University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar
Is it still good law? What later courts have actually done to this case.
Status
More on how this was screened
A Connecticut court chose a different causation test for its own state statute; that state-law choice is listed separately and does not alter Nassar's federal rule.
3,582 later cases cite University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar; 211 of those citations sat close to treatment language and were flagged for reading, and all of them have been read. Citations that did not sit near treatment language were not flagged and were not read one by one, so a court that weakened this case without using any of that language would not appear here.
Relying on University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar?
This page shows what later courts did to it. Ask about your specific facts and see whether it still carries your argument, with citations you can check.
Treatments
Limited
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The court declined to extend Nassar's but-for causation rule to FMLA retaliation claims and applied the Fifth Circuit's mixed-motive standard.
Markiewicz v. Galloway, Johnson, Tompkins, Burr, and Smith, APLC · E.D. La. · filed
While Galloway’s legal arguments are persuasive, the Court is persuaded that they are best left to the Fifth Circuit which thus far has expressly declined (more than once) to address the impact of Gross and Nassar on Richardson’s mixed-motive holding notwithstanding that those decisions are not recent. Undoubtedly, the Fifth Circuit has cast doubt on the continued viability of Richardson, but it has also cautioned against “blindly applying” Gross and Nassar to the FMLA, Stanton v. Jarvis Christian Coll., No. 20-40581, 2022 WL 738617, at *5 (5th Cir. Mar. 11, 2022) (unpublished) (citing Adams v. Mem’l Herman, 973 F.3d 343, 353 (5th Cir. 2020)). Earlier this year in Stanton, the Fifth Circuit explained why grafting the holdings of Gross and Nassar onto the FMLA is not as simple as it may seem at first blush. See Stanton, 2022 WL 738617, at *6.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener → -
The Sixth Circuit declined to extend Nassar's Title VII but-for standard to Title IX retaliation claims and retained its pre-Nassar standard.
Doe v. University of Kentucky · Sixth Circuit · filed
In Nassar, the Supreme Court held that plaintiffs needed to show that the protected activity was the “but-for” cause of the suffered adverse action to establish a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII. 570 U.S. at 352. While some of our sister circuits have queried whether Nassar applies to Title IX retaliation claims, Hurley, 911 F.3d at 696 n.10, we have continued to apply the pre-Nassar standard for Title IX claims. Fuhr, 710 F.3d at 675; Gordon, 686 F. App’x at 320; Bose, 947 F.3d at 988; see also Nassar, 570 U.S. at 355–56 (distinguishing Title VII’s text from Title IX’s “broad and general terms” that contemplate a broader swath of retaliatory conduct). Therefore, we do so here.
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