23 Vt. Stat. Ann. § 1201

Section 1201 focuses on whether a driver was under the influence, regardless of the amount of alcohol consumed; objective symptoms may establish that condition.

State v. Jacques · filed 1972-10-03

As to the gravity of the claimed omission, it should be pointed out that if the case is not one involving the issues of 23 V.S.A. §§ 1202-1205, the concern of 23 V.S.A. § 1201 and its predecessors (see annotations under former 23 V.S.A. § 1183) is with the fact of being under the influence, whatever the measure of alcoholic beverages necessary to produce that physical state. Evidence of objective symptoms supporting the existence of that state may be sufficient.

Section 1201(a)(2) allows a conviction when a person operates a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor to the slightest degree.

State v. Wall · filed 1979-09-17(a)(2)

He objects to that part of the charge that if the jury found him to be in the slightest degree under the influence, it would be enough to sustain a conviction under 23 V.S.A. § 1201(a), which makes it an offense to operate a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. The court’s charge, however, was correct under our holding in State v. Storrs, 105 Vt. 180, 185, 163 A. 560, 562 (1933).

Section 1201(a)(2) prohibits driving while alcohol causes an observable loss of full control over mental or physical faculties, regardless of the degree of that loss.

State v. Carmody · filed 1982-02-02(a)(2)

To support a claim of “under the influence” requires observable behavior indicating a loss of full control over the faculties of mind and body, as the Storrs case states. With this a witnessed fact, the measure of that loss is not material, and the violation of that portion of the statute is sufficiently established.

A jury may receive the “slightest degree” instruction under § 1201(a)(2) when testimony supports a loss of control of physical and mental faculties.

State v. Stockwell · filed 1982-11-02(a)(2)

The “slightest degree” instruction may be used only “in cases where testimony supports a claim of loss of control of physical and mental faculties, and not where the evidence deals solely with the chemical level of alcohol.” ... Here the instruction was given without error. The testimony of the police officer constituted evidence of a loss of control of physical and mental faculties.

Section 1201(a)(1) does not require visible signs of intoxication to prove driving with a prohibited blood alcohol concentration.

State v. Orvis · filed 1983-09-06(a)(1)

Moreover, while it is beyond dispute that external manifestations of intoxication are relevant and may be introduced at trial, State v. Rollins, supra, 141 Vt. at 108-10, 444 A.2d at 886-87, this Court has never held that they are essential to a successful prosecution under 23 V.S.A. § 1201(a) (1).

Observed driving and signs of impairment can establish a prima facie case of driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor.

State v. Veilleux · filed 1981-12-10(a)(2)

The erratic driving, staggering, bloodshot and dilated eyes, slow or slurred speech, an odor of an alcoholic beverage on the breath, a poor response to dexterity tests, and disheveled clothes and hair, taken together made up a prima facie case of driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor.

Section 1201(a)(2) permits a jury to find driving while intoxicated from circumstantial evidence of operation and evidence of intoxication, including the driver’s admissions.

State v. Debanville · filed 1983-02-07(a)(2)

Given the considerable circumstantial evidence of operation and the direct and circumstantial evidence of intoxication at 5:08 p.m., coupled with the defendant’s several admissions, a jury of reasonable men and women could properly conclude that defendant was driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor at the time of the accident.

Section 1201(a)(2) requires that the driver be under the influence, an element that distinguishes DUI/Fatal from manslaughter.

State v. Poirier · filed 1983-03-28(a)(2)

DUI/Fatal requires the death of a person resulting from the defendant’s operation of a vehicle on a highway while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. 23 V.S.A. §§ 1201, 1210. Thus, an essential element of DUI/Fatal is that the defendant be under the influence.

Section 1201(a)(2) permits proof of driving under the influence through an officer’s observations and a breath test result showing alcohol-related loss of control over the faculties of mind and body.

State v. Comstock · filed 1985-04-12(a)(2)

Officer LaFountain’s observations of defendant, along with the breath test result, are sufficient to establish that defendant drove notwithstanding observable “loss of full control over the faculties of mind and body” as a result of liquor consumption.

