Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith

Status

2,549 later cases cite Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith; 185 of those citations sat close to treatment language and were flagged for reading, and all of them have been read. Citations that did not sit near treatment language were not flagged and were not read one by one, so a court that weakened this case without using any of that language would not appear here.

Treatments

Superseded by statute

• The court held that RFRA superseded Smith's rule for neutral, generally applicable laws in challenges to New York prison regulations by restoring compelling-interest and least-restrictive-means review.

  Campos v. Coughlin · S.D.N.Y. · filed May 3, 1994

  The Act is of historical and legal significance because it reinstates the “compelling state interest” standard applicable to free exercise of religion claims previously eviscerated by the Supreme Court’s decision in Employment Division, Dept. of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 110 S.Ct. 1595, 108 L.Ed.2d 876 (1990). ... I agree with these courts. The plain language of the statute makes it clear that it applies to all state laws and regulations without exception. ... In sum, the Act, on its face, plainly applies to inmates’ claims challenging prison rules which substantially burden their free exercise of religion, and requires that any such rule be in furtherance of a compelling interest and be the least restrictive means to secure the government’s objectives.

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• The court held that RFRA displaced Smith's rule eliminating compelling-interest scrutiny for neutral, generally applicable laws and restored that scrutiny to the prisoner's claim.

  Diaz v. Collins · E.D. Tex. · filed December 20, 1994

  Congress reacted to this decision by passing the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (the Act), codified at 42 U.S.C. 2000bb et seq. The stated purpose of the Act was to overrule the decision in Smith. Section bb-1 of the Act provides as follows: ... Government shall not substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability ... Government may substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that application of the burden to the person ... is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest, and ... is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.

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• The court held that RFRA displaced Smith's neutral-law standard for this prisoner's free-exercise claim by restoring the compelling-government-interest test.

  Phipps v. Parker · W.D. Ky. · filed March 3, 1995

  In Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 110 S.Ct. 1595, 108 L.Ed.2d 876 (1990), the Supreme Court held that the where a law is neutral and of general applicability, even where the law places an incidental burden on the free exercise of religion, it will be upheld if it is reasonably related to a legitimate government interest. However, in 1993 Congress passed the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb et seq. (1993), which restored the compelling government interest test as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 83 S.Ct. 1790, 10 L.Ed.2d 965 (1963) and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 92 S.Ct. 1526, 32 L.Ed.2d 15 (1972). ... Further the ability to expand the constitutional guarantees of the Bill of Rights has been held to be within Congress’ power under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. ... Thus the standard under the RFRA controls the disposition of the summary judgment motions.

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• The court held that RFRA displaced Smith's rational-basis rule for federal free-exercise claims involving state prisoners and restored compelling-interest scrutiny.

  Akbar-El v. Muhammed · Ohio Court of Appeals, Fourth District · filed June 28, 1995

  Congress passed the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 with the express purpose of overruling Emp. Div. v. Smith, supra, and restoring the compelling interest test set forth in Sherbert v. Verner and Wisconsin v. Yoder. The Act provides that the state may substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion only if the state demonstrates both that the application of the burden furthers a compelling state interest and that the application of the burden is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling state interest. ... We agree with the Northern District of Ohio in Johnson. The Religious Restoration Act of 1993 applies to freedom of religion cases involving prisoners.

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• The court held that RFRA superseded Smith's reasonableness standard and required the compelling-interest test for a challenge to a Pennsylvania county-prison regulation.

  Muslim v. Frame · E.D. Pa. · filed June 30, 1995

  The standard applied in St Claire no longer remains the law. In 1993, Congress enacted the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb, to require courts addressing free exercise claims to apply the “compelling interest” test established by the Supreme Court in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 83 S.Ct. 1790, 10 L.Ed.2d 965 (1963), and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 92 S.Ct. 1526, 32 L.Ed.2d 15 (1972). See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b) (stating that the purpose of RFRA is to “restore the compelling interest test” established in Sherbert and Yoder). Congress enacted RFRA to overrule statutorily the Court’s decision in Employment Division, Dept. of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 110 S.Ct. 1595, 108 L.Ed.2d 876 (1990), which, like the Third Circuit’s ruling in St. Claire, applied a reasonableness standard to a free exercise challenge.

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• The court treated RFRA as superseding Smith's rule for neutral, generally applicable laws in claims against New York prison officials by restoring the compelling-interest test.

  Alameen v. Coughlin · E.D.N.Y. · filed July 19, 1995

  The two are interrelated since RFRA established a new statutory standard to be used when balancing government interests and individual religious freedoms. RFRA was in fact enacted with the express purpose of restoring the “compelling interest” test articulated by the Supreme Court in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 83 S.Ct. 1790, 10 L.Ed.2d 965 (1963), and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 92 S.Ct. 1526, 32 L.Ed.2d 15 (1972). 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(1). The compelling interest test had, in Congress’ view, been considerably weakened by Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 110 S.Ct. 1595, 108 L.Ed.2d 876 (1990), which, according to a finding of Congress, “virtually eliminated the requirement that government justify burdens on religious exercise imposed by laws neutral toward religion.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(4).

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• The court held that RFRA rejected Smith's holding and reinstated pre-Smith free-exercise law in an action against Texas prison officials.

  Lewis v. Scott · E.D. Tex. · filed September 27, 1995

  This conclusion is compelled by the explicit purposes of the act and the decisions of other circuits. The statute specifically rejects the holding of Employment Division and reinstates prior case law. Debate in the Senate indicates that this reinstatement was meant to extend to the “substantial burden” element of the statute.

