David Newlin v. David W. Helman, Jesse E. Robinson v. B. Smith, James C. Griffin v. William R. Harris
Is it still good law? What later courts have actually done to this case.
Status
More on how this was screened
Whitfield v. Scully, Lafauci v. Cunningham, Torres v. O'Quinn, and Michael Siluk, Jr. v. Catherine Merwin declined to follow Newlin's simultaneous filing-fee collection rule, but the Supreme Court later adopted Newlin's per-case approach in Bruce v. Samuels. The other citing opinions applied unaffected Newlin holdings, repeated history parentheticals reporting earlier treatments, or used nearby treatment language for unrelated issues.
404 later cases cite David Newlin v. David W. Helman, Jesse E. Robinson v. B. Smith, James C. Griffin v. William R. Harris; 101 of those citations sat close to treatment language and were flagged for reading, and all of them have been read. Citations that did not sit near treatment language were not flagged and were not read one by one, so a court that weakened this case without using any of that language would not appear here.
Relying on David Newlin v. David W. Helman, Jesse E. Robinson v. B. Smith, James C. Griffin v. William R. Harris?
This page shows what later courts did to it. Ask about your specific facts and see whether it still carries your argument, with citations you can check.
Treatments
Overruled in Part
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The Seventh Circuit overruled Newlin's distinction among collateral attacks and held that the Prison Litigation Reform Act does not apply to any request for collateral relief under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241, 2254, or 2255.
Walker v. O'Brien · Seventh Circuit · filed
With the benefit of the views from the other circuits, we have concluded that the line Newlin draws between collateral attacks that are in some way related to the original criminal proceeding and those that are not should be abandoned. ... We therefore hold today, in keeping with the decisions in Davis v. Fechtel, 150 F.3d 486, 488-90 (5th Cir.1998); McIntosh v. United States Parole Commission, 115 F.3d 809, 811-12 (10th Cir.1997); and Blair-Bey v. Quick, 151 F.3d 1036, 1039-41 (D.C.Cir.1998), that *629the PLRA does not apply to any requests for collateral relief under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241, 2254, or 2255. ... Because Part III of this opinion overrules in part an earlier decision of a panel of this court, and because Parts II and IV address important issues about the administration of the habeas corpus regime, the opinion has been circulated to the full court under Circuit Rule 40(e). A majority of the judges in active service did not wish to rehear the case en banc.
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The Seventh Circuit overruled Newlin's suggestion that “good faith” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) differs from objective frivolousness and held that the standards are synonymous.
Lee v. Clinton · Seventh Circuit · filed
The standard for refusing to permit an appeal to be taken in forma pauperis is that the appeal be certified by the district court in writing as “not taken in good faith,” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), and in Newlin v. Helman, 123 F.3d 429, 433 (7th Cir.1997), we suggested that “good faith” is not a synonym for “frivolous.” Yet the two concepts have long been explicitly equated in decisions concerning pauper status ... But we find this statutory analysis, which seems to us the strongest and indeed the only argument that can be made in support of Newlin, unpersuasive. ... Because we are overruling so much of Neiulin and Hyche as is inconsistent with our interpretation of the statute, we have circulated the opinion to the entire court in advance of publication, in accordance with 7th Cir. R. 40(e). No judge in regular active service voted to hear the case en banc.
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Declined to Follow
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The Second Circuit declined to follow Newlin's simultaneous-collection rule and held that multiple filing-fee encumbrances generally must be recouped sequentially at a constant rate of 20 percent of monthly receipts.
Whitfield v. Scully · Second Circuit · filed
Addressing precisely this statutory question, the Seventh Circuit has read § 1915 to require simultaneous rather than sequential payment of multiple encumbrances, relying largely on two arguments. ... We think these arguments do not carry the day. ... Consequently, we conclude that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2) generally requires the recoupment of multiple encumbrances in sequential fashion at a constant rate of 20 percent of monthly receipts to the prisoner’s account.
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The District of Massachusetts adopted Whitfield's reasoning instead of Newlin's and held that indigent prisoners' filing fees must be collected sequentially rather than simultaneously.
Lafauci v. Cunningham · D. Mass. · filed
The Second Circuit recently weighed in on the issue. ... Rejecting New-lin’s interpretation, the Second Circuit held that multiple filing fees should be recouped sequentially, at a constant rate of 20% of monthly receipts to the prisoner’s account. ... For these reasons, this court adopts the Second Circuit’s reasoning in Whitfield and concludes that § 1915(b)(2) requires that filing fees be collected from indigent prisoners sequentially, rather than simultaneously.
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The Fourth Circuit rejected Newlin's per-case collection rule and held that section 1915(b)(2) caps aggregate monthly filing-fee deductions at twenty percent of a prisoner's income regardless of the number of pending cases or appeals.
Torres v. O'Quinn · Fourth Circuit · filed
We join the Second Circuit and hold that § 1915(b)(2) requires that no more than twenty percent of an inmate’s monthly income be deducted to pay filing fees, irrespective of the total number of cases or appeals the inmate has pending at any one time.
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The Third Circuit rejected Newlin's simultaneous per-case collection rule and held that section 1915(b)(2) caps total monthly filing-fee deductions at twenty percent, with multiple fees collected sequentially.
Michael Siluk, Jr. v. Catherine Merwin · Third Circuit · filed
Nevertheless, we recognize that the contrary view, as expressed by the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Newlin, has gained some support. In Newlin, the Court reasoned that, because the PLRA is designed to ‘require the prisoner to bear some marginal cost for each legal activity,’ simultaneous recoupment is most consistent with the statute’s purpose because it exacts that price the soonest. The Newlin Court was concerned that, ‘[ujnless payment begins soon after the event that creates the liability, this will not happen[ ]’ and prisoners could file ‘multiple suits for the price of one.’ However, that analysis conflates the distinct objectives of ensuring payment of all filing fees and expediting payment of fees. Neither the text of the statute nor the legislative history supports this view.
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