Section 1201(a)(2) permits clinical evidence to supplement a chemical test or, in some circumstances, to prove driving under the influence on its own.

State v. Lund · filed 1984-02-03(a)(2)

However, there is no restriction imposed by § 1201(a)(2) which limits the State's proof to just clinical evidence of DUI. The State may offer clinical evidence to further buttress the chemical test, or under certain circumstances only clinical evidence.

Section 1201(a)(2) requires evidence that the driver was under the influence while operating; apparent intoxication beside a disabled vehicle alone does not establish when the driver became intoxicated.

State v. Burnham · filed 1984-09-14(a)(2)

Looking at the evidence most favorable to the State and excluding defendant’s assertion that- he consumed only two beers on the day in question, we are unable to find any evidence at all of the time of operation; there was neither direct nor circumstantial evidence on which a jury could have convicted defendant. We only know that the defendant was standing near his disabled vehicle, apparently in an intoxicated state, at the time the officer arrived. We have no way of knowing when the defendant became intoxicated or the accident occurred.

A driver is under the influence when intoxicating liquor causes any loss of full control over the faculties of mind and body.

State v. LeBeau · filed 1984-04-06(a)(2)

A person is considered to be under the influence of intoxicating liquor when he or she has lost full control over the faculties of mind and body; the measure of that loss is immaterial.

Section 1201(a)(2) requires proof that the defendant operated a vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor; evidence of when he drove and his sobriety at that time can establish the offense.

State v. Anderkin · filed 1984-12-07(a)(2)

The defendant contends there was insufficient evidence presented at trial to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was operating the car while under the influence. We disagree. ... The evidence was thus sufficient to establish all the elements of the offense charged.

A jury may find a driver guilty of operating under the influence based on an officer’s observations and a blood alcohol level related back to the time of driving.

State v. Boardman · filed 1987-07-02(a)(2)

On the basis of all the evidence in the record, including the officer’s observations of defendant and the blood alcohol level related back to the time defendant was driving, we find no error in the jury’s conclusion that the defendant was guilty of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor.

Section 1201(a)(2) prohibits operating a vehicle on a highway while under the influence of intoxicating liquor; evidence of erratic driving and signs of impairment can support a conviction.

State v. Lettieri · filed 1988-01-15(a)(2)

Based on an examination of the entire record, sufficient evidence exists to support the jury’s verdict that defendant was operating under the influence of intoxicating liquor in violation of 23 V.S.A. § 1201(a)(2).

Section 1201(a)(2) requires the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant operated a motor vehicle on a public highway while under the influence of intoxicating liquor.

State v. Noyes · filed 1986-11-07(a)(2)

In fact, there were no concessions made by defendant’s counsel of any elements of the offense. Under these circumstances, it was incumbent on the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt all three elements of the crime of driving while intoxicated: (1) operation of a motor vehicle; (2) on a public highway; (3) while under the influence of intoxicating liquor.

Section 1201(a)(2) requires proof that intoxicating liquor caused a driver to lose full control of the faculties of mind and body; the degree of that loss is immaterial.

State v. Gray · filed 1988-06-03(a)(2)

In order to prove intoxication, the State need only prove that defendant had lost full control over the faculties of mind and body due to the effect of intoxicating liquor; the measure of that loss is immaterial.

Section 1201(a)(2) allows intoxication to be proved entirely through observation testimony without blood alcohol evidence.

State v. Bedell · filed 1989-01-13(a)(2)

Intoxication can be proved entirely by testimony of observance without blood alcohol content being relied on.

Section 1201(a)(2) permits proof that a driver was under the influence through BAC testimony using an average elimination rate; the calculation need not be certain if the evidence meets the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard.

