Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic Steamship Corp.

Status

1,330 later cases cite Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic Steamship Corp.; 73 of those citations sat close to treatment language and were flagged for reading, and all of them have been read. Citations that did not sit near treatment language were not flagged and were not read one by one, so a court that weakened this case without using any of that language would not appear here.

Treatments

Superseded by Statute

• The Ninth Circuit held that the 1972 LHWCA amendments bar a vessel owner from recovering indemnity from a stevedoring employer for a covered employee injury, displacing Ryan’s indemnity rule in that setting.

  Dodge v. Mitsui Shintaku Ginko K.K. Tokyo · United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · filed April 19, 1976

  The intent and effect of this amendment was to overrule this Court’s decisions in Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85 [66 S.Ct. 872, 90 L.Ed. 1099] (1946), and Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan Atlantic S. S. Corp., 350 U.S. 124 [76 S.Ct. 232, 100 L.Ed. 133] (1957), insofar as they made an employer circuitously liable for injuries to its employee, by allowing the employee to maintain an action for unseaworthiness against the vessel and allowing the vessel to maintain an action for indemnity against the employer. 417 U.S. at 113 n. 6, 94 S.Ct. at 2178 n. 6 (emphasis added). Hence, it appears that the effect of the 1972 Amendments was to disallow both contribution and indemnity. ... In light of the above authority, we hold that the employer-stevedore has no liability to the vessel owner, either directly or indirectly, for personal injury damages incurred in a compensation-covered accident.

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• The court held that the 1972 LHWCA amendments foreclosed Ryan implied indemnity against a stevedore employer for covered longshoreman injuries, including the asserted derivative claims by third parties.

  S.S. Seatrain Louisiana v. California Stevedore & Ballast Co. · United States District Court for the Northern District of California · filed July 20, 1976

  Dissatisfied with this round-about recovery system, Congress amended the Act in 1972 by adding Section 905(b), abrogating the vessel’s indemnity action against the stevedore and breathing new life into the existing Section 905(a) of the Act that makes the stevedore’s compensation payments to its employee the “exclusive liability” of the stevedore-employer. ... Thus, the Ryan indemnity route was justifiably foreclosed since the underlying rationale for it, the mitigation of the harsh no-fault doctrine of a warranty of seaworthiness, had been removed.

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• The Fourth Circuit held that the 1972 LHWCA amendments eliminated the Ryan indemnity action against private stevedores and, through the Suits in Admiralty Act, barred the shipowner’s corresponding indemnity suit against the United States.

  United States Lines, Inc. v. United States · United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit · filed March 8, 1979

  When the unseaworthy condition was attributable to the employer’s unworkmanlike performance, the shipowner could recover indemnity from the stevedore (employer), Ryan Co. v. Pan-Atlantic Corp. (1956) 350 U.S. 124, 131-34, 76 S.Ct. 232, 100 L.Ed. 133. ... Congress overruled the SierackiRyan form of action with the 1972 amendments to the L.H.W.C.A. It abolished the doctrine of unseaworthiness as a basis for liability against the shipowner in favor of the longshoreman, thereby restricting the longshoreman’s claim against the shipowner to one for negligence. It also outlawed the employer’s liability to the shipowner, whether claimed under warranty or otherwise. 33 U.S.C. § 905(b) (1970 & Supp. V 1975). ... The amendments, relating only to workers covered under the Act, had no direct effect on longshoremen like Speller who are covered under the F.E.C.A. The indirect effect, however, was to cut off the indemnity action between the shipowner and the United States. Since a shipowner can no longer sue a private stevedore for indemnity, it cannot, under the terms of the Suits in Admiralty Act, recover from the United States, for the government is subject to suit only in those instances in which a private individual would be so subject. 46 U.S.C. § 742 (1970). The district court therefore properly found that suit may not be maintained against the United States.

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• The Supreme Court held that section 905(b), added by the 1972 LHWCA amendments, eliminated Ryan indemnity for damages recovered by an injured longshoreman from a vessel.

  Edmonds v. Compagnie Générale Transatlantique · Supreme Court of the United States · filed June 27, 1979

  This first sentence overrules Ryan and prevents the vessel from recouping from the *264stevedore any of the damages that the longshoreman may recover from the vessel.

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• The court held that the 1972 LHWCA amendment eliminated Ryan-based indemnity claims against a longshoreman’s employer and rejected Southport’s claim against Misener.

  Misener Marine Construction Co. v. Southport Marine, Inc. · Florida District Court of Appeal, Second District · filed November 30, 1979

  This circuitous Ryan — Sieracki run around the statutory language was in turn abrogated in 1972 by an amendment to the Longshoreman and Harbor Worker’s Compensation Act which purported to remove any indemnity cause of action based on tort or contract against the injured longshoreman’s employer. ... The net result of this history is that the circuitous actions by the longshoreman against the vessel, and then by the vessel against the longshoreman’s employer have been eliminated. This removes any basis for the argument proffered by Southport under Pennsylvania Railroad Company, supra.

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• The Fifth Circuit concluded that the 1972 LHWCA amendments eliminated Ryan indemnity actions and limited a stevedore employer’s liability accordingly.

  Chiasson v. Rogers Terminal & Shipping Corp. · United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit · filed June 28, 1982

  No one can doubt that Congress in the 1972 Amendments aimed to overrule Sieracki claims based on unseaworthiness 5 and Ryan indemnity actions. While increasing substantially the compensation benefits recoverable under the Act, Congress expressly limited the employer’s liability by doing away with Ryan indemnity actions.

