Lambert Run Coal Co. v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad
Is it still good law? What later courts have actually done to this case.
Status
More on how this was screened
The six confirmed treatments are listed below. The statutory change is limited to § 1441 removals: later courts continue to apply Lambert Run to removals under § 1442, while the Eighth Circuit declined to apply the rule to a § 1444 removal.
28 later cases cite Lambert Run Coal Co. v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad; 28 of those citations sat close to treatment language and were flagged for reading, and all of them have been read. Citations that did not sit near treatment language were not flagged and were not read one by one, so a court that weakened this case without using any of that language would not appear here.
Relying on Lambert Run Coal Co. v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad?
This page shows what later courts did to it. Ask about your specific facts and see whether it still carries your argument, with citations you can check.
Treatments
Superseded by statute
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Congress's 1986 amendment displaced the derivative jurisdiction rule for later-filed actions removed under § 1441, though the Seventh Circuit applied the old rule to this earlier action.
United States ex rel. Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp. v. Brandt Construction Co. · Seventh Circuit · filed
See Lambert Run Coal Co. v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 258 U.S. 377, 42 S.Ct. 349, 66 L.Ed. 671 (1922); Illinois v, Kerr-McGee Chemical Corp., 677 F.2d 571 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1049, 103 S.Ct. 469, 74 L.Ed.2d 618 (1982); Koppers, supra. Congress recently abrogated this rule by amendment of the removal statute, but the amendment applies only to cases filed in state court after June 19, 1986.
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The Sixth Circuit held that Congress displaced the derivative jurisdiction doctrine for actions commenced after June 19, 1986, while applying it to this earlier action.
Chivas Products Ltd. v. Owen · Sixth Circuit · filed
Lambert Run Coal Co. v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 258 U.S. 377, 382, 42 S.Ct. 349, 351, 66 L.Ed. 671 (1922). The doctrine has been much disapproved, see 14A C. Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, Federal Practice & Procedure § 3722 at 284-90, and in 1986 Congress overruled it by statute, see 28 U.S.C. § 1441(e). But the 1986 amendment was applicable only to “civil actions” commenced in state court after June 19, 1986.
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The Sixth Circuit again recognized Congress's displacement of derivative jurisdiction, but held that the amendment did not reach this earlier action.
Morda v. Klein · Sixth Circuit · filed
Lambert Run Coal Co. v. Baltimore & O. R., 258 U.S. 377, 382, 42 S.Ct. 349, 66 L.Ed. 671 (1922). Congress overruled by statute the judicial doctrine of derivative jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(e). But because the change is applicable only to actions commenced in state court after June 19, 1986, the amendment to § 1441 cannot help us here.
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The Eleventh Circuit held that the 1986 amendment to § 1441 superseded Lambert Run's derivative jurisdiction rule for removals under that section.
Hollis v. Florida State University · Eleventh Circuit · filed
A good summary of the theory can be found in Lambert Run Coal Co. v. Baltimore & O.R. Co., 258 U.S. 377, 382 (1922): “The jurisdiction of the federal court on removal is, in a limited sense, a derivative jurisdiction. If the state court lacks jurisdiction of the subject-matter or of the parties, the federal court acquires none, although it might in a like suit originally brought there have had jurisdiction.” ... the theory has been superseded by statute and no longer has any force. In 1986 Congress amended §1441, the general removal provision, by adding subsection (e).
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The district court held that § 1441(f) displaced derivative jurisdiction in a case removed under § 1441.
District Title v. Warren · D.D.C. · filed
Lambert Run Coal Co. v. Balt. & O.R. Co., 258 U.S. 377, 382, 42 S.Ct. 349, 66 L.Ed. 671 (1922). But that doctrine does not transform a question of personal jurisdiction into a question of this Court’s subject-matter jurisdiction. Moreover, the doctrine of derivative jurisdiction does not apply in this case. Defendants removed this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C; § 1441, Notice of Removal at 1, and "Congress has chosen to abrogate the derivative jurisdiction doctrine for removals effectuated under” that provision.
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Declined to follow
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The Eighth Circuit abandoned derivative jurisdiction for removal under § 1444, beyond the text of Congress's § 1441 amendment.
North Dakota v. Fredericks · Eighth Circuit · filed
“The jurisdiction of the federal court on removal is, in a limited sense, a derivative jurisdiction.” Lambert Run Coal Co. v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 258 U.S. 377, 382, 42 S.Ct. 349, 351, 66 L.Ed. 671 (1922). ... Accordingly, we hold that the doctrine of derivative jurisdiction, as applied to defeat removals, should be abandoned completely. The doctrine is no bar to the § 1444 removal that took place in this case.
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