State v. Blake · filed 1989-03-10(a)(2)

Defendant next argues that he should have been acquitted because the State failed to prove that he was under the influence, as required for conviction under 23 V.S.A. § 1201(a)(2). ... The State’s expert presented the jury with a detailed analysis, relating the BAC result back to the time the defendant was stopped, explaining how he arrived at his computation. At most, defendant’s expert established that the calculation of the State’s expert was not an absolute certainty. But it need not have been. The jury was properly instructed that it had to find defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and defendant fails to demonstrate on appeal why the State’s evidence failed to meet that test under the applicable standard of review for denial of an acquittal motion.

Section 1201(a)(2) treats a driver as under the influence when alcohol causes the driver to cease retaining full control over mental and physical faculties.

State v. Abbott · filed 1989-06-16(a)(2)

The argument is based on an erroneous characterization of the Storrs test, which is whether a defendant, because of the use of alcohol, “has ceased to retain full control over his faculties of mind and body” and is therefore under the influence of alcohol.

Section 1201(a)(2) permits a conviction based on circumstantial evidence sufficient to show that the defendant was intoxicated while operating a vehicle on a highway.

State v. Anderson · filed 1989-08-04(a)(2)

Defendant appeals a jury conviction of driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor in violation of 23 V.S.A. § 1201(a)(2). ... The likelihood of this scenario is so remote that the State's evidence, albeit circumstantial, was more than sufficient to persuade a jury to find defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crime charged.

Section 1201(a)(2) treats a person as under the influence when drinking causes a loss of full control over mental and physical faculties, regardless of the extent of that loss; the 1970 amendment did not change this test.

State v. Zumbo · filed 1991-11-08(a)(2)

In Storrs, we stated that where one, by reason of his indulgence in intoxicating liquor, has ceased to retain full control over his faculties of mind and body, he is under the influence of such liquor, and the extent to which he has lost the use of his mental and physical powers is not material upon this question. ... We have previously rejected defendant's argument that the 1970 amendment of § 1201 overruled Storrs. Carmody, 140 Vt. at 637-38, 442 A.2d at 1295. The test's longevity and repeated affirmations attest to its rational delineation of the statutory prohibition of driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. We accordingly reject defendant's contention that Storrs should be overruled.

In a prosecution for driving under the influence, evidence that casts doubt on the driver’s impairment is relevant and admissible.

State v. Hanks · filed 2001-03-02(a)(2)

On the other hand, any evidence raising a doubt as to defendant’s condition, which is the ultimate question in a generic DWI prosecution under § 1201(a)(2), is relevant and admissible.

Section 1201(a)(2) requires proof that a vehicle was operated on a highway while the driver was intoxicated.

State v. McGrath · filed 2012-04-26(a)(2)

In the context of DUI, the body of the crime is that a vehicle was operated on a highway while the driver was intoxicated. 23 V.S.A. § 1201(a)(2).

Section 1201(a)(2) requires proof that alcohol caused a loss of full control over the faculties of mind and body; the extent of that loss is immaterial.

State v. Sarkisian-Kennedy · filed 2020-01-24(a)(2)

Under 23 V.S.A. § 1201(a)(2), to prove intoxication, “the State need only prove that defendant had lost full control over the faculties of mind and body due to the effect of intoxicating liquor; the measure of that loss is immaterial.” Gray, 150 Vt. at 193; 552 A.2d at 1196.

A conviction under § 1201 can rest on an inference that a driver was under the influence while operating when evidence shows the driver remained intoxicated from the accident until an officer arrived shortly afterward.

State v. Levesque · filed 1974-10-01

The close proximity in time between the accident and the officer’s arrival at the scene, and the defendant’s condition subsequent to the accident provided circumstantial evidence that the defendant’s intoxicated condition had been continuous within the time that the accident occurred. Therefore, the jury properly made the retroactive inference of the previous fact of the defendant being under the influence of intoxicating liquor while he was operating his automobile at the time of the accident from the conditions in which the officer found the defendant shortly thereafter.

Section 1201(a)(1) requires proof that the driver had the prohibited blood alcohol level at the time of operation, so a later test result must be related back to that time.