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• The Ninth Circuit held that the 1972 LHWCA amendments eliminated Ryan type indemnity claims while leaving the distinct Burnside employer claim available.

  Crescent Wharf & Warehouse Co. v. Barracuda Tanker Corp. · United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · filed January 11, 1983

  The Owners correctly claim that two mainstays of Burnside, Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic Steamship Corp., 350 U.S. 124, 76 S.Ct. 232, 100 L.Ed. 133 (1956), and Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85, 66 S.Ct. 872, 90 L.Ed. 1099 (1946), were expressly overruled by the 1972 amendments.1

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• The court held that section 905(b) barred a nonvessel intermediary from obtaining employer indemnity to reimburse a vessel, thereby foreclosing the vessel’s Ryan indemnity remedy indirectly.

  Gaudet v. J. Ray McDermott & Co., Inc. · United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana · filed March 18, 1983

  In short, then, Conoco is asking the Court to resurrect the vessel’s Ryan triangle remedy. Conoco is asking that the vessel be allowed to do indirectly what the vessel clearly cannot do directly, namely, get indemnified by the employer. Given both the purpose and the language of *799 section 905(b), the Court must decline Cdnoco’s request.

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• The Fifth Circuit endorsed section 905(b) as eliminating Ryan indemnity for a covered longshoreman injury while holding that the statute permits a separate additional-insured agreement.

  Voisin v. O.D.E.C.O. Drilling Co. · United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit · filed October 29, 1984

  The district court ruled correctly that the indemnity clause of the Odeco Master Service Contract directly contravenes section 905(b). 557 F.Supp. at 720. ... Ten years later, in Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan Atlantic Steamship Corp., 350 U.S. 124, 76 S.Ct. 232, 100 L.Ed. 133 (1956), the court held that a vessel liable under Sieracki circumstances could obtain indemnification from the longshoreman’s employer (the stevedore), on the theory that the creation of the unseaworthy condition by the longshoring crew was a breach of the stevedore’s implied warranty of workmanlike performance. ... It was against this backdrop that Congress added section 905(b) to the LHWCA. Congress enacted section 905(b) “to eliminate the shipowner’s liability to the longshoreman for unseaworthiness and the stevedore’s liability to the shipowner for unworkmanlike service resulting in injury to the longshoreman — in other words, to overrule Sieracki and Ryan.”

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Limited

• The Ninth Circuit held that a negligent shipowner liable under both negligence and unseaworthiness theories cannot obtain Ryan indemnity from a negligent contractor.

  Knight v. Alaska Trawl Fisheries, Inc. · United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · filed October 14, 1998

  We find the reasoning of these courts persuasive. We hold that a negligent shipowner is not entitled to receive Ryan indemnity from a negligent contractor when the shipowner is found liable under both negligence and unseaworthiness theories.

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• The court declined to extend Ryan implied indemnity to a marine contractor seeking recovery from a subcontractor outside the covered stevedoring employer relationship.

  Matthews v. United States · United States District Court for the Southern District of New York · filed February 28, 2001

  The Court thus concludes in this case that even if the contract between KMS and Independent Testing contained a warranty of workmanlike performance, there is no implied right to indemnification. ... This conclusion is further supported by the absence here of the special circumstances the Second Circuit noted is necessary for Ryan indemnity to apply, strict liability combined with the unavailability of contribution.

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• The California Supreme Court declined to extend Ryan’s workers’ compensation indemnity rule to an easement holder protected from liability by recreational use immunity.

  Prince v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. · Supreme Court of California · filed March 19, 2009

  Prince relies on S.F. Unified, supra, 162 Cal.App.2d 434, Ryan Co. v. Pan-Atlantic Corp., supra, 350 U.S. 124, and Weyerhaeuser S. S. Co. v. Nacirema Co., supra, 355 U.S. 563, to argue that implied contractual indemnity is properly available even when the alleged indemnitor is “immune from direct liability” to the injured party. In those cases, the courts either held or recognized that a workers’ compensation law did not preclude an entity from seeking implied contractual indemnity from a contractor for damages paid to an injured party, where the contractor was also the employer of the injured party. (S.F. Unified, supra, 162 Cal.App.2d at pp. 440-442 [Workmens’ Compensation Act]; Ryan Co. v. Pan-Atlantic Corp., supra, 350 U.S. at pp. 128-132 [Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act *1167(33 U.S.C. § 901 et seq.)]; see Weyerhaeuser S. S. Co. v. Nacirema Co., supra, 355 U.S. 563 [following Ryan Co. v. Pan-Atlantic Corp.'].)11 We are not convinced. As PG&E points out, the compensation laws in those cases were not comparable to section 846 and the recreational use immunity it affords. Under section 846, an easement holder “owes no duty of care to keep the premises safe for entry or use by others for any recreational purpose.” Because PG&E owed no such duty to Jackson, there is no question that PG&E is immune from liability to Jackson. By contrast, the compensation laws did not operate to shield the employers from liability to their injured employees or otherwise negate any duty of care owing from employers to employees. To the contrary, those laws reflected compensation bargains, pursuant to which employers were held to assume liability for all industrial injuries, regardless of fault, in exchange for a limitation on the amount of that liability.12 In light of the obvious differences between section 846 and the compensation laws, as well as the balance of the legal analysis appearing in S.F. Unified, supra, 162 Cal.App.2d at pages 444-449, these cases are not persuasive authority for disregarding the no-indemnity-without-liability rule.

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