Case Citator › Rose v. Lundy

Rose v. Lundy

Is it still good law? What later courts have actually done to this case.

Superseded by statute
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Citation
455 U.S. 509
Decided
Confirmed treatments
3
Flagged citations read
106 of 106
Citing cases (total)
5,807
Treatment dates
2000–2005
Superseded by statute
A reviewed court treats this case as superseded by later legislation. Rose v. Lundy has been fully screened: all 106 flagged citations have been read, and the 3 confirmed treatments are listed below. AEDPA displaced Rose's mandatory-dismissal rule where 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2) permits denial of unexhausted claims and where dismissal would jeopardize timely federal review.
More on how this was screened

Rhines v. Weber later authorized a limited stay-and-abeyance exception for diligent petitioners with good cause and potentially meritorious claims. The other reviewed opinions applied Rose, reported those later developments or Rose's treatment of earlier precedents, or used nearby adverse language for unrelated rulings. Two exact cluster IDs resolved through the required fallback to unrelated older opinions rather than the queued habeas matters.

Every treatment on this page is written from the citing opinion itself, with a verbatim quote, never copied from a commercial citator. A citation flagged by our screen but not shown here was read and found not to weaken this case.

5,807 later cases cite Rose v. Lundy; 106 of those citations sat close to treatment language and were flagged for reading, and all of them have been read. Citations that did not sit near treatment language were not flagged and were not read one by one, so a court that weakened this case without using any of that language would not appear here.

Relying on Rose v. Lundy?

This page shows what later courts did to it. Ask about your specific facts and see whether it still carries your argument, with citations you can check.

Treatments

Superseded by statute

  • In an unpublished disposition, the Tenth Circuit held that AEDPA § 2254(b)(2) superseded Rose's mandatory-dismissal rule by permitting denial of unexhausted claims on the merits.

    Rudolph v. Galetka · Tenth Circuit · filed

    Rose was superseded by statute, however, upon the passage of the Anti-Effective Death Penalty and Anti-terrorism Act (AEDPA), codified in relevant part at 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2). Section 2254(b)(2) states that “[a]n application for a writ of habeas corpus may be denied on the merits notwithstanding the failure of the applicant to exhaust the remedies available in the courts of the State.” This section allows federal district courts entertaining habeas petitions which contain unexhausted claims to address those claims if they can be decided on their merits against the petitioner.
    Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

  • The Third Circuit held that AEDPA's limitations period displaced mandatory dismissal when dismissing a timely mixed petition could jeopardize federal review.

    Crews v. Horn · Third Circuit · filed

    By introducing a time limit, AEDPA calls into doubt the conclusion in Lundy that dismissal of a mixed petition does not “unreasonably impair the prisoner's right to relief,” Lundy, 455 U.S. at 509, 102 S.Ct. 1198, because in situations such as the present one, AEDPA's limitations period may act to deprive a petitioner of a federal forum if dismissal of the habeas petition is required. ... We will, therefore, follow Zarvela. We hold that district courts have the discretion to stay mixed habeas corpus petitions but that, as in this case, when an outright dismissal could jeopardize the timeliness of a collateral attack, a stay is the only appropriate course of action.
    Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Limited

  • The Court limited Rose's dismissal rule by requiring stay-and-abeyance for qualifying mixed petitions and permitting deletion of unexhausted claims when full dismissal would unreasonably impair federal review.

    Rhines v. Weber · Supreme Court of the United States · filed

    On the other hand, it likely would be an abuse of discretion for a district court to deny a stay and to dismiss a mixed petition if the petitioner had good cause for his failure to exhaust, his unexhausted claims are potentially meritorious, and there is no indication that the petitioner engaged in intentionally dilatory litigation tactics. In such circumstances, the district court should stay, rather than dismiss, the mixed petition. ... For the same reason, if a petitioner presents a district court with a mixed petition and the court determines that stay and abeyance is inappropriate, the court should allow the petitioner to delete the unexhausted claims and to proceed with the exhausted claims if dismissal of the entire petition would unreasonably impair the petitioner’s right to obtain federal relief.
    Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

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