State v. Rollins · filed 1982-03-25(a)(1)

The State must also establish that the .10% level existed at the time of operation. In this case, it was incumbent upon the prosecution to relate back the .24% reading from 9:14 p.m. (time of the test) to 7:45 p.m. (last time of operation).

Section 1201(a)(2) allows intoxication while driving to be proved by reliable circumstantial evidence without proof of the exact time of operation.

State v. Willette · filed 1982-09-07(a)(2)

But, although proof of time of operation may be necessary in the usual case, it is not required if there is other reliable evidence which would indicate that the defendant was intoxicated while operating his motor vehicle.

Section 1201(a)(2) requires the jury to find that the defendant was under the influence of intoxicating liquor while operating a motor vehicle.

State v. Baldwin · filed 1981-12-10(a)(2)

Likewise, the jury was properly instructed on the elements of the offense, including the requirement they must find that the operation occurred while defendant was under the influence of intoxicating liquor.

A conviction under § 1201(a)(2) requires evidence that the defendant was under the influence at the time of operation.

State v. Turner · filed 1985-02-08(a)(2)

We conclude there was sufficient evidence for a finding by the jury as to the time of the accident. Since there was also adequate evidence to establish that defendant was under the influence at the time of operation, the trial court properly denied defendant’s motion for acquittal.

Section 1201(a)(2) requires proof that the driver was under the influence while operating the vehicle, but the State need not establish the time of operation if other reliable evidence shows operation while intoxicated.

State v. Broe · filed 1985-07-19(a)(2)

Nevertheless, proof of time of operation is not essential if there is other reliable evidence indicating operation while intoxicated.

Section 1201(a)(2) prohibits operating a vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor; visible intoxication close to the time of operation can support a conviction.

State v. Carpenter · filed 2000-03-10(a)(2)

There was ample evidence to support the State’s theory that defendant was under the influence of intoxicating liquor at the time of operation. The jury did not need to rely on the permissive inference instruction to reach its verdict because there was credible evidence to support a conclusion that defendant’s visibly intoxicated state was very close in time to his operation of the vehicle.

Section 1201(a)(1)’s blood alcohol element can be proved by expert testimony that states the amount by weight once, even if later answers omit those words.

State v. Batchelor · filed 1977-06-07(a)(1)

Appellant was convicted below, after jury trial, of violation of 23 V.S.A. § 1201(a)(1), by operating a motor vehicle on a public highway in the Town of Wilmington with .10 per cent or more of alcohol in his blood, as shown by chemical analysis of his breath. ... The record also indicates that the expert called by the State testified to a blood alcohol content by weight of .26 per cent, in response to the first question asked him on this point. That later answers failed to use those specific words is not material; no other standard was referred to, and it seems quite clear that the general testimony was, fairly viewed, couched in the statutory terms.

Under § 1201(a)(2), a later breath test may corroborate evidence of impaired driving without expert testimony relating the result back to the time of driving.

State v. Carter · filed 1983-03-28(a)(2)

Since she had not had anything to drink between the time of her initial stop and her subsequent DUI processing, the test results were unquestionably relevant to the State's case. Moreover, we fail to see how the State's decision not to relate back the test results to the time of operation resulted in prejudice to defendant. They were as relevant as personal observations at that time. Absent the relating back evidence, the test results simply established the fact that defendant had consumed some amount of intoxicating liquor before being stopped.

In a prosecution under § 1201(a)(2), a chemical test may show that the driver consumed alcohol, but its numerical result must be excluded unless it is related back to the time of operation and used under § 1204(a)(3).

State v. Dumont · filed 1985-08-30(a)(2)

In view of the marginal additional probative value of the numerical result, and the danger of its misuse by the jury, expert testimony concerning the blood alcohol content test in a § 1201(a)(2) prosecution should be strictly limited to whether the test demonstrates that the defendant did, in fact, consume any intoxicating liquor. The numerical result itself should be excluded unless it is related back to the time of operation and used pursuant to the permissive presumption established at 23 V.S.A. § 1204(a)(3).

