Case Citator › Reed v. Town of Gilbert

Reed v. Town of Gilbert

Is it still good law? What later courts have actually done to this case.

Limited by some courts
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Citation
576 U.S. 155
Decided
Confirmed treatments
9
Flagged citations read
310 of 310
Citing cases (total)
1,299
Treatment dates
2018–2026
Limited by some courts
At least one reviewed court has limited this case’s holding to narrower facts or a narrower rule. No reviewed court has overruled it. Limited. All 310 flagged citations have been screened.
More on how this was screened

The nine confirmed treatments listed below decline to extend Reed’s strict-scrutiny rule to commercial speech or adult-business secondary effects. The Supreme Court’s decision in City of Austin v. Reagan National Advertising of Austin, LLC applies Reed’s message-based test and treats location-only sign distinctions as content neutral; reading a sign does not alone trigger strict scrutiny. Most other citing opinions merely report Reed’s displacement of older precedent.

Every treatment on this page is written from the citing opinion itself, with a verbatim quote, never copied from a commercial citator. A citation flagged by our screen but not shown here was read and found not to weaken this case.

1,299 later cases cite Reed v. Town of Gilbert; 310 of those citations sat close to treatment language and were flagged for reading, and all of them have been read. Citations that did not sit near treatment language were not flagged and were not read one by one, so a court that weakened this case without using any of that language would not appear here.

Relying on Reed v. Town of Gilbert?

This page shows what later courts did to it. Ask about your specific facts and see whether it still carries your argument, with citations you can check.

Treatments

Limited

  • Does not extend Reed strict scrutiny to adult-business secondary-effects regulations, which remain governed by Renton and Alameda Books.

    Maxim Cabaret, Inc. v. City of Sandy Springs · Supreme Court of Georgia · filed

    But Reed did not involve secondary-effects legislation. Nor did the opinion in Reed mention, much less overrule, prior cases in which the Supreme Court specifically held that regulations designed to reduce the negative secondary effects of adult entertainment businesses are treated as content neutral and thus subject to an intermediate level of scrutiny.
    Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

  • Confines Reed strict scrutiny to noncommercial content restrictions and continues applying Central Hudson to commercial speech.

    Reagan National Advertising of Austin, Inc. v. City of Cedar Park · Western District of Texas · filed

    Reed does not require the application of strict scrutiny to content-based regulations of commercial speech.
    Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

  • Refuses to extend Reed strict scrutiny to regulations confined to commercial debt-collection speech; applies Central Hudson.

    Commonwealth v. Credit Acceptance Corporation · Massachusetts Superior Court · filed

    Neither Reed nor Barr involved a limitation on commercial speech, neither decision mentions Central Hudson, and neither case overruled or narrowed Central Hudson and its progeny.
    Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

  • Declined to extend Reed’s facial content-discrimination rule to regulations governed by the adult-entertainment secondary-effects doctrine.

    Discotheque, Inc. v. Augusta-Richmond County, Georgia · Eleventh Circuit (nonprecedential) · filed

    The secondary-effects precedents of the Supreme Court and this Court have direct application here, while Reed does not, so we must apply the secondary-effects doctrine even though it may appear to rest on reasoning rejected in Reed.
    Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

  • Declines to extend Reed to require strict scrutiny of sexually oriented business regulations governed by the secondary-effects doctrine.

    Valadez v. Paxton · Western District of Texas · filed

    Because Reed was not a case involving sexually oriented businesses, did not discuss Renton at length, and the Fifth Circuit in Hegar has continued to apply Renton, the Court finds that the secondary effects test remains good law.
    Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

  • Declines to extend Reed to require strict scrutiny of sexually oriented business regulations governed by the secondary-effects doctrine.

    Association of Club Executives of Dallas, Inc. v. City of Dallas · Fifth Circuit · filed

    Both Reed and City of Austin concerned physical signs and said nothing about SOBs or the secondary effects doctrine. The Court “does not normally overturn . . . earlier authority sub silentio.” Shalala v. Ill. Council on Long Term Care, Inc., 529 U.S. 1, 18 (2000).7 So, it would be a mistake to interpret those decisions as silently spelling Renton’s demise. To the contrary, City of Austin cautioned inferior courts against doing exactly that. See City of Austin, 142 S. Ct. at 1474 (warning that overreading Reed would “contravene numerous precedents” upon which “Reed did not purport to cast doubt”).
    Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

  • Declined to extend Reed’s strict-scrutiny rule to the TCPA’s restrictions on unsolicited commercial fax advertisements, applying Central Hudson instead.

    Steven A. Conner, DPM, P.C. v. Fox Rehabilitation Services, P.C. · Third Circuit (nonprecedential) · filed

    Reed similarly has little relevance, as the statute at issue there regulated exclusively noncommercial speech and therefore did not implicate the commercial-speech doctrine.66 Because none of those decisions abrogated Central Hudson, we are bound to apply the commercial-speech doctrine.
    Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

  • Declined to extend Reed’s facial content-discrimination rule to ordinances governed by the adult-entertainment secondary-effects doctrine.

    WBY, Inc. v. City of Chamblee, Georgia · Eleventh Circuit · filed

    Although Reed has perhaps called into question the reasoning underlying the secondary-effects doctrine, it did not overrule it; indeed, Reed did not purport to address the secondary-effects doctrine. Without further clarification, we cannot disregard well-established precedent.
    Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

  • Declined to extend Reed’s strict-scrutiny rule to commercial disclosures regulated by the Video Privacy Protection Act, applying Central Hudson intermediate scrutiny.

    Welbel v. Shout! Factory, LLC · N.D. Ill. · filed

    Whether that is true—and most courts believe it is not—the facts and holdings of Reed and Sorrell are distinguishable. Despite the fact that Reed concerned speech that might be described as “commercial,” the Supreme Court in Reed did not address whether the speech was commercial. See 576 U.S. 155.
    Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

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