Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins
Is it still good law? What later courts have actually done to this case.
Status
More on how this was screened
Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc. declined to extend the framework to ADEA claims and criticized its administrability; Hayes v. Leavitt separately criticized its reading of “because of” in the retaliation context. The Supreme Court of Kentucky chose Nassar's but-for standard instead of Price Waterhouse's framework for state-law retaliation claims. The other citing opinions applied Price Waterhouse, reported its own treatment of older authority or later statutory history, rejected adverse party arguments, or appeared in withdrawn, reversed, nonprecedential, or separate opinions.
3,835 later cases cite Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins; 388 of those citations sat close to treatment language and were flagged for reading, and all of them have been read. Citations that did not sit near treatment language were not flagged and were not read one by one, so a court that weakened this case without using any of that language would not appear here.
Relying on Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins?
This page shows what later courts did to it. Ask about your specific facts and see whether it still carries your argument, with citations you can check.
Treatments
Superseded by statute
-
The court held that the Civil Rights Act of 1991 legislatively overruled Price Waterhouse's rule that an employer avoids a Title VII violation by proving it would have made the same decision without the discriminatory motive.
Savko v. Port Authority of Allegheny County · W.D. Pa. · filed
Similarly, an employment action may now violate the 1991 Act even though the same action would have been taken absent a discriminatory motive. This is a legislative overruling of the Supreme Court’s decision in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 109 S.Ct. 1775, 104 L.Ed.2d 268 (1989).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener → -
The court held that the Civil Rights Act of 1991 superseded Price Waterhouse by making a discriminatory motivating factor sufficient to establish an unlawful employment practice even when other factors also motivated the decision.
Hodgdon v. Mt. Mansfield Co., Inc. · Supreme Court of Vermont · filed
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989), was superseded by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 107, 105 Stat. 1071, 1075 (1991) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2), which provides that the complaining party establishes unlawful employment practice by demonstrating that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor in the employment decision, even if other factors also motivated the decision.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener → -
The court held that the Civil Rights Act of 1991 partially overruled Price Waterhouse by preserving declaratory and injunctive relief and attorney's fees despite an employer's same-decision showing.
Griffiths v. Cigna Corp. · Third Circuit · filed
The 1991 Act partially overruled Price Waterhouse by providing that even if an employer demonstrates that it would have made the same decision absent a discriminatory motive, the plaintiff continues to be eligible for declaratory and injunctive relief and for attorney's fees and costs.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener → -
The court held that the Civil Rights Act of 1991 overturned Price Waterhouse's same-decision rule as to liability by allowing limited relief despite a mixed-motive defense.
Lewis v. American Foreign Service Ass'n · D.D.C. · filed
The Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B), overturned that part of the holding in Price Waterhouse dealing with the defendant’s liability. The relevant section now allows the Plaintiff to recover attorneys fees and costs and to receive declaratory and injunctive relief even if the Defendant made a showing of mixed motive.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener → -
The Civil Rights Act of 1991 displaced Price Waterhouse's complete same-decision defense for Title VII mixed-motive claims.
Pilditch v. Board of Education · Seventh Circuit · filed
However, the Civil Rights Act of 1991 overrules Price Waterhouse on this point and makes an employment decision illegal if it was motivated at all by an illegitimate motive.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener → -
The Civil Rights Act of 1991 displaced Price Waterhouse's rule that an employer's same-decision showing completely defeated Title VII liability.
Selgas v. American Airlines, Inc. · D.P.R. · filed
The defendants argue that because the jury found that American would have made the same employment decisions regarding the plaintiff even if her gender was not taken into account, the defendants proved a complete defense to the Title VII claims, citing Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 244-45, 109 S.Ct. 1775, 1787-88, 104 L.Ed.2d 268 (1989). However, the Civil Rights Act of 1991 partially overruled Price Waterhouse. Title VII now provides that “an unlawful employment practice is established when the complaining party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex or national origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice.”
Read the full opinion on CourtListener → -
Section 2000e-2(m) displaced Price Waterhouse's complete same-decision defense for Title VII mixed-motive claims.
Doe v. Kohn Nast & Graf, P.C. · E.D. Pa. · filed
Before the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, a mixed motives defendant could “avoid a finding of liability only by proving that it would have made the same decision even if it had not allowed [the forbidden consideration] to play [a motivating] role.” Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 244-45, 109 S.Ct. 1775, 1787-88. Section 2000e-2(m) of the Act was designed to overrule that part of Price Waterhouse.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener → -
The 1991 amendments displaced Price Waterhouse's rule that a same-decision showing prevents all Title VII liability.