In a § 1201(a)(2) prosecution, the State must connect a blood alcohol test’s numerical result to the time of operation before using that number; the test may still show that the defendant consumed alcohol.

State v. McQuillen · filed 1986-10-03(a)(2)

It is important that evidence of the numerical test result be treated with care in a prosecution under 23 V.S.A. § 1201(a)(2). ... If the State elects to introduce numerical results into evidence, it should be prepared to establish the relevance of those results, as we clearly indicated in Dumont. In the event the State does not introduce the required relation-back evidence, we reiterate that the test result is not thereby rendered irrelevant.

Section 1201(a)(2) permits prosecution for driving under the influence without an officer first offering or requesting a breath or blood test.

State v. Begins · filed 1987-06-12(a)(2)

The Court holds today that law enforcement officers are not required to offer to, or request of, DUI suspects a breath or blood test as a precondition for prosecution under 23 V.S.A. § 1201(a)(2).

Under § 1201(a)(2), breath-test evidence of alcohol consumption is admissible without relating the result back to driving or ruling out drinking afterward; those gaps affect its weight.

State v. Zantanos · filed 1988-07-01(a)(2)

We have consistently held that test results that are not related back are relevant in a § 1201(a)(2) proceeding and that evidence that the results show the defendant did consume intoxicating liquor is admissible because the probative value outweighs the danger of unfair prejudice to the defendant. ... We have imposed no requirement, as a condition of the use of the test results to show consumption, that the State exclude all possible methods of consumption inconsistent with guilt, including consumption after operation. The failure to exclude the possibility that the consumption occurred after operation goes to the weight of the test result evidence, not its admissibility.

In a bench trial under § 1201(a)(2), a BAC reading that has not been related back to the time of driving may corroborate observed alcohol consumption, but cannot establish BAC at that time.

State v. Dupree · filed 1989-03-24(a)(2)

Defendant was convicted after court trial of driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor in violation of 23 V.S.A. § 1201(a)(2). ... There is no such danger where trial was had by court. Here the trial judge specifically stated in his order that no inference of defendant’s BAC at the time of operation could be drawn from the evidence. ... There is no error.

Section 1201(a) does not require the prohibited conduct to occur on a public highway.

State v. McGrail · filed 1976-02-03(a)

The statute in issue did not attempt to delineate where the proscribed acts must occur, i.e. on a public highway or upon private property.

Section 1201(a)(2)'s highway element includes operation in a restaurant parking lot open to general vehicle circulation.

State v. Jarvis · filed 1984-08-10(a)(2)

Although defendant argues that there was no evidence that the Rusty Nail parking lot was open to the public other than the arresting officer’s opinion to that effect, the record does not bear him out. ... We conclude therefore that the State met its burden of proof that the defendant, at the time of the stop by the officer, was operating a motor vehicle upon a public highway, as contemplated by 23 V.S.A. § 1201 (a) (2), 23 V.S.A. § 674 and 23 V.S.A. § 4(13).

Section 1201 treats an interstate breakdown lane as a highway for purposes of driving under the influence.

State v. Bailey · filed 1988-04-08(a)(2)

In light of these past determinations, we have no hesitancy in concluding that the area in which defendant’s vehicle was found comes within the meaning of the term “highway” as employed in § 1201.

Section 1201(a)(2) requires the State to prove that the defendant operated a vehicle on a highway; a jury instruction treating that element as conceded improperly relieves the State of its burden.

State v. Boise · filed 1985-06-07(a)(2)

It was incumbent upon the State to prove the operation of the vehicle “on a highway.” 23 V.S.A. § 1201(a)(2). An instruction which informs the jury that this element of the crime has been conceded, when in fact it was not, improperly relieves the State of its burden. Thus the charge was in error.

Section 1201(a)(2)'s highway element can be established by evidence that the defendant drove on an interstate highway where other vehicles were traveling, without direct testimony that the road was open to the public.

