Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson
Is it still good law? What later courts have actually done to this case.
Status
More on how this was screened
The listed courts applied that change to suits before them. The Supreme Court later held in Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc. that Section 27A(b) could not reopen final federal judgments; that later ruling limits the reinstatement results, while Section 27A(a) governs qualifying pending suits. Other reviewed opinions applied Lampf, reported its effect on older cases, or discussed unrelated law.
64 later cases cite Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson; 64 of those citations sat close to treatment language and were flagged for reading, and all of them have been read. Citations that did not sit near treatment language were not flagged and were not read one by one, so a court that weakened this case without using any of that language would not appear here.
Relying on Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson?
This page shows what later courts did to it. Ask about your specific facts and see whether it still carries your argument, with citations you can check.
Treatments
Superseded by statute
-
Section 27A barred retroactive use of Lampf’s new limitations period in this pending securities suit.
Ockerman v. May Zima & Co. · M.D. Tenn. · filed
Since the Court's determination that the analogous State Blue Sky Law limitations period applied to plaintiffs’ 10b-5 claims, the Supreme Court has overruled the approach of applying limitations period of the most analogous state law to 10b-5 claims. See Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 2773, 115 L.Ed.2d 321 (1991) (decided June 19). However, section 1126(a) of the recently passed and signed Comprehensive Deposit Insurance Reform & Taxpayer Protection Act of 1991, formerly Senate Bill 543, prevents courts from applying Lampf retroactively.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener → -
Section 27A displaced Lampf’s retroactive limitations bar and required reinstatement of the securities claims.
Venturtech II v. Deloitte Haskins & Sells · E.D.N.C. · filed
The court’s prior order of reinstatement was based upon § 476 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991, Pub.L. No. 102-242, to be codified as § 27A of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa-1. Section 476 overruled the retroactive application of the statute of limitations announced in Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, — U.S. —, 111 S.Ct. 2773, 115 L.Ed.2d 321 (1991), as directed by the Supreme Court’s holding in James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, — U.S. —, 111 S.Ct. 2439, 2448, (1991). Simply stated, § 476 requires the reinstatement upon timely motion by the plaintiff of any § 10(b) claims dismissed as time barred after Lampf which otherwise were timely according to pre-Lampf law applicable in the jurisdiction.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener → -
Section 27A required the court to apply the limitations law in force before Lampf to these older suits.
Majeski v. Balcor Entertainment Co. Ltd. · E.D. Wis. · filed
On December 20, 1991, the President signed Senate Bill 543 into law, which essentially overruled Lampf. The new law states that: The limitation period for any private civil action implied under section 10(b) of this Act that was commenced on or before June 19, 1991, shall be the limitation period provided by the laws applicable in the jurisdiction, including principles of retroactivity, as such laws existed on June 19, 1991. ... The defendants argue that the new law mandates that “the jurisdiction” is the Seventh Circuit. This court agrees with the defendants; the Seventh Circuit was “the jurisdiction” for this action as of June 19, 1991. Additionally, this court’s earlier analysis and conclusion that Seventh Circuit law applies to the Eckstein class is still applicable. See Eckstein v. Balcor Film Investors, 740 F.Supp. 572 (E.D.Wis.1990). Thus, the Seventh Circuit law as it existed on June 19, 1991 applies.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener → -
Section 27A controlled the older securities suit and required reinstatement after a Lampf based dismissal.
Henderson v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc. · Eleventh Circuit · filed
Shortly before trial, the Supreme Court announced its decisions in Lampf *1569Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, — U.S.-, 111 S.Ct. 2773, 115 L.Ed.2d 321 (1991), and James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 2439, 115 L.Ed.2d 481 (1991), which changed the applicable statute of limitations for Plaintiffs’ suit. In light of these decisions, the district court granted Scientific’s motion for summary judgment on the ground that the action was time-barred. On appeal, Plaintiffs argue that section 27A of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which was recently added to the Act, requires the district court to reinstate their action. Scientific, on the other hand, contends that section 27A is unconstitutional. We conclude that section 27A is constitutional and controlling. Accordingly, we vacate the judgment and remand with instructions to reinstate the action.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener → -
Section 27A displaced Lampf’s retroactive reach for this older suit, so the Illinois limitations period applied.
McCool v. Strata Oil Co. · Seventh Circuit · filed
Congress then decided that retroactive application of Lampf was not desirable. Accordingly, one of the miscellaneous provisions of the FDIC Improvement Act amends the ’34 Act to do away with the combined effect of Lampf and Jim Beam on cases commenced before Lampf and Jim Beam were decided. ... We conclude that there is adequate evidence on the record to show the plaintiffs’ reliance on the old rule. The Illinois statute of limitations applies to this case.4
Read the full opinion on CourtListener → -
Section 27A prevented retroactive application of Lampf and defeated the limitations defense.
