Case Citator › Mempa v. Rhay

Mempa v. Rhay

Is it still good law? What later courts have actually done to this case.

Limited by some courts
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Citation
389 U.S. 128
Decided
Confirmed treatments
2
Flagged citations read
44 of 44
Citing cases (total)
44
Treatment dates
1971–1973
Limited by some courts
At least one reviewed court has limited this case’s holding to narrower facts or a narrower rule. No reviewed court has overruled it. Mempa v. Rhay's right to counsel at deferred sentencing remains intact, but two opinions listed below declined to require appointed counsel in every parole or probation revocation hearing after sentencing. All 44 flagged citations have been read.
Every treatment on this page is written from the citing opinion itself, with a verbatim quote, never copied from a commercial citator. A citation flagged by our screen but not shown here was read and found not to weaken this case.

44 later cases cite Mempa v. Rhay; 44 of those citations sat close to treatment language and were flagged for reading, and all of them have been read. Citations that did not sit near treatment language were not flagged and were not read one by one, so a court that weakened this case without using any of that language would not appear here.

Relying on Mempa v. Rhay?

This page shows what later courts did to it. Ask about your specific facts and see whether it still carries your argument, with citations you can check.

Treatments

Limited

  • The Fourth Circuit declined to extend Mempa's deferred sentencing rule to a right to appointed counsel in every parole revocation hearing.

    Bearden v. South Carolina · Fourth Circuit · filed

    The answer is to be found in the penumbra of Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 88 S.Ct. 254, 19 L.Ed.2d 336 (1967). On its face, Mempa is a narrow decision limited to “the question of the extent of the right to counsel at the time of sentencing where the sentencing has been deferred subject to probation.” 389 U.S. at 130, 88 S.Ct. at 254. ... In determining whether to extend the right of counsel from the deferred sentencing procedure of the original criminal trial to a revocation of parole after every stage of the trial has been completed, we think these expressed reasons advanced by the Court ought to be evaluated in the new context. ... We hold that the Sixth Amendment and the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment do not require the states in every case to afford counsel to indigent parolees.
    Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

  • The Supreme Court held that Mempa does not require appointed counsel at every probation revocation hearing when sentence was imposed before probation began.

    Gagnon v. Scarpelli · Supreme Court of the United States · filed

    In Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U. S. 128 (1967), the Court held that a probationer is entitled to be represented by appointed counsel at a combined revocation and sentencing hearing. ... But this line of reasoning does not require a hearing or counsel at the time of probation revocation in a case such as the present one, where the probationer was sentenced at the time of trial.
    Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Does this case still carry your argument?

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