Case Citator › McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green

Is it still good law? What later courts have actually done to this case.

Criticized by some courts
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Citation
411 U.S. 792
Decided
Confirmed treatments
6
Flagged citations read
707 of 707
Citing cases (total)
38,454
Treatment dates
1993–2017
Criticized by some courts
At least one reviewed court has criticized this case’s reasoning. No reviewed court has overruled it. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green has been criticized and limited; all 707 flagged citations have been read. Six adverse treatments are listed below.
More on how this was screened

Three state courts separately chose different frameworks under their own laws, as noted below.

Every treatment on this page is written from the citing opinion itself, with a verbatim quote, never copied from a commercial citator. A citation flagged by our screen but not shown here was read and found not to weaken this case.

38,454 later cases cite McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green; 707 of those citations sat close to treatment language and were flagged for reading, and all of them have been read. Citations that did not sit near treatment language were not flagged and were not read one by one, so a court that weakened this case without using any of that language would not appear here.

Relying on McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green?

This page shows what later courts did to it. Ask about your specific facts and see whether it still carries your argument, with citations you can check.

Treatments

Limited

  • The Supreme Court limited McDonnell Douglas's “legitimate” reason language in ADEA cases, rejecting any reading under which every improper reason necessarily violates the ADEA.

    Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins · Supreme Court of the United States · filed

    Although some language in our prior decisions might be read to mean that an employer violates the ADEA whenever its reason for firing an employee is improper in any respect, see McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U. S. 792, 802 (1973) (creating proof framework applicable to ADEA) (employer must have “legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason” for action against employee), this reading is obviously incorrect.
    Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

  • The Montana Supreme Court confined the trial-oriented framework at summary judgment, where a plaintiff need only raise an inference of pretext rather than prove pretext.

    Heiat v. Eastern Montana College · Supreme Court of Montana · filed

    The three-step McDonnell Douglas analysis, as adopted in the summary judgment context by this Court in Kenyon, conflicts with ... the two-step analysis traditionally employed in deciding motions for summary judgment. Under the traditional summary judgment analysis the party opposing summary judgment has only one burden, namely, to demonstrate that genuine issues of material fact exist. To do so, the party opposing summary judgment must present material and substantial evidence, rather than mere conclusory and speculative statements, to raise a genuine issue of material fact. Howard, 901 P.2d at 119. In Kenyon, we made the mistake of following the lead of many state and federal courts throughout the country and superimposed the three-step McDonnell Douglas trial analysis into the summary judgment context without specifically noting that the plaintiff’s burden in defending against a motion for summary judgment differs from the plaintiff’s burden at trial. At trial, the plaintiff has the burden of proof so the McDonnell Douglas construct of placing the initial burden on the plaintiff is logical. However, when, as here, the defendant makes a motion for summary judgment, that construct does not work.
    Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

  • The Seventh Circuit declined to extend McDonnell Douglas from antidiscrimination law to substantive FMLA entitlement claims.

    Diaz v. Fort Wayne Foundry Corp. · Seventh Circuit · filed

    This is not a sound extension of McDonnell Douglas. Under the FMLA an employee need not show that other employees were treated less favorably. The question is not how the Foundry treats others, but whether it respected each employee’s entitlements.
    Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

  • The Eleventh Circuit held McDonnell Douglas inapplicable to circumstantial mixed-motive discrimination claims and substituted a motivating-factor framework.

    Quigg v. Thomas County School District · Eleventh Circuit · filed

    In sum, we hold that the McDonnell Douglas framework is not applicable to mixed-motive discrimination claims based on circumstantial evidence; instead, the mixed-motive framework set forth in White is the appropriate framework for examining these claims.
    Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

  • The Third Circuit declined to extend McDonnell Douglas to hostile-work-environment claims because no legitimate justification exists for such an environment.

    Moody v. Atlantic City Board of Education · Third Circuit · filed

    We agree that the burden-shifting framework is inapplicable here because, as the Pollard court explained, there can be no legitimate justification for a hostile work environment. 213 F.3d at 943. Therefore, we will not apply the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework to Moody’s hostile work environment claim.
    Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Criticized

  • The district court criticized McDonnell Douglas as one of several proliferating motive frameworks that can complicate rather than clarify the evidentiary inquiry.

    Gullick v. Ott · W.D. Wis. · filed

    To be sure, courts have tried hard (perhaps a little too hard) to create frameworks with the purpose of making the determination more objective and structured. E.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973) (establishing framework for circumstantial evidence cases); Thanongsinh v. Board of Education, 462 F.3d 762 (7th Cir.2006) (altering framework in case in which plaintiff alleged that defendant’s performance evaluations were discriminatory); Mills v. Health Care Service Corp., 171 F.3d 450, 457 (7th Cir.1999) (creating different test for discrimination cases brought by nonminority plaintiffs); Johnson v. Zema Systems Corp., 170 F.3d 734, 745 (7th Cir.1999) (presumption of nondiscrimination arises when same person hired and fired plaintiff). But these ever-proliferating standards, tests and presumptions sometimes complicate the question more than clarify it and can lead to seemingly inconsistent applications when a court believes that justice and the particular facts of a case require a modification of the rule.
    Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Does this case still carry your argument?

Describe your facts. Ezel reads McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green and the cases that treated it, then tells you whether it still holds for your situation, with citations.

Opens in Ezel Pro.

  • Checks the law as it stands today, not only this page
  • Cites every source it relies on, so you can verify it
  • Chat, drafting and research in one workspace