J. I. Case Co. v. Borak
Is it still good law? What later courts have actually done to this case.
Status
More on how this was screened
Borak's specific holding that shareholders may sue under § 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act remains in force. All 46 flagged citations have been read.
46 later cases cite J. I. Case Co. v. Borak; 46 of those citations sat close to treatment language and were flagged for reading, and all of them have been read. Citations that did not sit near treatment language were not flagged and were not read one by one, so a court that weakened this case without using any of that language would not appear here.
Relying on J. I. Case Co. v. Borak?
This page shows what later courts did to it. Ask about your specific facts and see whether it still carries your argument, with citations you can check.
Treatments
Limited
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The Supreme Court confined Borak's private action under § 14(a) and declined to infer one under § 17(a) merely from the securities laws' remedial purpose.
Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington · Supreme Court of the United States · filed
The Court in Borak found a private cause of action implicit in § 14 (a). See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U. S., at 690-693, n. 13; Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc., 430 U. S. at 25; Allen v. State Board of Elections, 393 U. S., at 557. We do not now question the actual holding of that case, but we decline to read the opinion so broadly that virtually every provision of the securities Acts gives rise to an implied private cause of action.
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The Eleventh Circuit declined to extend Borak's § 14(a) private action to an issuer's proposed claim under §§ 14(d) and 14(e).
Liberty National Insurance Holding Company v. The Charter Company · United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit · filed
Section 14(a) of this title, enacted in 1934, provides an implied private cause of action for individuals to challenge proxy contests. J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 84 S.Ct. 1555, 12 L.Ed.2d 423 (1964). ... There are three substantial reasons for rejecting such a finding, however. First, the mere use of the same introductory boilerplate language cannot compel us to treat sections 14(a) and (d) identically. Second, we do not here decide the question of the existence of any private right of action under sections 14(d) and (e), only the issuer’s right to bring such a claim.
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Criticized
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The D.C. Circuit rejected Borak's need for a remedy rationale as a reason to infer a private action under the federal anti-lobbying statute.
National Treasury Employees' Union v. Campbell · United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit · filed
Now, however, as the district court recognized in overruling Hodgson,9 this need-fora-remedy argument does not pull the weight it once did. In 1964, while inferring a cause of action under the Securities Exchange Act, the Supreme Court stated that “under the circumstances here it is the duty of the courts to be alert to provide such remedies as are necessary to make effective the congressional purpose.” J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 433, 84 S.Ct. 1555, 1560, 12 L.Ed.2d 423 (1964).
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The Third Circuit criticized Borak's failure to test whether Congress intended a private action.
Wisniewski v. Rodale, Inc. · United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · filed
At no point in its opinion did the Borak Court purport to discern Congress’s intent regarding a private right of action (as opposed to Congress’s general purposes in enacting the statute).
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Abrogated
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The Supreme Court expressly abandoned Borak's method of implying private actions from a statute's purpose while leaving its established § 14(a) result undisturbed.
Alexander v. Sandoval · Supreme Court of the United States · filed
That understanding is captured by the Court’s statement in J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 433 (1964), that “it is the duty of the courts to be alert to provide such remedies as are necessary to make effective the congressional purpose” expressed by a statute. We abandoned that understanding in Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975) — which itself interpreted a statute enacted under the anden regime — and have not returned to it since. Not even when interpreting the same Securities Exchange Act of 1934 that was at issue in Borak have we applied Borak’s method for discerning and defining causes of action.
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