Pedigo v. P.A.M. Transport, Inc. · W.D. Ark. · filed
The Act, with respect to Title VII mixed motive cases, establishes that an employer may no longer escape liability entirely. The amendments appear to reverse decisions, including Price Waterhouse, decided before the effective date of the amendment, that hold that an employer who acts with a mixture of discriminatory and non-discriminatory motives may avoid a finding of liability under Title VII.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener → -
The 1991 mixed-motive amendments displaced Price Waterhouse in certain respects, while leaving it relevant where no improper mixed motive was shown.
Joler v. Scott Paper Company · First Circuit · filed
The "mixed motive" provision of the 1991 amendments to the statute, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(g)(2)(B), did in certain respects overrule the Supreme Court's decision in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989), but in this case no improper mixed motive was shown by the evidence.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener → -
The Civil Rights Act of 1991 displaced Price Waterhouse only insofar as the same-decision showing defeated liability outright, while preserving its preponderance standard.
O'Day v. McDonnell Douglas Helicopter Co. · Ninth Circuit · filed
By enacting the 1991 Civil Rights Act, Congress partially overruled Price Waterhouse. The Act allows an employer to limit the employee’s remedy, rather than defeat liability outright, by showing it would have made the same decision.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener → -
The 1991 amendments displaced Price Waterhouse's rule exempting an employer from all Title VII liability and remedies upon a same-decision showing.
Hearn v. General Electric Co. · M.D. Ala. · filed
The 1991 amendments' legislative history indicates that their purpose was to partially overrule that part of Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 109 S.Ct. 1775, 104 L.Ed.2d 268 (1989), which exempted employers from liability and precluded any Title VII remedy ...
Read the full opinion on CourtListener → -
The 1991 amendments displaced Price Waterhouse's rule exempting an employer from all Title VII liability and remedies upon a same-decision showing.
Salter v. Douglas MacArthur State Technical College · M.D. Ala. · filed
the purpose of the amendments was to overrule partially that part of Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 109 S.Ct. 1775, 104 L.Ed.2d 268 (1989), which exempted employers from liability and precluded any Title VII remedy if they could produce evidence and persuade the court that an adverse employment decision would still have been made in the absence of a discriminatory motive.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener → -
The 1991 amendments displaced Price Waterhouse's no-liability rule and allowed limited relief, including discretionary fees, after a same-decision showing.
Snell v. Reno Hilton Resort · D. Nev. · filed
The 1991 amendments to the Civil Rights Act of 1964 partially overruled Price Waterhouse by defining a plaintiff in such a posture as a prevailing party ...
Read the full opinion on CourtListener → -
Section 2000e-2(m) displaced Price Waterhouse's direct-evidence distinction and same-decision no-liability rule at the Title VII trial stage.
Allen v. City of Athens · M.D. Ala. · filed
the only Supreme Court ease that ever emphasized the distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence, Price Waterhouse, was overruled by § 2000e-2(m), which recognizes no such distinction.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener → -
The 1991 Act partially displaced Price Waterhouse for discrimination claims but did not extend that change to Title VII retaliation claims, for which Price Waterhouse remained controlling.
Tanca v. Nordberg · First Circuit · filed
The central issue is whether the changes wrought in the law by section 107 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Public Law 102-166 (the "1991 Act"), which explicitly apply only to discrimination claims (and which were meant to partially overrule Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989)), also apply to claims of retaliation. We hold that they do not and that the rule of Price Waterhouse applies to retaliation claims.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener → -
The 1991 Act displaced Price Waterhouse's rule that a same-decision showing avoided all liability, leaving the showing to limit relief.
Carter v. Pena · D.D.C. · filed
the 1991 Act affirmed the Price Waterhouse holding that mixed-motive is an affirmative defense on which an employer bears the burden of persuasion, but overruled the portion of the holding that an employer could avoid all liability by proving that it would have made the same decision despite the illegitimate factor.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener → -
Section 107 displaced Price Waterhouse's complete same-decision defense by making the showing relevant to remedy rather than liability.
Wolff v. Brown · Eighth Circuit · filed
This issue has its roots in § 107 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which partially overruled Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener → -
The 1991 Act modified Price Waterhouse so that an employer violates Title VII whenever race plays an actual role, regardless of independently sufficient considerations.
Etefia v. East Baltimore Community Corp. · D. Md. · filed
the court acknowledged that the Civil Rights Act of 1991 modifies Price Wa-terhouse ...
