Young, II v. Quinlan
Is it still good law? What later courts have actually done to this case.
Status
More on how this was screened
Nyhuis v. Reno held that the Prison Litigation Reform Act eliminated the futility exception and displaced Young's distinction between mixed claims and damages-only claims for exhaustion purposes. The other citing opinions apply Young's surviving holdings, distinguish their facts, or merely repeat Farmer's and the PLRA's effects as citation history.
264 later cases cite Young, II v. Quinlan; 92 of those citations sat close to treatment language and were flagged for reading, and all of them have been read. Citations that did not sit near treatment language were not flagged and were not read one by one, so a court that weakened this case without using any of that language would not appear here.
Relying on Young, II v. Quinlan?
This page shows what later courts did to it. Ask about your specific facts and see whether it still carries your argument, with citations you can check.
Treatments
Abrogated
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The Supreme Court displaced Young's objective “knew or should have known” deliberate-indifference test and required proof that the prison official was subjectively aware of and disregarded the excessive risk.
Farmer v. Brennan · Supreme Court of the United States · filed
We granted certiorari, 510 U. S. 811 (1993), because Courts of Appeals had adopted inconsistent tests for “deliberate indifference.” Compare, for example, McGill v. Duckworth, 944 F. 2d 344, 348 (CA7 1991) (holding that “deliberate indifference” requires a “subjective standard of recklessness”), cert, denied, 503 U. S. 907 (1992), with Young v. Quinlan, 960 F. 2d 351, 360-361 (CA3 1992) (“[A] prison official is deliberately indifferent when he knows or should have known of a sufficiently serious danger to an inmate”). ... We reject petitioner’s invitation to adopt an objective test for deliberate indifference. We hold instead that a prison official cannot be found liable under the Eighth Amendment for denying an inmate humane conditions of confinement unless the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.
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Superseded by statute
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The Third Circuit held that the Prison Litigation Reform Act eliminated the futility exception and rendered largely irrelevant Young's distinction between mixed claims and claims seeking only damages.
Nyhuis v. Reno · Third Circuit · filed
See Young v. Quinlan, 960 F.2d 351, 356 n. 8 (3d Cir.1992) (Bivens action) (citing Veteto v. Miller, 794 F.2d 98, 100 (3d Cir.1986) (holding “that the requirement for exhaustion of the administrative remedy provided by the [administrative process] applies to a prisoner’s suit for injunctive or mandatory relief whether or not it carries an added claim for damages”)). As explained below, we believe that the PLRA did away with the futility exception altogether. See infra Section I.C. Therefore, the PLRA rendered, for the most part, irrelevant the distinction that Muhammad and Young drew between mixed claim actions and those only involving requests for money damages.
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