Jones v. United States
Is it still good law? What later courts have actually done to this case.
Status
4,800 later cases cite Jones v. United States; 443 of those citations sat close to treatment language and were flagged for reading, and all of them have been read. Citations that did not sit near treatment language were not flagged and were not read one by one, so a court that weakened this case without using any of that language would not appear here.
Relying on Jones v. United States?
This page shows what later courts did to it. Ask about your specific facts and see whether it still carries your argument, with citations you can check.
Treatments
Overruled in Part
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The Supreme Court expressly overruled Jones's automatic-standing rule for defendants charged with possessory offenses, requiring each defendant to show that the challenged search violated that defendant's own Fourth Amendment rights.
United States v. Salvucci · Supreme Court of the United States · filed
Today we hold that defendants charged with crimes of possession may only claim the benefits of the exclusionary rule if their own Fourth Amendment rights have in fact been violated. The automatic standing, rule of Jones v. United States, supra, is therefore overruled.
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Limited
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The Supreme Court confined Jones's “legitimately on premises” language to its facts and replaced lawful presence as the controlling test with a legitimate-expectation-of-privacy inquiry.
Rakas v. Illinois · Supreme Court of the United States · filed
We do not question the conclusion in Jones that the defendant in that case suffered a violation of his personal Fourth Amendment rights if the search in question was unlawful. Nonetheless, we believe that the phrase “legitimately on premises” coined in Jones creates too broad a gauge for measurement of Fourth Amendment rights. … But the Jones statement that a person need only be “legitimately on premises” in order to challenge the validity of the search of a dwelling place cannot be taken in its full sweep beyond the facts of that case.
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Declined to Follow
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The Sixth Circuit treated Jones's automatic-standing rule as eliminated by Simmons and refused to apply it in the circuit.
United States v. Anthony F. Delguyd and Santo Maimone · Sixth Circuit · filed
This Court has subsequently held that Simmons eliminated the automatic standing rule of Jones; United States v. Dye, 508 F.2d 1226, 1232-34 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 974, 95 S.Ct. 1395, 43 L.Ed.2d 653 (1975); United States v. Hearn, 496 F.2d 236, 240—41 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1048, 95 S.Ct. 622 (1974).
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The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals refused to apply automatic standing because it concluded that later Supreme Court decisions had eliminated the dilemma supporting Jones's rule.
McCraney v. State · Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals · filed
Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 80 S.Ct. 725, 4 L.Ed.2d 697 (1960), established a rule of “automatic” standing to contest an allegedly illegal search where possession of the seized evidence is itself an essential element of the offense for which one is charged. … Although the automatic standing rule has not been directly overruled, we believe the dilemma for which it was created to overcome has been eliminated by the later decisions of Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 88 S.Ct. 967, 19 L.Ed.2d 1247 (1968), and Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223, 93 S.Ct. 1565, 36 L.Ed.2d 208 (1973).
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The Florida Third District Court of Appeal declined to revive Jones's automatic-standing rule as an independent rule of state law.
Norman v. State · Florida Third District Court of Appeal · filed
Whether courts of this state were bound to follow the now abrogated standing rule of Jones, see n. 7, supra, is of no present concern. Our concern is only whether this state has established an automatic standing rule independently of Jones. We conclude that the automatic standing rule has not become a part of this state's jurisprudence so as to survive the overruling of Jones. This conclusion does not, however, prevent us from resuscitating the rule. We decline to do so, however, since we fully agree with Salvucci that the protection against the “self-incrimination dilemma” that Jones was designed to afford is no longer needed in light of Simmons v. United States, supra, n. 1.
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The New York Court of Appeals rejected Jones's automatic-standing rule under the State Constitution and abrogated its own prior adoption of the rule.
People v. Ponder · New York Court of Appeals · filed
Analysis indicates that the “automatic standing” rule should be rejected. Even in Jones the Supreme Court made clear that as a general principle “it is entirely proper to require of one who seeks to challenge the legality of a search as the basis for suppressing relevant evidence that he * * * establish, that he himself was the victim of an invasion of privacy” (362 US, at p 261). … We are therefore now free to reevaluate the “automatic standing” rule and, seeing no reason at this time to diverge from the Supreme Court's analysis in Salvucci, we likewise abrogate the rule as part of the law of this State.
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The Michigan Supreme Court rejected Jones's automatic-standing approach under the Michigan Constitution and adopted the reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test.
People v. Smith · Michigan Supreme Court · filed
Godwin relied on Jones v United States, 362 US 257; 80 S Ct 725; 4 L Ed 2d 697 (1960). Plaintiff contended that the test of “reasonable expectation of privacy” set forth in United States v Salvucci, 448 US 83; 100 S Ct 2547; 65 L Ed 2d 619 (1980), which overruled the “automatic standing” test of Jones, applies. … Upon consideration, we conclude that there are no policy considerations which incline us to adopt the “automatic standing” test and that there is nothing in the differences in language between art 1, § 11 and Am IV that requires or suggests the adoption of the “automatic standing” test. … We adopt a “reasonable expectation of privacy” test consonant with our search and seizure precedents.
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The Supreme Court of Hawaiʻi declined to adopt Jones's automatic-standing rule as a matter of state constitutional law.
State v. Tau'a · Supreme Court of Hawaiʻi · filed
Although we have consistently required defendants seeking to avail themselves of the exclusionary rule to satisfy the Katz/Rakas test—i.e., to demonstrate that their own reasonable expectations of privacy have been violated—there is dictum in Abordo acknowledging the so-called “automatic standing” rule established by the United States Supreme Court in Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 80 S.Ct. 725, 4 L.Ed.2d 697 (1960). … For the reasons discussed infra, we decline to adopt the Jones “automatic standing” rule as a matter of state constitutional law.
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The Supreme Court of Connecticut declined to adopt Jones's automatic-standing doctrine under the Connecticut Constitution.
State v. Davis · Supreme Court of Connecticut · filed
Considering all of the Geisler factors, we conclude that article first, § 7, of the state constitution does not embody the automatic standing doctrine. To the extent that the court in Jones concluded that a mere possessory interest in a seized item, without more, gives rise to a reasonable expectation of privacy in the item, we agree with the court in Salvucci that any such assumption was unfounded.
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