Rose v. Clark
Is it still good law? What later courts have actually done to this case.
Status
More on how this was screened
Brecht v. Abrahamson later replaced Chapman's harmless-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard with the less onerous Kotteakos standard on federal habeas review. The other opinions applied Rose's harmless-error and structural-error framework, reported these two Supreme Court treatments, or placed nearby adverse language on other authorities.
2,426 later cases cite Rose v. Clark; 82 of those citations sat close to treatment language and were flagged for reading, and all of them have been read. Citations that did not sit near treatment language were not flagged and were not read one by one, so a court that weakened this case without using any of that language would not appear here.
Relying on Rose v. Clark?
This page shows what later courts did to it. Ask about your specific facts and see whether it still carries your argument, with citations you can check.
Treatments
Limited
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The Supreme Court confined Rose's formulations for reviewing rebuttable presumptions, explaining that one was not appropriate in every case and another was incorrect in isolation.
Yates v. Evatt · Supreme Court of the United States · filed
In fact, the opinion in Rose does contain language that, when taken out of context, suggests standards that are both more restrictive and less restrictive than the standard for reviewing rebuttable presumptions that we apply today. Compare id., at 580-581 ("In many cases, the predicate facts conclusively establish intent, so that no rational jury could find that the defendant committed the relevant criminal act but did not intend to cause injury") (emphasis in original), with id., at 579 (rebuttable presumption is harmless error "[w]here a reviewing court can find that the record developed at trial establishes guilt beyond a reasonable doubt"). The first statement, by its own terms, would not reflect the appropriate enquiry in every rebuttable presumption case; the second, in isolation, would not be correct, as our opinion today explains.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener → -
The Supreme Court confined Rose's use of Chapman's harmless-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard by holding that federal habeas courts instead apply Kotteakos's substantial-and-injurious-effect standard to trial error.
Brecht v. Abrahamson · Supreme Court of the United States · filed
Although we have applied the Chapman standard in a handful of federal habeas cases, see, e. g., Yates v. Evatt, 500 U. S. 391 (1991); Rose v. Clark, 478 U. S. 570 (1986); Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U. S. 371 (1972); Anderson v. Nelson, 390 U. S. 523 (1968) (per curiam), we have yet squarely to address its applicability on collateral review. ... But since we have never squarely addressed the issue, and have at most assumed the applicability of the Chapman standard on habeas, we are free to address the issue on the merits. ... For the foregoing reasons, then, we hold that the Kotteakos harmless-error standard applies in determining whether habeas relief must be granted because of constitutional error of the trial type.
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