State v. Jewett · filed 1987-06-26(a)(2)

Although the State failed to elicit testimony that the highway in question was in fact open to the public on the date in question, such failure does not require reversal. When viewed in the light most favorable to the State, State v. Gilman, 145 Vt. 84, 86, 483 A.2d 598, 599 (1984), there was evidence that the road on which defendant was travelling was an interstate highway, and that a number of other vehicles were travelling on the same roadway at the time of the offense. This was sufficient to allow the jury to conclude that the road was a highway within the meaning of 23 V.S.A. §§ 4(13) and 1201.

Section 1201(a)(2)'s highway element can be satisfied on a privately owned road open to public or general vehicle circulation.

State v. Paquette · filed 1989-06-16(a)(2)

Under this definition we need only determine whether Young Road is “open ... to public or general circulation of vehicles.” ... The ownership of the road and legal right of vehicle operators to be on it are not, however, the basis of the “highway” element of the law under which defendant is prosecuted.

Section 1201(a)(2) requires operation or control of a vehicle on a highway open to public circulation; a restricted, employee-used lot posted against trespassing does not qualify.

State v. McNeil · filed 1995-08-11(a)(2)

Unless we are prepared to write public access out of the law, we cannot conclude that this defendant was in control of her vehicle on a highway.

Section 1201(a)’s operation element can be supported by a driver’s admission that he could not dim the vehicle’s headlights while on the highway.

State v. Dragon · filed 1977-02-01(a)

The respondent’s statement to the officer that he was unable to dim the lights of the vehicle because of mechanical malfunctions is, we hold, direct evidence of his operation of that vehicle upon Route 7. The combination of this direct evidence and the circumstantial evidence presented by the State precluded the need for the trial court to submit the requested instruction to the jury.

Under § 1201(a)(1) and (a)(2), a person behind the wheel of a running vehicle on a public highway who admits to recent driving has operated the vehicle.

State v. Constantine · filed 1987-07-06(a)(1), (a)(2)

Defendant’s contention that he was not operating a vehicle within the meaning of 23 V.S.A. §§ 1201(a)(1) and 1201(a)(2) is without merit. He was observed by a police officer behind the steering wheel of a motor vehicle which had its motor running on a public highway. ... This admission, together with his observed position in the vehicle, is sufficient to establish operation.

Section 1201(a)(2)’s operation element may be proved by circumstantial evidence sufficient for a jury to infer beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant drove.

State v. Warner · filed 1989-04-28(a)(2)

... we conclude that the testimony of Officer Whalen provided sufficient evidence from which a jury could rationally infer beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant in fact got into his truck and drove himself home after leaving the police station.

Section 1201(a)(2) gives fair notice that a person may not operate or control a vehicle on a highway while under the influence of intoxicating liquor.

State v. Stevens · filed 1979-09-17(a)(2)

23 V.S.A. § 1201(a) (2). Its meaning is not uncertain. It adequately meets the constitutional standard of a criminal statute, namely, that it “must give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden.”

Section 1201(a)(2) gives ordinary people fair notice that being in actual physical control of a vehicle on a highway while under the influence of intoxicating liquor is prohibited.

State v. Trucott · filed 1984-12-14(a)(2)

We hold, first, that the meaning of 23 V.S.A. § 1201 (a) is not vague or uncertain within the constitutional strictures of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Its language is sufficient, in our judgment, to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden.

A person may be in actual physical control of a vehicle while asleep or otherwise unconscious.

State v. Blaine · filed 1987-07-17(a)(2)

The fact that a vehicle’s occupant may have been sleeping or otherwise unconscious does not prevent a finding of actual physical control.

Section 1201(a)(4) permits the State to charge more than one offense under § 1201 arising from the same incident.

State v. Fuller · filed 1984-06-08(a)(4)

Thus, since the incident in this case occurred in 1982, after the 1981 amendment to § 1201 became operative, the State was within its power in charging the defendant with violations of both §§ 1201(a) (1) and 1201(a) (2).

