insurer about
the case may occur late in the case, or not at all.
Nor can a lawyer be said to be “rendering professional legal services” to
the insurer merely by virtue of the fact that a successful outcome in the lawsuit
will benefit the insurer financially. Were this the case, any third party creditor
with a lien against judgment proceeds could potentially be considered a
“client.” Courts in numerous jurisdictions have refused to recognize a lawyerclient relationship between insurance companies and lawyers for the insured
based upon foreseeable economic impact alone. See e.g., Continental Casualty
Company v. Pullman Comley, Bradley & Reeves, 929 F.2d 103,108 (2nd Cir.
1991)(excess insurer was not “client” of law firm hired by primary insurer to
represent insured in medical malpractice action and could not maintain a
malpractice action against the law firm on that basis); Great American
Insurance Co. v. Dover, Dixon Horne, P.L.L.C., 456 F.3d 909, 912 (8th Cir.
2006) (secondary excess liability carrier lacked standing to bring malpractice
claim against insured’s counsel); Zenith Insurance Company v. Cozen
O’Connor, 148 Cal. App. 4th 998, 55 Cal. Rptr. 3d 911 (Cal. App. 2007)
(reinsurer was not “client” of primary insurer’s counsel, despite knowledge by
all parties that reinsurer faced 100% of the liability for unsuccessful outcome
of case).
The Ruggles decision itself makes no suggestion that the Court intended
that the subrogated insurer would become the “client” of the insured’s attorney
for ethical purposes. The Alaska Supreme Court recently rejected such
arguments in a case involving analogous facts. In Alaska Native Tribal Health
Consortium v. Settlement Funds Held For Or To Be Paid on Behalf of E.R., 84
P.3d 418 (Alaska 2004) the Court found that a portion of the proceeds received
by an injured plaintiff in a personal injury suit were required to be paid to the
Tribal Health Consortium to settle hospital liens for medical services provided
by the Consortium. As in Ruggles, the Court concluded that any such recovery
by the Consortium must be reduced by its pro rata share of attorneys fees
expended to obtain the judgment. Id. at 431. The Court rejected an argument
by the Consortium that plaintiff’s attorney, by alleging that the Consortium
must bear its pro rata share of fees related to the recovery, was in essence,
“claiming to be attorney for the Consortium,” thus triggering various alleged
ethical violations. Id. at 435. The Court found no ethical violations, noting
that the attorney had met his ethical duty by complying with Alaska Bar
Association Ethics Opinion 92-3. Id. That ethics opinion deals with “the
obligation of an attorney to hold funds when a dispute arises concerning the
rights of third parties to client funds in the possession of attorney.” Id.
(emphasis added).

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The Alaska Supreme Court, in Alaska Native Tribal Health Consortium,
also expressly declined to impose upon plaintiff or plaintiff’s attorney any
obligation, as a prerequisite to the fee-sharing obligation, to inform the
Consortium of its intent to seek a fee from proceeds recovered, or even to
inform the Consortium of the pendency of the lawsuit. Id. at 434. Had the
Court intended for lienholders, or subrogees, to personal injury claims to be
deemed the “clients” of plaintiff’s lawyer for ethical purposes, this ruling would
be inconsistent with ARCP 1.5, which generally requires a lawyer to execute a
written fee agreement with a client “before or within a reasonable time after”
commencing the representation.
While Alaska Native Tribal Health Consortium dealt with statutory
hospital liens rather than contractual subrogation, there is no reason to believe
that the court would not apply similar reasoning in the Ruggles context.
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the pursuit of an insurer’s
subrogated claim under the authority of Ruggles v. Grow, standing alone, does
not create an attorney-client relationship between a subrogated insurer and
counsel for the insured.2
Approved by the Alaska Bar Association Ethics Committee on September 4,
2008.
Adopted by the Board of Governors on September 11, 2008.

G:\Ds\COMM\ETHICS\DRAFTS\2008-2 Final Draft re Ruggles Issue.doc

2

The Committee does not mean to suggest by this opinion that an express or implied contract could not be
established in an appropriate case by independent evidence of an attorney-client relationship. See Zenith, 148
Cal. App. 4th at 950 (“it is the intent and conduct of the parties that controls the question as to whether an
attorney-client relationship has been created”). Moreover, it should be noted that, even in the absence of an
attorney-client relationship, insured’s attorney may owe ethical duties to the insurer as an interested third party.
See, e.g. ARPC 1.15 (safekeeping of funds in which a third party claims an interest); Alaska Bar Association
Ethics Op. 92-3 (ethical responsibility of attorney re disputed funds).

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