Carnegie-Mellon University v. Cohill
Is it still good law? What later courts have actually done to this case.
Status
More on how this was screened
Royal Canin U.S.A. v. Wullschleger later held that 28 U.S.C. § 1367 and intervening Supreme Court precedent superseded Cohill's dictum suggesting that a federal court could retain a removed case after an amended complaint eliminated every federal claim. The other reviewed opinions followed or applied Cohill, reported the treatment imposed by Royal Canin, described Cohill's treatment of Thermtron Products, Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, or directed nearby treatment language at unrelated authorities.
9,403 later cases cite Carnegie-Mellon University v. Cohill; 107 of those citations sat close to treatment language and were flagged for reading, and all of them have been read. Citations that did not sit near treatment language were not flagged and were not read one by one, so a court that weakened this case without using any of that language would not appear here.
Relying on Carnegie-Mellon University v. Cohill?
This page shows what later courts did to it. Ask about your specific facts and see whether it still carries your argument, with citations you can check.
Treatments
Superseded by Statute
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The court held that the 1988 amendments to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) superseded Cohill's reiteration of the former jurisdiction-at-removal rule, making remand automatic when later changes eliminate subject-matter jurisdiction.
Bailey v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. · N.D. Ala. · filed
In Carnegie-Mellon University v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 108 S.Ct. 614, 98 L.Ed.2d 720 (1988), the Supreme Court reiterated the St. Paul Mercury rationale based on the then existing version of § 1447(c) which, as at the time of St Paul Mercury, took only a backward look at the jurisdictional facts as of the date of removal. Although this court has been unable to find any legislative history that reveals the Congressional thinking behind the 1988 amendment to § 1447(c), it seems logical that Congress was responding to Camegie-Mellon and to St Paul Mercury. The new language in subsections (c) and (e) on its face reflects that Congress suddenly realized that federal judges’ hands were being tied and that the courts were being forced to ignore a core principle of federalism that recognizes the primacy of the state courts. It follows, of course, that federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. There is a stark difference between the language of pre-1988 subsection (e) and new subsection (c), especially as elucidated by the contemporaneous addition of subsection (e) It is quite apparent to this court that Congress intended to create in a federal court control over what changes it will allow in plaintiff’s contentions after removal and in what parties he can add, while recognizing that if such changes result in a loss of subject matter jurisdiction, no discretion remains in the federal court to retain jurisdiction, and that remand becomes automatic. The fact that the case was properly removed in the first place becomes irrelevant.
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The Supreme Court held that 28 U.S.C. § 1367 and intervening precedent superseded Cohill's dictum suggesting that a federal court could retain a removed case after an amended complaint eliminated every federal claim.
Royal Canin U.S.A. v. Wullschleger · Supreme Court of the United States · filed
Those later materials supersede whatever Cohill presumed about exer- cising federal jurisdiction in a case like this one. So by vir- tue of both what it decided and when it arose, Cohill does not matter to the question before us.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
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