Calderon v. United States District Court
Is it still good law? What later courts have actually done to this case.
Status
More on how this was screened
The en banc Ninth Circuit displaced Calderon (Beeler)'s petition-filing rule; later courts rejected or criticized its assumed April 23, 1997 grace-period cutoff, and three District of Arizona decisions confined its equitable-tolling holding rather than extending it to prospective tolling. The other citing opinions were positive applications, history parentheticals reporting another court's act, rejected arguments, duplicate copies of the same opinion, or citations flagged in error.
406 later cases cite Calderon v. United States District Court; 203 of those citations sat close to treatment language and were flagged for reading, and all of them have been read. Citations that did not sit near treatment language were not flagged and were not read one by one, so a court that weakened this case without using any of that language would not appear here.
Relying on Calderon v. United States District Court?
This page shows what later courts did to it. Ask about your specific facts and see whether it still carries your argument, with citations you can check.
Treatments
Overruled in part
-
The en banc Ninth Circuit overruled Calderon (Beeler) to the extent it held that a habeas case becomes pending only when the habeas petition itself is filed.
Calderon v. United States District Court for the Central District of California · Ninth Circuit (en banc) · filed
Accordingly, we overrule those portions of Beeler and Kelly III that held that a habeas corpus case is pending only when the habeas petition itself has been filed.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Declined to follow
-
The Ninth Circuit treated Calderon's April 23, 1997 grace-period deadline as dictum and instead held that Rule 6(a) made April 24, 1997 the deadline.
Patterson v. Stewart · Ninth Circuit · filed
State prisoners, like Patterson, whose convictions became final prior to AEDPA’s enactment, had a one-year grace period in which to file their petitions. Calderon v. United States Dist. Ct. (Beeler), 128 F.3d 1283, 1286 (9th Cir.1997), overruled in part on other grounds by Calderon v. United States Dist. Ct. (Kelly), 163 F.3d 530, 540 (9th Cir.1998) (en banc). This court has stated, in dictum, that the one-year grace period expired on April 23, 1997. Calderon (Beeler), 128 F.3d at 1287. ... We therefore hold that AEDPA’s one-year grace period for challenging convictions finalized before AEDPA’s enactment date is governed by Rule 6(a) and ended on April 24, 1997 in the absence of statutory tolling.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener → -
The Seventh Circuit declined to follow Calderon's assumed April 23, 1997 grace-period cutoff and held that Rule 6(a) made April 24, 1997 the timely filing deadline.
Newell v. Hanks · Seventh Circuit · filed
Later cases in this and other circuits have also assumed, where the date was not critical, that April 23, 1997, was the end of AEDPA’s one-year grace period. E.g., ... Calderon v. U.S. Dist. Court for the Cent. Dist. of Cal., 128 F.3d 1283, 1287 (9th Cir.1997), overruled on other grounds by 163 F.3d 530 (9th Cir.1998) ... Notwithstanding Lindh, however, whether AEDPA’s grace period ended on April 23 or April 24, 1997, is still an open question in this circuit. ... We now expressly hold what was implied in Marcello: Rule 6(a) applies to the computation of AEDPA’s grace period, and so any habeas corpus petition filed on or before April 24, 1997, is timely.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Limited
-
The District of Arizona confined Calderon (Beeler) to holding that AEDPA's limitations period is subject to equitable tolling, rather than treating Beeler as deciding whether prospective tolling is permissible.
Forde v. Shinn · D. Ariz. · filed
The Ninth Circuit in Beeler did not directly address whether prospective tolling was permissible; the issue was whether the statute of limitations was subject to equitable tolling at all. See Beeler, 128 F.3d at 1285 (deciding whether the AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations was subject to equitable tolling or was an inflexible limitation on federal court jurisdiction). After deciding the statute of limitations could be tolled, the Ninth Circuit went on to affirm the district court’s decision to allow Beeler more time to file his petition after his first attorney withdrew from representation, but it is not evident from the opinion that the district court’s decision to toll, in contrast to its legal authority to toll, was even at issue on appeal. Id. at 1289. Beeler simply stands for the proposition that the AEDPA is subject to equitable tolling and this is clearly reconcilable with Smith.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener → -
The District of Arizona likewise confined Calderon (Beeler) to the general availability of equitable tolling and treated prospective tolling as an unresolved context.
Payne v. Shinn · D. Ariz. · filed
The Ninth Circuit in Beeler did not directly address whether prospective tolling was permissible; the issue was whether the statute of limitations was subject to equitable tolling at all. See Beeler, 128 F.3d at 1285 (deciding whether the AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations was subject to equitable tolling or was an inflexible limitation on federal court jurisdiction). After deciding the statute of limitations could be tolled, the Ninth Circuit went on to affirm the district court’s decision to allow Beeler more time to file his petition after his first attorney withdrew from representation, but it is not evident from the opinion that the district court’s decision to toll, in contrast to its legal authority to toll, was even at issue on appeal. Id. at 1289. Beeler simply stands for the proposition that the AEDPA is subject to equitable tolling and this is clearly reconcilable with Smith.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener → -
The District of Arizona held that Calderon (Beeler) did not decide the availability of prospective equitable tolling and denied a request for such tolling as premature.
Burns v. Shinn · D. Ariz. · filed
To conclude, neither the Supreme Court nor the Ninth Circuit has directly addressed the availability of prospective equitable tolling of federal habeas petitions. Beeler simply stands for the proposition that the AEDPA is subject to equitable tolling. The Ninth Circuit in Smith, however, has instructed this Court to examine a petitioner’s diligence “up to the time of filing his claim in federal court.” Smith, 953 F.3d at 598–99. This the Court cannot do until a petition is filed. Thus, the request for prospective equitable tolling is denied as premature.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Criticized
-
The Seventh Circuit criticized Calderon's April 23, 1997 grace-period cutoff as an unexplained assumption made in a case that did not decide whether April 23 or April 24 was the deadline.
United States v. Marcello · Seventh Circuit · filed
We and five other circuits have, without analysis, followed the April 23, 1997, cutoff for those who already were imprisoned at the time the new law took effect. ... Calderon v. United States Dist. Court for the Cent. Dist. of Calif., 128 F.3d 1283, 1287 (9th Cir.1997), overruled on other grounds, 163 F.3d 530 (9th Cir.1998) ... The issue in all of these cases was not whether the deadline should be April 23, 1997, or April 24, 1997, but rather whether prisoners whose judgments of conviction had been finalized well before the new law’s date of enactment should be allowed to seek collateral relief at all. None of these cases discussed the rationale for setting April 23 instead of April 24 as the deadline.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Does this case still carry your argument?
Describe your facts. Ezel reads Calderon v. United States District Court and the cases that treated it, then tells you whether it still holds for your situation, with citations.
Opens in Ezel Pro.
- Checks the law as it stands today, not only this page
- Cites every source it relies on, so you can verify it
- Chat, drafting and research in one workspace