Immigration & Naturalization Service v. St. Cyr
Is it still good law? What later courts have actually done to this case.
Status
More on how this was screened
Robledo-Gonzales v. Ashcroft and United States v. Zuniga-Guerrero separately declined to extend St. Cyr's Section 212(c) retroactivity reasoning to illegal reentry after a final removal order or rejection of a pre-AEDPA plea offer. The other readable opinions applied St. Cyr, reported its displacement of older precedent, or directed nearby treatment language at another authority, statute, or party argument. Duplicate copies of the same opinion, and the original opinion later replaced by the amended Elia opinion, were reviewed but do not create duplicate entries.
2,983 later cases cite Immigration & Naturalization Service v. St. Cyr; 144 of those citations sat close to treatment language and were flagged for reading; 139 of them have been read, and the text of 5 citing opinions could not be retrieved, so those remain unread. Citations that did not sit near treatment language were not flagged and were not read one by one, so a court that weakened this case without using any of that language would not appear here.
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This page shows what later courts did to it. Ask about your specific facts and see whether it still carries your argument, with citations you can check.
Treatments
Superseded by statute
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The amended Sixth Circuit opinion held that the REAL ID Act displaced St. Cyr's preservation of habeas review for removal orders by making a petition for review the exclusive review mechanism.
Elia v. Gonzales · Sixth Circuit · filed
The Court noted, however, that it had found in INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 121 S.Ct. 2271, 150 L.Ed.2d 347 (2001), that petitioners could seek review of removal orders in this situation through petitions for habeas corpus. ... Through the REAL ID Act, Congress amended § 1252 to change this state of affairs. ... See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5) and (e) (petitions for review sole means for judicial review of removal orders, save for limited habeas review of expedited removal orders).
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In a footnote to its discussion of St. Cyr, the Tenth Circuit noted that the REAL ID Act made a petition for review the sole means of reviewing a removal order and excluded the habeas review St. Cyr had preserved.
Antunez-Obregon v. Ashcroft · Tenth Circuit · filed
In St. Cyr, direct review of the removal order was statutorily barred, but the Supreme Court held that the statutory language did not abrogate habeas corpus review ... Thus, this section makes a petition for review to an appellate court the sole means of review of an order of removal issued under the INA and specifically excludes review under the habeas statutes.
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The district court held that the REAL ID Act displaced St. Cyr's habeas-review route and channeled constitutional and legal challenges arising from removal proceedings into petitions for review.
Bolante v. Achim · E.D. Wis. · filed
Congress actually eliminated all jurisdiction to review some types of decisions, but to avoid a suspension clause question, the Supreme Court interpreted such language as not affecting habeas review. INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 300-10, 121 S.Ct. 2271, 150 L.Ed.2d 347 (2001), superseded by statute, REAL ID Act § 106 ... In response, Congress enacted the REAL ID Act of 2005 eliminating habeas jurisdiction to review most immigration issues.
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The Sixth Circuit held that the REAL ID Act eliminated the habeas jurisdiction St. Cyr had recognized over challenges to removal orders.
Ali Jaber v. Alberto R. Gonzales · Sixth Circuit · filed
We also reject Jaber’s argument, relying on the Supreme Court’s holding in INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 121 S.Ct. 2271, 150 L.Ed.2d 347 (2001), that this court has habeas jurisdiction over his case. The REAL ID Act of 2005 clearly eliminated a habeas petition as a means for judicial review of a removal order, abrogating any holding in St Cyr to the contrary.
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Limited
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The Seventh Circuit declined to extend St. Cyr's preservation of pre-repeal Section 212(c) eligibility to an alien who departed after a final deportation order and then illegally reentered.
Robledo-Gonzales v. Ashcroft · Seventh Circuit · filed
Mr. Robledo-Gonzales also criticizes the regulation because St. Cyr did not specifically hold that aliens could be treated differently based on the fact that they had reentered the Country illegally. However, the petitioner in St. Cyr had not reentered the Country illegally. Consequently, the Court did not have an occasion to consider the legitimacy of this distinction.
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The Sixth Circuit declined to extend St. Cyr's reliance-based protection to a noncitizen who rejected a plea offer before AEDPA and pleaded guilty only after AEDPA took effect.
United States v. Zuniga-Guerrero · Sixth Circuit · filed
Zuñiga alternatively asks this court to find that AEDPA creates a retroactive effect in his situation because he rejected an offered plea bargain two days before AEDPA took effect. ... he argues that aliens who reject offered plea bargains rely on waiver eligibility just as much as those who, like St. Cyr, accept such offers. ... We disagree. Unlike St. Cyr, Zuñiga does not belong to a class of aliens whose actions “were likely facilitated by their continued eligibility for § 212(c) relief.”
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