Section 1201 permits both blood-alcohol and under-the-influence charges but prohibits multiple convictions arising from the same incident.

State v. Hugo · filed 1991-04-12(c)

Although 23 V.S.A. § 1201 permits the State to charge a defendant with both driving while there is .10% or more alcohol in the blood and with driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, the statute expressly prohibits multiple convictions arising out of the same incident.

Section 1201(a)(2) covers driving under the influence of alcohol to the slightest degree, even when a drug also contributes to the impairment.

State v. Frigault · filed 1989-05-05(a)(2)

The more appropriate question is whether the instruction was error under § 1201(a)(2). It must be borne in mind that the jury had already been correctly instructed on the elements of the offense. The evidence introduced by defendant apparently caused the jury to wonder if a drug interaction (alcohol and codeine) was covered by the offense charged. The court correctly concluded that the answer is yes, so long as the defendant was under the influence of alcohol to some degree. There is no error.

Being behind the wheel and removing the ignition key can provide sufficient evidence of actual physical control under § 1201(a)(2).

State v. Griffin · filed 1989-06-23(a)(2)

His own testimony reveals that he not only was behind the wheel of the vehicle but that he removed the key from the ignition. The issue was not whether he was operating the vehicle, but whether he had control of it. ... There was ample evidence from the defendant to support a determination of actual physical control.

Section 1201(a)(2) can cover an intoxicated driver standing outside a running vehicle when the driver caused it to become stuck and remained responsible for it, but it does not cover a passenger who made no attempt to operate it.

State v. Stevens · filed 1990-07-20(a)(2)

Our holding is limited to the facts of tcis case. We reach this result only because defendant was, upon any reasonable view of the evidence, the operator and responsible for the vehicle being in the snowbank. A person in defendant’s position who had been solely a passenger and made no attempt to operate the car could not legitimately be considered guilty of DUI.

Evidence that a person was slumped over the wheel with the keys in or near the ignition, together with signs of intoxication, can establish actual physical control while under the influence under § 1201(a)(2).

State v. Curavoo · filed 1991-01-04(a)(2)

Absent defendant’s refusal to take the alco-sensor test, the remaining evidence overwhelmingly establishes the statutory requirements for actual physical control of a motor vehicle while under the influence.

Section 1201(a)(2) does not require the State to prove that a vehicle was fully operable for an actual physical control conviction.

State v. Garber · filed 1991-01-24(a)(2)

Conviction under § 1201 does not require a demonstration by the State that defendant’s vehicle was fully operable.

Section 1201(f)'s affirmative defense is unavailable when the evidence shows that the defendant operated the vehicle.

State v. Emmons · filed 2001-10-29(f)

Assuming § 1201(f) applies in a prosecution charging actual physical control, defendant must still meet the elements of the defense. Under the second element, if the proffered evidence shows that defendant did in fact operate the vehicle, then he is not entitled to present the defense to the jury.

Section 1201(f) provides an affirmative defense to operating while intoxicated, and a defendant must make a prima facie showing on its elements to receive a jury instruction.

State v. Leopold · filed 2005-08-02(f)

Section 1201(f) provides an affirmative defense that excuses the offense of operating a vehicle while intoxicated under certain factual circumstances. Because the section specifies that it provides an affirmative defense, the defendant bears the burden of establishing a prima facie case on the statutory elements. Appellant here did not present sufficient evidence to establish such a prima facie case, and therefore we affirm the trial court’s refusal to instruct the jury on the defense.

Jury instructions and a verdict form can adequately present § 1201(g)'s affirmative defense.

State v. Alzaga · filed 2019-10-04(g)

We conclude that the instructions and the form accurately reflected the law and provided the jury with sufficient information about how to make findings on defendant’s affirmative defense.

Section 1201(b) punishes refusal to take a breath test whether the refusal is verbal or nonverbal.

State v. Morale · filed 2002-09-06(b)

Indeed, 23 V.S.A. § 1201(b) punishes the refusal itself, whether it comes in the form of a verbal refusal, a head nod, or a sign indicating that the suspect refuses to take the test.

