United States v. Nixon
Is it still good law? What later courts have actually done to this case.
Status
More on how this was screened
People v. Spykstra declined to extend Nixon's strict admissibility requirement to defense subpoenas directed at third parties, an issue Nixon left open. Gonite v. UnitedHealthcare of Georgia, Inc. declined to extend Nixon's criminal prosecutorial-authority statement to government civil and qui tam litigation. The other reviewed opinions applied Nixon, reported later treatment of other authorities, rejected adverse arguments, or used nearby treatment language for unrelated law.
4,054 later cases cite United States v. Nixon; 90 of those citations sat close to treatment language and were flagged for reading; 89 of them have been read, and the text of 1 citing opinion could not be retrieved, so it remains unread. Citations that did not sit near treatment language were not flagged and were not read one by one, so a court that weakened this case without using any of that language would not appear here.
Relying on United States v. Nixon?
This page shows what later courts did to it. Ask about your specific facts and see whether it still carries your argument, with citations you can check.
Treatments
Declined to follow
-
The Second Circuit declined to follow Nixon's footnote dictum requiring substantial independent evidence of a conspiracy before admission of coconspirator statements, adhering instead to its fair-preponderance standard.
United States v. Mangan · Second Circuit · filed
Although noting the statement in fn. 14 to United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 701 n. 14, 94 S.Ct. 3090, 41 L.Ed.2d 1029 (1974), that “As a preliminary matter, there must be substantial, independent evidence of the conspiracy, at least enough to take the question to the jury,” appellant’s counsel recognizes that we have declined to follow this dictum, contained in a footnote in a case where the Court’s attention was focused on issues considerably transcending the rule of evidence relating to declarations of conspirators, and have adhered to our view that in the judge’s passing upon the preliminary issue of admissibility, it suffices if the independent evidence establishes the defendant’s participation by a “fair preponderance.”
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Limited
-
The Supreme Court of Colorado declined to impose Nixon's strict admissibility requirement as an absolute rule for pretrial defense subpoenas directed to third parties, an issue Nixon expressly left unresolved.
People v. Spykstra · Supreme Court of Colorado · filed
The Nixon Court expressed a strict admissibility requirement but also recognized, without deciding, that this requirement might not apply to subpoenas issued to third parties. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 700 n. 12, 94 S.Ct. 3090; see also Benjamin E. Rosenberg & Robert W. Topp, The ByWays and Contours of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 17(C): A Guide Through Uncharted Territory, 45 Crim. Law Bulletin 195, 209-13 (Spring 2009) (criticizing the application of the Nixon evidentiary standard to defense third-party subpoenas) (collecting cases); Peter J. Henning, Defense Discovery in White-Collar Criminal Prosecutions: Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure in Subpoenas, Champion Dec. 1999 (same). Although we do not subscribe to the broader discovery standard advocated by the commentators, we agree that an absolute determination of admissibility at the subpoena stage is not warranted.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener → -
The court declined to extend Nixon's statement that the Executive exclusively controls prosecution to all government civil litigation, holding that it did not invalidate the False Claims Act's qui tam mechanism.
Gonite v. UnitedHealthcare of Georgia, Inc. · M.D. Ga. · filed
United maintains that the Take Care Clause “grants the President the ‘exclusive authority’ to determine whether to commence civil action on the government’s behalf.” Doc. 69-1 at 19 (citing United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 693 (1974)). Thus, “‘[t]he President must exercise ‘sufficient control’ over the government’s litigation.’” Id. (citing Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 696 (1988). United argues that “[b]ecause the FCA’s qui tam provision permits relators to maintain primary control over litigation on the government’s behalf, the qui tam provision violates the Take Care Clause.” Id. First, the Take Care Clause does not unequivocally convey to the President exclusive authority to initiate any type of litigation against the United States. See Riley, 252 F.3d at 753. United relies on dicta in Nixon for this proposition. 418 U.S. at 693. Rather, the Take Care Clause directs the President to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.” U.S. Const., art. II, § 3. And on the matter of control, the Eleventh Circuit has recognized that the United States possesses “substantial control” over non-intervened FCA qui tam actions. See Yates v. Pinellas Hematology & Oncology P.A., 21 F.4th 1288, 1310-11 (11th Cir. 2021) (citing Riley, 252 F.3d at 753); Hunt, 887 F.3d at 1086 (describing the control mechanisms at the government’s disposal when a relator brings an FCA action); 31 U.S.C. § 3730. The qui tam provision does not violate the Take Care Clause.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Does this case still carry your argument?
Describe your facts. Ezel reads United States v. Nixon and the cases that treated it, then tells you whether it still holds for your situation, with citations.
Opens in Ezel Pro.
- Checks the law as it stands today, not only this page
- Cites every source it relies on, so you can verify it
- Chat, drafting and research in one workspace