Case Citator › The Sharman Company, Inc. v. United States

The Sharman Company, Inc. v. United States

Is it still good law? What later courts have actually done to this case.

Overruled in part
Court
Federal Circuit
Citation
2 F.3d 1564
Decided
Confirmed treatments
5
Flagged citations read
62 of 62
Citing cases (total)
62
Treatment dates
1995–2015
Overruled in part
A reviewed court has overruled part of this case’s holding. The Sharman Company, Inc. v. United States was overruled in part on whether a nonroutine contract claim must already be disputed when submitted to the contracting officer. The Federal Circuit’s en banc Reflectone decision rejected that requirement while continuing to cite Sharman for the need for a contracting officer’s final decision before suit.
More on how this was screened

Later courts confined other uses of Sharman where a court already had jurisdiction or a contractor had missed the appeal deadline. Five confirmed treatments are listed below after review of all 62 flagged citations.

Every treatment on this page is written from the citing opinion itself, with a verbatim quote, never copied from a commercial citator. A citation flagged by our screen but not shown here was read and found not to weaken this case.

62 later cases cite The Sharman Company, Inc. v. United States; 62 of those citations sat close to treatment language and were flagged for reading, and all of them have been read. Citations that did not sit near treatment language were not flagged and were not read one by one, so a court that weakened this case without using any of that language would not appear here.

Relying on The Sharman Company, Inc. v. United States?

This page shows what later courts did to it. Ask about your specific facts and see whether it still carries your argument, with citations you can check.

Treatments

Overruled in part

  • Sitting en banc, the Federal Circuit overruled Sharman’s requirement that a nonroutine Contract Disputes Act claim already be disputed when submitted to a contracting officer.

    Reflectone, Inc. v. Dalton · United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, en banc · filed

    To the extent that Dawco and its progeny10 have been read to also hold that, based on FAR 33.201, a “claim” (other than a routine request for payment) must already be in dispute when submitted to the CO, they are hereby overruled. ... Four of our cases followed Dawco by requiring that a CDA “claim" be in dispute when submitted to the CO: Bill Strong Enters., Inc. v. Shannon, 49 F.3d 1541, 1544-45 (Fed.Cir.1995); Sharman Co., 2 F.3d at 1571 (holding government letter to contractor seeking repayment of progress payments did not assert a government claim, in part because amount specified was not yet in dispute)
    Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Limited

  • The court declined to extend Sharman’s contracting officer divestiture rule to a claim already within the court’s jurisdiction through a deemed denial.

    United Partition Systems, Inc. v. United States · United States Court of Federal Claims · filed

    The Federal Circuit’s opinion in Sharman did not touch on the authority derived from Paragraph 605(c)(5) respecting a case in which the Court has concluded it possesses jurisdiction over a claim. In Sharman, the CDA’s jurisdictional prerequisites had not been met when the complaint was filed. 2 F.3d at 1569. ... Consequently, the extension of Sharman in Witherington must be discounted. In instances where this Court lacks jurisdiction over a claim, it is not empowered to issue a stay or otherwise to act regarding that claim. However, when the Court does possess jurisdiction over a claim based on a deemed denial, it is specifically granted discretion to ret-rocede authority to the contracting officer by Paragraph 605(c)(5) of the CDA.
    Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

  • The court declined to extend Sharman to excuse a contractor’s untimely challenge to a final decision.

    Renda Marine, Inc. v. United States · United States Court of Federal Claims · filed

    In fact, the twelve-month limitations period was not mentioned in Sharman and the Federal Circuit offered no opinion as to whether its holding *792could somehow be construed as carving out an “exception” to the clearly stated finality rule in section 605(b) of the CDA. ... In this court’s view, the omission of such a discussion in Sharman is explained because, among other reasons, it could not be so construed. ... Accordingly, the court declines to rule on the validity of the CO’s Final Decision, and plaintiffs arguments based on Sharman do not persuade the court to reconsider the court’s April 19, 2005 Opinion and Order finding that the Final Decision “is now ‘final and conclusive’ and not reviewable by this court.”
    Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

  • The Federal Circuit held that Sharman did not permit a late challenge to a final decision when the government had not put that decision in issue by counterclaim.

    Renda Marine, Inc. v. United States · United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit · filed

    Renda’s reliance on Sharman is misplaced. In Sharman, this court ruled that the Claims Court lacked jurisdiction over the government’s claim because it was the product of an invalid contracting officer’s decision. Id. However—and this is the critical point— the government’s claim and the underlying contracting officer’s decision were properly before the Claims Court and this court because the government had put them in issue by asserting its counterclaim. ... case here. Renda did not timely appeal the November 26, 2002 final decision, and the government did not put the decision in issue by filing a counterclaim based upon the decision. Renda’s argument that the CO’s final decision is invalid because, in the words of Sharman, it involves a claim that is the “mirror image” of a claim already in litigation, see id. at 1573, is thus beside the point. Only a court, after hearing argument from both a contractor and the government, may declare a contracting officer’s final decision invalid—for whatever reason. A contractor may not do so unilaterally. In this case, the Court of Federal Claims was not in a position to consider the validity of the November 26, 2002 final decision because Renda did not timely appeal the decision and the government did not put it in issue.
    Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

  • The court held that Sharman did not bar a statutory remand to the contracting officer after a deemed denial had given the court jurisdiction.

    Rudolph and Sletten, Inc. v. United States · United States Court of Federal Claims · filed

    In Sharman Co. v. United States, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that “[o]nce a claim is in litigation, the Department of Justice gains exclusive authority to act in the pending litigation. . . . That exclusive authority divests the contracting officer of his authority to issue a final decision on the claim.” See Sharman Co. v. United States, 2 F.3d 1564, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (citations omitted), overruled on other grounds by Reflectone, Inc. v. Dalton, 60 F.3d 1572. However, Sharman did not address circumstances where the Court has determined that it possesses jurisdiction and seeks to remand a case to the contracting officer pursuant to section 7103(f)(5). Id. Rather, as discussed above, the CDA explicitly grants the Court the authority to “retrocede authority to the contracting officer” when the Court “posses[es] jurisdiction over a claim based on a deemed denial.”
    Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Does this case still carry your argument?

Describe your facts. Ezel reads The Sharman Company, Inc. v. United States and the cases that treated it, then tells you whether it still holds for your situation, with citations.

Opens in Ezel Pro.

  • Checks the law as it stands today, not only this page
  • Cites every source it relies on, so you can verify it
  • Chat, drafting and research in one workspace