Section 1201(b)’s reasonable-request element depends on whether the officer had reasonable grounds to suspect impaired driving; the clarity of the breath-test warning does not affect it.

State v. Coburn · filed 2006-04-14(b)

The clarity or lack of clarity in the warning has no bearing on whether the police officer’s request for a breath test was reasonable. Rather, that factor turns solely on whether the officer had reasonable grounds to believe the suspect was intoxicated while operating or attempting to operate a motor vehicle, such that DUI processing should be initiated.

Section 1201(b) makes refusal of an evidentiary test an offense when a person previously convicted under § 1201 operates a vehicle on a highway, refuses an officer’s reasonable request for a test, and the officer has reasonable grounds to believe the person violated § 1201(a).

State v. Bresland · filed 2012-09-06(b)

The elements of the offense for which defendant was charged in count two are that: (1) she was previously convicted for a violation of 23 V.S.A. § 1201; (2) she was operating, attempting to operate, or in actual physical control of a vehicle on a highway; (3) she refused a law enforcement officer’s reasonable request under the circumstances for an evidentiary test; and (4) the officer had reasonable grounds to believe the person was in violation of § 1201(a). The officer’s affidavit provided a factual basis on each of the elements.

Section 1201(b) makes it a crime for an operator previously convicted of DUI to refuse a reasonable request for an evidentiary test, including a blood test when breath-testing equipment is not reasonably available.

State v. Dubuque · filed 2013-01-18(b)

Consequently, in those circumstances, a refusal to give a blood sample constitutes refusal to take a test under 23 V.S.A. § 1201(b). That section states that an operator who has previously been convicted of DUI and who refuses a “reasonable request” to submit to an evidentiary test commits a crime.

A prior DUI conviction that makes refusal of an evidentiary test criminal under § 1201(b) may also be used to enhance the penalty for that refusal.

State v. Wainwright, State v. Wilder · filed 2013-12-20(b)

We reverse, and conclude that the plain language of the statute allows the same prior DUI conviction to be used both as an element of criminal refusal and to enhance the penalty for the refusal.

Section 1201(b) requires reasonable grounds akin to probable cause for an evidentiary test request; the officer need not rule out every possibility that the driver drank after operating.

State v. Perley · filed 2015-08-14(b)

We agree with defendant that the term “reasonable grounds” is akin to probable cause. ... In any event, as the trial court stated, the officer did not need to exclude all hypothetical possibilities in order to have reasonable grounds to believe that defendant had been operating under the influence.

Under § 1201(b), an officer has reasonable grounds to believe a driver violated the DUI law when the officer has probable cause, assessed from the totality of the circumstances.

State v. Schapp · filed 2019-05-17(b)

Reasonable grounds as used in this section equates to probable cause, which requires that “the facts and circumstances known to an officer are sufficient to lead a reasonable person to believe that a crime was committed and that the suspect committed it.”

Section 1201(b) permits a jury to find reasonable grounds for an evidentiary test from evidence of alcohol odor, slurred speech, bloodshot eyes, a beer can, and poor performance on a field sobriety test.

In Re Thomas Keeler · filed 2022-10-14(b)

This conclusion is supported by the evidence, which included the trooper’s testimony that petitioner smelled of alcohol, was slurring his speech, and had bloodshot and watery eyes; the trooper’s observation of a beer can behind petitioner’s seat; and the trooper’s description of petitioner’s very poor performance on the walk-and-turn test, which was corroborated by a cruiser video shown to the jury. This evidence was more than sufficient for the jury to conclude that the trooper had reasonable grounds to request an evidentiary test from petitioner.

Section 1201(a)(2) covers operation of a boom lift because it is a motor vehicle under the statutory definition.

State v. Smith · filed 2011-07-28(a)(2)

We need go no further than the plain meaning to hold that a boom lift is a vehicle for purposes of 23 V.S.A. § 1201(a)(2) and § 1205(a).