Read the full opinion on CourtListener → -
Section 2000e-2(m) displaced Price Waterhouse's same-decision no-liability rule without silently altering the separate McDonnell Douglas pretext framework.
Carey v. Mt. Desert Island Hospital · First Circuit · filed
It would be implausible to assume that Congress, in enacting 2000e-2(m) to address one part of the Supreme Court's decision in Price Waterhouse, also intended, sub silentio, to eradicate the established legal landscape governing the litigation of disparate treatment cases.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener → -
The 1991 Act displaced only Price Waterhouse's remedial consequence after both sides satisfy their mixed-motive burdens, leaving those burdens unchanged.
Medlock v. Ortho Biotech, Inc. · Tenth Circuit · filed
Because the statutory overruling of Price Waterhouse does not alter the respective burdens of plaintiff and defendant in a mixed motive case, but only changes the remedies available when both parties meet their burden ...
Read the full opinion on CourtListener → -
The 1991 Act displaced Price Waterhouse's complete no-liability consequence after an employer proves it would have made the same decision.
Mandavilli v. Maldonado · D.P.R. · filed
The 1991 Civil Rights Act, however, overruled Price Waterhouse in part, by prohibiting a Defendant from defeating liability altogether even if the defendant shows it would have made the same decision regardless of the illegal motive.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener → -
Section 107 displaced Price Waterhouse's complete no-liability rule and permits limited relief after a same-decision showing.
Cassas v. Lenox Hill Hospital · S.D.N.Y. · filed
Congress in effect overruled this aspect of Price Waterhouse.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener → -
The 1991 Act partially displaced Price Waterhouse by permitting Title VII liability and limited relief notwithstanding an employer's same-decision showing.
Donovan v. Dairy Farmers of America, Inc. · N.D.N.Y. · filed
Congress, however, partially overruled Price Water-house in the Civil Rights Act of 1991 by allowing a finding of liability and limited relief to plaintiffs in mixed-motive cases.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener → -
The 1991 Act displaced Price Waterhouse's same-decision no-liability rule for status-based Title VII discrimination but left the defense intact for retaliation.
Pennington v. City of Huntsville · Eleventh Circuit · filed
Although the 1991 Act overruled in part the mixed-motive defense with respect to discrimination suits based on race, color, sex, and national origin, this circuit and other circuits have held that the mixed-motive defense is still available in retaliation cases.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener → -
Section 107 displaced Price Waterhouse only insofar as a same-decision showing allowed a defendant to avoid liability completely.
Davey v. Lockheed Martin Corp. · Tenth Circuit · filed
overruled Price Waterhouse to the extent that the case held a defendant's proof that it would have made the same decision absent the improper motive would allow the defendant to completely avoid liability.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener → -
The Supreme Court held that the Civil Rights Act of 1991 displaced any direct-evidence prerequisite derived from Justice O’Connor’s Price Waterhouse concurrence for mixed-motive Title VII claims.
Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa · Supreme Court of the United States · filed
Petitioner’s argument on this point proceeds in three steps: (1) Justice O’Connor’s opinion is the holding of Price Waterhouse; (2) Justice O’Connor’s Price Water-house opinion requires direct evidence of discrimination before a mixed-motive instruction can be given; and (3) the 1991 Act does nothing to abrogate that holding. Like the Court of Appeals, we see no need to address which of the opinions in Price Waterhouse is controlling: the third step of petitioner’s argument is flawed, primarily because it is inconsistent with the text of § 2000e-2(m).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener → -
The 1991 amendments displaced Price Waterhouse's rule eliminating all Title VII liability and remedies after a same-decision showing.
White v. Verizon South, Inc. · M.D. Ala. · filed
This history indicates that the purpose of the amendments was to overrule partially that part of Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 109 S.Ct. 1775, 104 L.Ed.2d 268 (1989), which exempted employers from liability and precluded any Title VII remedy if they could produce evidence and persuade the court that an adverse-employment decision would still have been made in the absence of a discriminatory motive.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener → -
The Civil Rights Act of 1991 displaced Price Waterhouse's affirmative defense against all liability, attaching liability but restricting remedies after the same-decision showing.
Huffman v. Interstate Brands Companies · California Court of Appeal · filed
Following the Price Waterhouse decision, Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which, among other things, overruled that portion of the decision that permitted an employer to avoid liability by proving its affirmative defense.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener → -
The Civil Rights Act of 1991 displaced Price Waterhouse’s rule that proof of the same decision entirely defeats Title VII liability; it now limits remedies but does not erase liability.