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• The Sixth Circuit held that RFRA displaced Smith's rejection of the compelling-interest test by restoring that test for a religious-exercise claim against Ohio prison officials.

  Carr Johnson v. Dennis Baker · Sixth Circuit · filed September 27, 1995

  The passage of this Act makes it unnecessary to a large degree to parse prior judicial pronouncements since the Act specifically provides: ... The purposes of this chapter are-- ... (1) to restore the compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) and to guarantee its application in all cases where free exercise of religion is substantially burdened.... ... In restoring the compelling interest test, Congress indicated its intention to overrule legislatively the Supreme Court's earlier decision in Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).

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• The California Supreme Court held that RFRA displaced Smith's neutral-law rule for a landlord's statutory religious-exemption claim and required the restored pre-Smith framework.

  Smith v. Fair Employment & Housing Commission · Supreme Court of California · filed April 9, 1996

  In applying RFRA to this case, we look to the entire body of case law interpreting the free exercise clause prior to Employment Div., Ore. Dept. of Human Res. v. Smith, supra, 494 U.S. 872. That we must do so is evident from the language of the act, its legislative history, and federal judicial decisions interpreting it.

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• The New Jersey Appellate Division applied RFRA's compelling-interest framework instead of Smith's neutral-law test to a religious school's free-exercise defense.

  South Jersey Catholic School Teachers Ass'n v. St. Teresa of Infant Jesus Church Elementary School · Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division · filed May 16, 1996

  Apparently, under RFRA, the Smith analysis applies only if the burden on free exercise is insubstantial. Id. at 1593. Consequently, a court must make a threshold determination as to whether the burden on free exercise is substantial or incidental, in order to determine which level of scrutiny to apply. Id. at 1595. The discussion over the extent to which free exercise rights are burdened is perhaps somewhat academic. Regardless of whether the burden is substantial or incidental, there still must be a determination of whether the State’s interest is compelling.

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• The Eighth Circuit held that RFRA supplied the new governing standard for a prisoner's free-exercise claim, displacing Smith and restoring the earlier compelling-interest test.

  Ochs v. Thalacker · Eighth Circuit · filed July 22, 1996

  RFRA was enacted to legislatively overrule Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 110 S.Ct. 1595, 108 L.Ed.2d 876 (1990), and restore the “compelling interest” test of earlier cases.

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• The California Court of Appeal held that Smith remained constitutional law but that RFRA supplied the governing statutory framework for the defendant's demand for compelling-interest review.

  People v. Peck · California Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division Two · filed December 30, 1996

  RFRA “does not present itself as an interpretation of the Constitution overruling [Employment Division v.] Smith, rather it consists of a command that must be followed as a matter of federal law.”

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• The Pennsylvania Supreme Court applied RFRA's stricter standard to the claim, treating the statute as displacing Smith's neutral-law standard.

  Commonwealth v. Stewart · Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · filed February 24, 1997

  Congress enacted the RFRA to restore application of the “compelling interest” test established in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 92 S.Ct. 1526, 32 L.Ed.2d 15 (1972) and Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 83 S.Ct. 1790, 10 L.Ed.2d 965 (1963) to free exercise claims. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b). The RFRA, thus, statutorily overruled Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 110 S.Ct. 1595, 108 L.Ed.2d 876 (1990), in which the United States Supreme Court eliminated the “compelling interest” test for laws of general applicability, neutral toward religion.

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• The Fifth Circuit held that RFRA supplanted the former rational-basis standard for neutral laws and required compelling-interest review of the prisoner's free-exercise claims.

  Diaz v. Collins · Fifth Circuit · filed May 22, 1997

  In so doing Congress intended to legislatively overrule United States Supreme Court decisions such as Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), and O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987).

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Criticized

• The court criticized Smith's accommodation discussion as dicta that was difficult to reconcile with later Supreme Court and binding circuit precedent.

  Children's Healthcare is a Legal Duty, Inc. v. Vladeck · D. Minn. · filed August 7, 1996

  In any case, it is difficult to square the dicta in Smith with recent Supreme Court precedent which recognizes “the Religion Clauses do not require the government to be oblivious to impositions that legitimate exercises of state power may place on religious belief and practice.”

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Declined to follow

• The Supreme Judicial Court declined to follow Smith when construing the Massachusetts Constitution and retained the earlier compelling-interest balancing test.

  Attorney General v. Desilets · Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts · filed July 14, 1994

  Despite the similarity of the two constitutional provisions, this court should reach its own conclusions on the scope of the protections of art. 46, § 1, and should not necessarily follow the reasoning adopted by the Supreme Court of the United States under the First Amendment. Indeed, after the release of our Nissenbaum opinion, the Supreme Court substantially altered its standard for determining whether conduct was protected under the free exercise of religion clause by its decision in Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Resources of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), a much criticized opinion that weakened First Amendment protections for religious conduct. In interpreting art. 46, § 1, we prefer to adhere to the standards of earlier First Amendment jurisprudence.

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• The New Hampshire Supreme Court declined to adopt Smith for claims under the State Constitution and instead required compelling-interest balancing for burdens on sincere religious practice.

  State v. Mack · Supreme Court of New Hampshire · filed December 22, 2020

  Having concluded that, in Perfetto, we did not adopt Smith, and that Perfetto itself does not control the outcome here, we must now consider the broader and fundamental question presented by this appeal: whether the defendant’s possession and use of psilocyn and/or psilocybin mushrooms is protected by Part I, Article 5 of the State Constitution.

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