Oshiver v. Levin, Fishbein, Sedran & Berman
Is it still good law? What later courts have actually done to this case.
Status
More on how this was screened
The Seventh Circuit also declined Oshiver’s broader approach to equitable relief. All 62 flagged citations have been read; the 2 confirmed treatments are listed below.
62 later cases cite Oshiver v. Levin, Fishbein, Sedran & Berman; 62 of those citations sat close to treatment language and were flagged for reading, and all of them have been read. Citations that did not sit near treatment language were not flagged and were not read one by one, so a court that weakened this case without using any of that language would not appear here.
Relying on Oshiver v. Levin, Fishbein, Sedran & Berman?
This page shows what later courts did to it. Ask about your specific facts and see whether it still carries your argument, with citations you can check.
Treatments
Declined to follow
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The Seventh Circuit applied its narrower standard for equitable relief instead of Oshiver's broader approach to filing deadlines.
Monroe v. Columbia College Chicago · Seventh Circuit · filed
Oshiver’s conception of when equitable relief is appropriate is broader than the one this court has adopted, see Thelen v. Marc’s Big Boy Corp., 64 F.3d 264, 267–68 (7th Cir. 1995), but Monroe appears to rely on Oshiver’s discussion of a plaintiff’s diligence, and the importance of that diligence in awarding equitable relief, for the notion that his own timely pursuit of relief, albeit initially in the wrong forum (the Chicago Commission on Human Relations), paves the way for him to invoke the doctrine of equitable estoppel and to argue that Columbia’s wrongdoing should support the application of that doctrine and excuse the tardy filing of his EEOC charge. ... Monroe’s equitable estoppel theory goes nowhere.
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Abrogated
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The en banc Third Circuit recognized that intervening Supreme Court authority abrogated Oshiver’s presumption that a discovery rule generally applies to federal filing periods, where the statute starts the clock when a violation occurs.
Rotkiske v. Klemm · Third Circuit (en banc) · filed
In dictum in that case, we applied the discovery rule to Title VII, even though the statutory language required charges to be filed within 180 days “after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred.” ... The problem with Rotkiske’s reliance on Oshiver is that its dictum is in obvious tension with the Supreme Court’s decision in TRW. ... Indeed, to the extent that our decisions have relied on such a general presumption in applying a discovery rule to statutes that expressly begin to run when a violation “occurs,” they cannot be reconciled with the Supreme Court’s mandate that when “the text [of a statute] and reasonable inferences from it give a clear answer,” that is “the end of the matter.” Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 120 (1994) (citations omitted). See Oshiver, 38 F.3d at 1385 (presuming applicability of discovery rule); Podobnik v. U.S. Postal Serv., 409 F.3d 584, 590 (3d Cir. 2005) (same, following Oshiver).
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