Dominguez-Curry v. Nevada Transportation Department · Ninth Circuit · filed
the 1991 Amendments to Title VII were intended to overrule the Supreme Court’s holding in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989), that an employer could escape liability “simply by showing other sufficient causes”).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener → -
The Civil Rights Act of 1991 reversed Price Waterhouse’s rule that a same-decision showing eliminates Title VII liability and substituted limited remedies.
Smith v. Xerox Corp. · N.D. Texas · filed
In response to Price Waterhouse, the 1991 Act did two things: (1) it added 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m), reversing that part of Price Waterhouse that allowed an employer to escape liability if it would have taken the same adverse employment action without regard for the prohibited factor, and (2) it amended 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g), providing for limited remedies if the employer establishes it would have done the same thing anyway.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener → -
The Civil Rights Act of 1991 eliminated Price Waterhouse’s complete same-decision defense in covered Title VII cases, while courts continued using the framework in other statutes.
Worden v. SunTrust Banks, Inc. · Fourth Circuit · filed
Through the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Congress eliminated an employer’s ability to avoid all liability in some Title VII cases. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m); see Hill, 354 F.3d at 284. However, courts have continued to apply the Price Water- house mixed-motive analysis in other employment discrimi- nation contexts where Congress has not subsequently acted.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener → -
The Civil Rights Act of 1991 partially abrogated Price Waterhouse’s complete same-decision defense for the protected categories specified in Title VII, but did not import partial relief into Title VI, § 1981, or § 1983.
Anthony Smith v. John Wilson · Seventh Circuit · filed
As we explained in McNutt v. Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois, these amendments only partially abrogated Price Waterhouse: for employment discrim- ination claims falling outside the five categories specifically listed in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m), an employer’s demonstration that the same result would have occurred without the “motivating factor” still constitutes a complete defense.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener → -
The Civil Rights Act of 1991 codified Price Waterhouse in part, substantially rejected it in part, and removed the complete same-decision defense; the displaced framework does not govern Title VII retaliation.
University of Tex. Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar · Supreme Court of the United States · filed
The 1991 Act also abrogated a portion of Price Water house’s framework by removing the employer’s ability to defeat liability once a plaintiff proved the existence of an impermissible motivating factor.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener → -
The Civil Rights Act of 1991 codified Price Waterhouse in part, abrogated its complete same-decision defense in part, and substituted a new burden-shifting framework for Title VII discrimination.
Gourdeau v. City of Newton · D. Massachusetts · filed
In 1991, partially in response to Price Waterhouse, Congress altered Title VII to codify in part and abrogate in part the holding in that case.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Limited
-
The Supreme Court declined to extend Price Waterhouse’s mixed-motive burden shifting to federal age-discrimination claims, requiring ADEA plaintiffs to prove but-for causation.
Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc. · Supreme Court of the United States · filed
In this instance, it is the textual differences between Title VII and the ADEA that prevent us from applying Price Waterhouse and Desert Palace to federal age discrimination claims.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Criticized
-
The Supreme Court criticized Price Waterhouse’s burden-shifting framework as difficult to apply and of no perceivable benefit in the ADEA context.
Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc. · Supreme Court of the United States · filed
Whatever the deficiencies of Price Waterhouse in retrospect, it has become evident in the years since that case was decided that its burden-shifting framework is difficult to apply. ... Thus, even if Price Waterhouse was doetrinally sound, the problems associated with its application have eliminated any perceivable benefit to extending its framework to ADEA claims.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener → -
The court criticized Price Waterhouse’s reading of “because of” as flatly incorrect after Gross and refused to extend its mixed-motive framework to Title VII retaliation claims.
Hayes v. Leavitt · D.D.C. · filed
The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Gross, however, makes clear that Price Waterhouse’s interpretation of “because of” is flatly incorrect.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Declined to follow
-
The Kentucky Supreme Court rejected continued use of Price Waterhouse’s motivating-factor framework for Kentucky retaliation claims and adopted Nassar’s but-for standard.
Asbury University v. Powell · Supreme Court of Kentucky · filed
Though both Meyers and Zarebidaki reference Price Waterhouse, neither actually follows its mandates. Instead, the mandate in our courts, which we are free to choose, is that since the ultimate burden of persuasion is on the plaintiff, “but for” causation suffices, for all the reasons stated in Meyers and Zarebidaki ...
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Does this case still carry your argument?
Describe your facts. Ezel reads Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins and the cases that treated it, then tells you whether it still holds for your situation, with citations.
Opens in Ezel Pro.
- Checks the law as it stands today, not only this page
- Cites every source it relies on, so you can verify it
- Chat, drafting and research in one workspace