Case Citator › In re Winship

In re Winship

Is it still good law? What later courts have actually done to this case.

Limited by some courts
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Citation
397 U.S. 358
Decided
Confirmed treatments
3
Flagged citations read
287 of 287
Citing cases (total)
11,603
Treatment dates
1973–1986
Limited by some courts
At least one reviewed court has limited this case’s holding to narrower facts or a narrower rule. No reviewed court has overruled it. In re Winship is limited: all 287 flagged citations have been read, with the 3 distinct confirmed treatments listed below. State v. Lafferty adopted a narrow reading that Mullaney v. Wilbur later rejected.
More on how this was screened

Patterson v. New York and McMillan v. Pennsylvania supplied the controlling limits by permitting defendants to bear the burden on separate affirmative defenses and allowing sentencing factors that do not alter the offense elements or statutory maximum to be found by a preponderance. The other reviewed opinions applied Winship, described its displacement of older burden rules, rejected party arguments, or directed nearby treatment language at other authorities; duplicate copies of the same opinion, party filings, and a vacated opinion do not create additional treatments.

Every treatment on this page is written from the citing opinion itself, with a verbatim quote, never copied from a commercial citator. A citation flagged by our screen but not shown here was read and found not to weaken this case.

11,603 later cases cite In re Winship; 287 of those citations sat close to treatment language and were flagged for reading, and all of them have been read. Citations that did not sit near treatment language were not flagged and were not read one by one, so a court that weakened this case without using any of that language would not appear here.

Relying on In re Winship?

This page shows what later courts did to it. Ask about your specific facts and see whether it still carries your argument, with citations you can check.

Treatments

Limited

  • Before Mullaney v. Wilbur rejected its burden rule, the court held that Winship did not require the prosecution to negate every mitigating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt, including circumstances fully subjective and known only to the accused.

    State v. Lafferty · Supreme Judicial Court of Maine · filed

    We do not understand In Re Winship to hold that, in order to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt the prosecution must not only so prove each essential element of the crime charged but also must negate beyond a reasonable doubt all mitigating circumstances, even those fully subjective in nature, knowledge of which can only exist in the mind of the accused.
    Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

  • The Supreme Court limited Winship's reasonable-doubt requirement to facts constituting the offense and allowed New York to place the burden of proving a separate mitigating affirmative defense on the defendant.

    Patterson v. New York · Supreme Court of the United States · filed

    It seems to us that the State satisfied the mandate of Winship that it prove beyond a reasonable doubt “every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which [Patterson was] charged.” 397 U. S., at 364. ... But even if we were to hold that a State must prove sanity to convict once that fact is put in issue, it would not necessarily follow that a State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt every fact, the existence or nonexistence of which it is willing to recognize as an exculpatory or mitigating circumstance affecting the degree of culpability or the severity of the punishment.
    Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

  • The Supreme Court held that Winship did not require proof beyond a reasonable doubt of a sentencing factor that raised only the minimum sentence and did not alter the offense elements or statutory maximum.

    McMillan v. Pennsylvania · Supreme Court of the United States · filed

    Petitioners argue that under the Due Process Clause as interpreted in Winship and Mullaney, if a State wants to punish visible possession of a firearm it must undertake the burden of proving that fact beyond a reasonable doubt. We disagree. ... But in Patterson we rejected the claim that whenever a State links the “severity of punishment” to “the presence or absence of an identified fact” the State must prove that fact beyond a reasonable doubt. ... We have noted a number of differences between this case and Winship, Mullaney, and Specht, and we find these differences controlling here.
    Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

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