National Railroad Passenger Corporation v. Morgan

Status

6,572 later cases cite National Railroad Passenger Corporation v. Morgan; 571 of those citations sat close to treatment language and were flagged for reading, and all of them have been read. Citations that did not sit near treatment language were not flagged and were not read one by one, so a court that weakened this case without using any of that language would not appear here.

Treatments

Limited

• The District of Kansas declined to extend Morgan's Title VII hostile-environment rule to claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981.

  Ware v. Union Pacific Railroad Co. Omaha · D. Kan. · filed August 21, 2003

  While the Court recognizes that the Eighth Circuit has extended Morgan to Section 1981 claims, it is bound by Tenth Circuit law, which specifically says that the continuing violation theory does not apply to Section 1981 claims. Harris, 300 F.3d at 1193 n. 2; Amro, 1998 WL 380510, at *2 n. 4; Thomas, 111 F.3d at 1514. Since the Supreme Court decided Morgan on June 10, 2002, other judges in this judicial district have refused to extend the continuing violation theory to Section 1981 claims. See Hernandez v. Data Sys. Int’l, No. 02-2193-JWL, 2003 WL 21355928, at *7 (D.Kan. June 10, 2003); Henderson v. Int’l Union, No. Civ.A. 0-2575-CM, 2003 WL 21312335, at *27 (D.Kan. June 6, 2003). The Court concurs in these well reasoned opinions and declines plaintiffs invitation to extend Morgan to Section 1981 claims.

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• The District of Oregon confined Morgan to charge-filing timeliness and held it inapplicable to the distinct scope-of-exhaustion inquiry.

  Kitchen v. WSCO Petroleum Corp. · D. Or. · filed January 29, 2007

  The parties disagree on whether Morgan overrules the Ninth Circuit’s line of cases adhering to the principle in Freeman. However, Morgan concerns the timeliness of a filing (i.e. the statute of limitations), rather than exhaustion. In fact, in one case decided after Morgan, the Ninth Circuit applied the principles espoused in Freeman that a court may consider “all claims of discrimination that fall within the scope of the EEOC’s actual investigation or an EEOC investigation that could reasonably be expected to grow out of the charge.” Vasquez v. Co. of Los Angeles, 349 F.3d 634, 644 (9th Cir.2003). Vasquez did not discuss Morgan and its consequences. Therefore, Morgan is inapplicable to the exhaustion issue.

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• The Fourth Circuit held that Morgan's charge-filing limitations analysis does not govern whether an existing EEOC charge exhausts related post-charge retaliation.

  Jones v. Calvert Group, Ltd. · Fourth Circuit · filed January 5, 2009

  Although Calvert asserts that Morgan required Jones to file a new EEOC charge alleging that she was terminated in retaliation for her first charge, we do not read Morgan that broadly. Morgan addresses only the issue of when the limitations clock for filing an EEOC charge begins ticking with regard to discrete unlawful employment practices. In this respect, it concerns only Congress’s clear preference as expressed in Title VII for “prompt processing of all charges of employment discrimination.” Morgan, 536 U.S. at 109. It does not purport to address the extent to which an EEOC charge satisfies exhaustion requirements for claims of related, post-charge events.

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• The Southern District of Texas declined to extend Morgan to displace the Fifth Circuit's exception for retaliation growing out of an earlier exhausted charge.

  Cooper v. Wal-Mart Transportation, LLC · S.D. Tex. · filed September 24, 2009

  Wal-Mart admits that Gupta “might allow” Cooper to proceed on his retaliatory termination claim without filing a second EEOC charge, but argues that Gupta “has been undermined or abrogated by the Supreme Court’s holding in National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101 [122 S.Ct. 2061, 153 L.Ed.2d 106] (2002).” ... Courts in the Fifth Circuit have continued to apply Gupta after Morgan. ... Under Gupta, Cooper’s retaliatory termination claim is “properly before the court” because it grows out of the earlier filed EEOC and TWC charge. See Gupta, 654 F.2d at 413. On these facts, Gupta places the retaliation claim within this court’s “ancillary jurisdiction.” Id. Because Cooper’s retaliation claim falls within an exception to the exhaustion requirement, this court will consider it on the merits as well.

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• The Southern District of Indiana held that Morgan did not displace circuit precedent excusing a second charge for retaliation occurring after and because of an initial EEOC charge.

  Finch v. City of Indianapolis · S.D. Ind. · filed August 10, 2012

  The City contends that McKenzie and like decisions from the Seventh Circuit and other circuits permitting retaliation claims without a second EEOC charge do not survive the Supreme Court’s decision in National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 122 S.Ct. 2061, 153 L.Ed.2d 106 (2002). Although National Railroad contains broad language supportive of the City’s argument, National Railroad addressed a statute of limitations issue much different from the exhaustion issue at the heart of McKenzie. It does not clearly overrule or undercut McKenzie, and this court is bound by McKenzie until the Seventh Circuit holds otherwise.

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• The Eastern District of Missouri declined to extend Morgan to abolish the class-action single-filing rule.

  Simpson v. Boeing Co. · E.D. Mo. · filed June 13, 2014

  Despite this acknowledged tension, courts have continued to apply the single-filing rule to class actions. As the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals noted, “it is hard to quarrel with the original application of the single-filing doctrine, which was to class actions. Requiring that every class member file a separate charge might drown agency and employer alike by touching off a multitude of fruitless negotiations.” Horton, 343 F.3d at 900. The Seventh Circuit found it “clear that the single-filing doctrine is indeed valid insofar as class actions are concerned.... ” Id. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has also continued to apply the single-filing rule. See Foster v. Ruhrpumpen, Inc., 365 F.3d 1191, 1198-99 (10th Cir.2004) (addressing Morgan, but continuing to apply the single-filing rule). While this Court has not explicitly addressed the impact of Morgan on the single-filing rule, it has continued to discuss and apply that rule as well-settled law. See, e.g., Turner v. Sw. Bell Telephone L.P., No. 4:04-CV-1688 (SNL), 2006 WL 903373, at *6 (E.D.Mo. Apr. 7, 2006) (“The law is well-settled that if one or more putative members of a class properly file a charge of discrimination with EEOC or MHRA, and receive a Right to Sue letter, it is sufficient exhaustion of administrative remedies .... [a]s long as class issues are alleged_”). In short, defendant’s contention that Morgan has abrogated the rule is unsupported by case law.

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• The Northern District of Indiana held that Morgan does not bar the exhaustion exception for related post-charge retaliation.

  Sansone v. Brennan · N.D. Ind. · filed February 8, 2021

  Cutting against Defendant’s arguments, however, the authorities it cites acknowledge the continuing vitality of the exhaustion exception for later-filed retaliation claims that are sufficiently related to an exhausted EEOC charge. For instance, the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Horton recognized that Morgan was “principally about the continuing violation doctrine,” not the exhaustion exception, but found the exception inapplicable because the exhausted claim at issue arose from different facts. ... Considering these authorities, Defendant USPS’ opposition to the exhaustion exception for alleged post-charge retaliatory conduct is rejected here as well.

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