Agapitos v. PCM Investment Co. · M.D. Ga. · filed
In response to the Lampf and Beam decisions, however, Congress enacted a new Section 27A to the 1934 Act, which effectively overruled the decision in Beam insofar as it applied to Lampf, and to establish that the statute of limitation for actions under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 set forth in Lampf could not be applied retroactively. Defendant contends that Section 27A of the 1934 Act is unconstitutional because it violates the doctrine of separation of powers, and therefore is invalid. In Henderson v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 971 F.2d 1567 (11th Cir.1992) 2 , the Eleventh Circuit held that Section 27A is constitutional. Consequently, Defendant’s statute of limitations argument does not provide a basis for summary judgment
Read the full opinion on CourtListener → -
Section 27A displaced Lampf’s retroactive limitations bar for the pending securities claims.
Schick v. Ernst & Young · S.D.N.Y. · filed
E & Y alleges that Plaintiffs’ claims are barred under Lampf v. Gilbertson, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 2773, 115 L.Ed.2d 321 (1991) and James Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 2439, 115 L.Ed.2d 481 (1991). In these decisions the Supreme Court held that the applicable statute of limitations for Section 10(b) is the one year from discovery or three years from the time of fraud, and that this new rule of law was to be applied retroactively to all pending cases. These decisions together would bar consideration of plaintiffs’ claims, but Congress overruled the retroactive aspect of the law in the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991, Pub.L. No. 102-242, §§ 476, 27A, 105 Stat. 2236 (§ 27A). ... The Investors’ complaint is dismissed because of its failure to plead fraud with particularity, not because it is time-barred under 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener → -
Section 27A(b) required reinstatement of suits dismissed under Lampf’s time bar.
Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. First RepublicBank Corp. · Fifth Circuit · filed
Congress wrote § 27A(b) to prevent courts from applying Lampf to cases that plaintiffs filed before the Court rendered Lampf. ... We interpret "dismissed as time barred" in § 27A(b) to include all cases that were dismissed because of Lampf's time bar. Simmons satisfies this but-for scrutiny. ... We REVERSE the orders of the district courts and reinstate the cases.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener → -
Section 27A required pre-Lampf limitations law for the older suits, allowing their securities claims to proceed.
Eckstein v. Balcor Film Investors · Seventh Circuit · filed
Congress responded to Lampf by enacting stopgap legislation. A new § 27A of the ’34 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa-l(a), provides that “[t]he limitation period for any private civil action implied under section [10(b) of the ’34 Act] that was commenced on or before June 19, 1991, shall be the limitation period provided by the laws applicable in the jurisdiction, including principles of retroactivity, as such laws existed on June 19, 1991.” Plaintiffs believe that this law saves their suits. ... Section 27A recognizes that different circuits had taken different approaches to the appropriate statute of limitations in suits under § 10(b), and it codifies this fractured nature of federal law for cases filed before June 20, 1991. Congress requires us to apply federal law as courts understood it at a point in the past rather than to make an independent judgment about what that law actually is. ... So we must examine how a judge in the Central District of California would have viewed the limitations question on June 19, 1991. At the time, courts within the ninth circuit used the most analogous statute of limitations under the law of the state in which the district court sat.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener → -
Section 27A displaced Lampf’s time bar and the court reinstated the Section 10(b) claim.
Greenfield v. Shuck · D. Mass. · filed
On August 15, 1991 this Court allowed the defendants’ motion to dismiss in part, dismissing what was then Count II (alleging violations of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and SEC Rule 10(b)(5) and Count IV (alleging aiding and abetting violation of the Federal Securities Laws), pursuant to the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis, & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 111 S.Ct. 2773, 115 L.Ed.2d 321 (1991), superseded by statute, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa-1 (1991). After the denial of the RTC’s appeal, this Court held a hearing on the motion to stay prosecution on January 8, 1992, and took the matter under advisement. Nevertheless, in February of 1992, Greenfield filed a motion to submit a Third Amended Complaint, moving to reinstate the federal securities claims pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 78aa-l (1991). This Court again decided to withhold action upon the motion to stay until it had completed the disposition of the issues surrounding the motion to amend. The motion to amend was granted as to Count Two (violations of section 10[b]) of the original complaint which Count is now treated as Count II of the Third Amended Complaint.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Does this case still carry your argument?
Describe your facts. Ezel reads Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson and the cases that treated it, then tells you whether it still holds for your situation, with citations.
Opens in Ezel Pro.
- Checks the law as it stands today, not only this page
- Cites every source it relies on, so you can verify it
- Chat, drafting and research in one workspace