Case Citator › Prize Frize, Inc. v. Matrix

Prize Frize, Inc. v. Matrix

Is it still good law? What later courts have actually done to this case.

Superseded by statute
Court
Ninth Circuit
Citation
167 F.3d 1261
Decided
Confirmed treatments
2
Flagged citations read
63 of 63
Citing cases (total)
63
Treatment dates
2006–2021
Superseded by statute
A reviewed court treats this case as superseded by later legislation. Prize Frize, Inc. v. Matrix still governs ordinary removal under its surviving rules, but the Class Action Fairness Act displaced its requirement that every defendant consent to removal of a qualifying class or mass action. All 63 flagged citations have been read.
More on how this was screened

The two confirmed treatments are listed below.

Every treatment on this page is written from the citing opinion itself, with a verbatim quote, never copied from a commercial citator. A citation flagged by our screen but not shown here was read and found not to weaken this case.

63 later cases cite Prize Frize, Inc. v. Matrix; 63 of those citations sat close to treatment language and were flagged for reading, and all of them have been read. Citations that did not sit near treatment language were not flagged and were not read one by one, so a court that weakened this case without using any of that language would not appear here.

Relying on Prize Frize, Inc. v. Matrix?

This page shows what later courts did to it. Ask about your specific facts and see whether it still carries your argument, with citations you can check.

Treatments

Superseded by statute

  • The Ninth Circuit held that CAFA Section 1453(b) overrides Prize Frize's all-defendant consent requirement for qualifying class or mass action removal.

    Abrego Abrego v. Dow Chemical Co. · Ninth Circuit · filed

    The final CAFA amendment relevant here is § 1453, which addresses the removal of class actions. ... Section 1453(b) ... overrides the judge-created requirement that each defendant consent to removal, ... see Prize Frize, Inc. v. Matrix (U.S.) Inc., ... 167 F.3d 1261, 1267 (9th Cir.1999) (holding that “[t]he case was improperly removed because not all defendants consented to the removal” as required by § 1446)
    Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Limited

  • The district court declined to require an explanation for an absent, effectively unserved defendant when the plaintiff already knew a bankruptcy injunction barred service; it also treated a later defendant's consent as curing the notice defect.

    Gianelli v. Schoenfeld · E.D. Cal. · filed

    The Ninth Circuit case establishing this affirmative explanation requirement frames the requirement in all-or-nothing terms: “Where fewer than all the defendants have joined in a removal action, the removing party has the burden under section 1446(a) to explain affirmatively the absence of any co-defendants in the notice for removal.” Prize Frize, 167 F.3d at 1266 (emphasis added). ... Under the statutory and court-ordered discharge injunction, plaintiff’s service on PG&E was ineffective, as explained above. Accordingly, the undersigned sees no utility in requiring the removing defendants to explain the absence of PG&E, who—as an unserved defendant—had “no obligation to even make an appearance because [it is] not yet part[y] to the action.” ... While it would have undoubtedly been the better practice to explain PG&E’s failure to join in the notice of removal, the lack of such explanation is not grounds for remand here.
    Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

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